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Recently, there has been strong interest among economists in the impact of social
and cultural factors on economic outcomes. For instance, concepts like culture, social
capital or social attitudes have been used to explain several individual and group
outcomes such as labor supply, health, ﬁnancial development or economic growth.
In this spirit, in this thesis, I explore diﬀerences in individuals’ attitudes, their
determinants, and their potential to explain individual behavior.
The following are some of the ﬁndings. Personal and demographic character-
istics, especially education, inﬂuence attitudes towards the peace process in the
Palestinian-Israeli conﬂict (Chapter 1). Trust inﬂuences the type of child care that
mothers use, and this has an eﬀect on female labor supply. Since trust diﬀers across
European countries, it may explain diﬀerences in female labor supply (Chapter 2).
Trust also inﬂuences individuals’ investment decisions; individuals with less trust
tend to invest more in housing and less in ﬁnancial assets (Chapter 3). Trust and
attitudes towards reciprocity aﬀect individuals’ civic engagement diﬀerently. People
with more trust participate more through existing formal institutions. People with
high levels of reciprocity also tend to participate more, but if their levels of trust
are not so high, they may choose a more informal (less traditional) way of doing it
(Chapter 4).
Good measurement of the latent variables (like trust or attitudes towards recon-
ciliation and concessions) is crucial for understanding the eﬀects of individual unob-
servable traits such as attitudes on observable outcomes, or the eﬀects of observable
personal and demographic characteristics on the formation of those attitudes. It also
helps overcome the critique sometimes directed at the applied behavioral economics
literature that some researchers make claims that go beyond what the statistical
results justify. Therefore, one of the goals of this thesis is to use a rigorous measure
of these latent variables. To achieve this, I estimate attitudes and the eﬀects of
1




the individuals’ latent traits on speciﬁc outcomes using a hierarchical item response
model.
Item response theory models
Item response theory (IRT) models have been widely used in psychometrics to
measure latent traits like ability, trust or other attitudes using test results or survey
outcomes. They allow to obtain quantitative measures of these concepts using all
the available information, permit the measurement of several dimensions of the
latent attribute, and do not require imposing excessive parametric assumptions.
Conﬁrmatory factor analysis has been used for the same purposes as IRT models.
The main advantage of IRT models compared to factor analysis is that they deal
with discrete outcomes in a more straightforward way. As many answers to survey
questions are discrete, IRT models are particularly useful in this context. When
using such information, IRT models are thus a very useful tool for economists.
Since the measurement of latent attributes is central to the thesis, it is worth to
brieﬂy outline the main assumptions commonly used in the IRT literature.
Unidimensionality. An important assumption in IRT is that the questions used
(called “items”) should measure only one latent variable (ability, personality trait or
attitude). Only if this assumption is fulﬁlled is it possible to use the item responses
to make statements about the trait level of each person.
Local Independence. This assumption implies that the responses to the items
are stochastically independent of each other given the individual’s latent trait. This
implies that the correlation between two items can only be attributed to the latent
trait.
Monotonicity. The probability of a certain item response is a monotonic function
of an individual’s latent trait. This implies that individuals with higher levels of the
latent trait are more likely to choose higher answers (or lower answers, depending
on the coding of the questions).
Another important assumption has to do with the relation between the indi-
vidual’s latent trait and the item response probabilities. This relation is expressed
by means of the item response function (IRF). The probability of giving an an-
swer of r or smaller to a speciﬁc item R as a function of the latent trait a is
Pr(R ≤ r|A = a) = Gr(a), where Gr(a) is the IRF associated to answer r. The




choice of Gr(a) diﬀers among diﬀerent types of item response models. In this the-
sis, these functions are modeled as in Spady (2007, Semiparametric methods for
the measurement of latent attitudes and the estimation of their behavioural conse-
quences), using the distribution function corresponding to an exponential tilting of
second degree of the uniform density. Although parametric assumptions are needed
for identiﬁcation, this approach is much more ﬂexible than traditional ones that use
functions such as the logistic function or the normal cdf. Another advantage of the
approach is that it allows exploiting information about the distribution of the latent
variable from personal and demographic characteristics.
The resulting measure of the latent trait (trust, reciprocity or attitudes towards
concessions or reconciliation) takes into account several dimensions of the latent
concept, exploits personal information that may be informative and is conceptually
cleaner than the distant proxies or demographic characteristics often used in previous
work.
Overview of the thesis
The ﬁrst paper explores the formation of Palestinians’ attitudes towards a peace
process with a particular focus on the role of education. Understanding the factors
that shape attitudes towards peace is important in order to be successful in nego-
tiations or in implementing a peace agreement. In particular, there is disagreement
about the role of education. While some authors have linked violent and extreme
positions to ignorance and to low market opportunities, others have found that ed-
ucation is positively correlated with being a member of a terrorist group. To better
understand the role of education I propose to decompose the attitudes towards peace
into two dimensions; attitudes towards reconciliation and attitudes towards conces-
sions. This multidimensional construct provides new meaningful insights about the
role of education in the two dimensions.
The results of the paper indicate that education is positively related to attitudes
towards concessions but negatively to attitudes towards reconciliation. This negative
relationship has been strengthening over the years in the sample (2001-2006). What
possibly drives the negative eﬀect of education on attitudes towards reconciliation is
a higher level of frustration for more educated individuals due to low labor market
opportunities. This is consistent with the result that attitudes towards reconciliation
of individuals with high education closely follow the evolution of the overall economic




situation, while speciﬁc regional factors (construction of the Wall) inﬂuence attitudes
towards reconciliation for individuals with low education only.
The evidence presented in the second chapter suggests that trust matters for
mothers’ choice of child care technology. In extension, it may also aﬀect their deci-
sion to participate in the labor market. Labor force participation diﬀers signiﬁcantly
across countries, particularly for women. There is a large literature trying to under-
stand which factors drive labor force participation of prime-age women, and what
can explain diﬀerences across countries. Recent papers have considered the possi-
bility of heterogeneity in preferences, introducing elements like culture, beliefs, or
the degree of religiosity in explaining women’s participation and fertility decisions.
Since I show that there are large diﬀerences in trust across countries, trust is a
candidate explanation for diﬀerences in the use of formal child care and in female
participation rates across countries. This chapter provides empirical evidence for
this hypothesis using data for married women with children younger than 12 from
26 European countries.
In chapter 3 I test the hypothesis that trust inﬂuences households’ investment
in housing, using data for Spain. For most households, real estate is the main
portfolio component, while only a small percentage of households own a signiﬁcant
amount of risky assets. This pattern is particularly pronounced in Spain. Trust has
already been shown to matter for households’ portfolio choice by aﬀecting expected
returns from risky investments. Less trustful individuals expect lower returns and
hold less risky assets. Such a mechanism could aﬀect housing as an important
portfolio component. Using data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and from
the Survey of Household Finances (EFF) conducted by the Bank of Spain, I show
that households with less trust invest less in ﬁnancial assets and more in housing.
Trust also aﬀects the share of wealth invested in risky assets positively.
In the last chapter, I study the eﬀect of an individual’s level of social capital
on diﬀerent measures of individual civic engagement, classiﬁed by their degree of
formality. There is a public debate about the participation of individuals in the
development of civil society. While participation in some traditional associations
(like political parties) has declined in many European countries, aﬃnity and com-
mitment to new social movements remains fairly constant. Although the idea that
social capital enhances civic and political participation is commonly spread, there




is not much robust evidence on the relationship between the components of social
capital (such as trust or reciprocity) and individuals’ democratic attitudes and civic
participation. In this paper I use agents’ attitudes towards trust, and norms and
values of reciprocity as a measure of social capital. The analysis is performed using
data for Germany, which constitutes a good unit of analysis because of its diﬀer-
ences in the past political experiences, that have given rise to diﬀerences in the
composition of social capital. I ﬁnd that although both components of social capital
are associated with civic engagement, their importance diﬀers depending on how it
is exercised. Individuals with more trust in others and in institutions choose more
institutional ways of participating. People with high levels of reciprocity will also
tend to participate more but if their levels of trust are low, they may choose a more
informal (less traditional) way of doing so.
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Could education promote the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process?
Abstract. This paper explores Palestinians’ attitudes towards a peace process and
their determinants, with a particular focus on the role of education. Understanding
the factors that shape attitudes towards peace is important in order to be successful
in negotiations or in implementing a peace agreement. In the literature, there is par-
ticular disagreement about the role of education. While some authors have linked
violent and extreme positions to ignorance and to low market opportunities, others
have found that education is positively correlated with being a member of a terrorist
group. To better understand the role of education I decompose the attitudes towards
peace into two dimensions; attitudes towards reconciliation and attitudes towards
concessions. To measure these attitudes, I use a ﬂexible item response model pro-
posed by Spady (2007), which allows to take into account the multidimensionality
of the concepts. The results show that education has a positive eﬀect on attitudes
towards concessions but a negative eﬀect on attitudes towards reconciliation. This
may occur because relative to a situation of peace, highly educated individuals are
more strongly aﬀected by current depressed economic conditions in Palestine. They
therefore have more to gain from a peace agreement and may thus be more willing
to make concessions. At the same time, they may be more frustrated and therefore
less willing to reconcile. I also ﬁnd that their attitudes to reconciliation move closely
with aggregate economic conditions, while those of less educated individual are also
inﬂuenced by local factors such as the construction of the separation barrier in their
region of residence.
Keywords. conﬂict resolution, education, latent attitudes, item response models.
JEL Classification. I20, O15, O53.
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1.1. Introduction
The Arab-Israeli conﬂict has been considered one of the most complex and
emotion-laden historical problems of the twentieth century. This dispute between
the State of Israel and the Palestinians living under Israeli occupation has played
a critical role not only in Middle East politics, but also at the world level (see
Freedman 1979).
Repeatedly, a two state solution has been proposed, consisting in an independent
Palestinian state next to the state of Israel. Several eﬀorts at negotiating such a
solution have taken place and failed. According to many polls, large majorities of
Israelis and Palestinians would also favor a two state solution.1 Despite this basic
agreement, there are signiﬁcant areas of disagreement about what constitutes an
acceptable solution. First, not all Palestinians and Israelis agree on the concessions
they are willing to make in order to reach a peace agreement. Second, there is a
problem of credibility; even if a peace agreement is reached, reconciliation between
the two societies does not seem easy and therefore each side fears that the other
might not keep the basic commitments. As a consequence, the conﬂict has been
going on for many years and the level of violence has been increasing.
The goal of this paper is to analyze Palestinians’ attitudes towards a peace
process, with a particular focus on how these attitudes vary with personal and de-
mographic characteristics. Attitudes matter. As Jaeger, Klor, Miaari and Paserman
(2008) write, “These conﬂicts, [like the Israeli-Palestinian one,] in which a limited
number of fatalities are used to aﬀect negotiations, demoralize the civilian popula-
tion, or strategically incapacitate the opponent, are largely psychological.” Within
Palestinian society, there are a variety of views and opinions. Understanding the
factors that shape the attitudes of individual Palestinians is important because it
can help to identify some important elements for a successful peace process. Re-
cently, there have been some attempts to study the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict from
this point of view; e.g. Nachtwey and Tessler (2002), Jasso and Meyersson (2004),
Friedman (2005) and Jaeger et al. (2008).
While exploring the determinants of Palestinians’ attitudes to the conﬂict more
generally, this paper focusses in particular on the role played by education. Often,
violent and extreme positions are attributed to ignorance and to low market oppor-
tunities. Berman and Laitin (2005) for instance use a ‘club good’ model to explain
the function of voluntary religious organizations as providers of terrorism, where ter-
rorism is seen as a local public good. A possible interpretation of this model is that
1See results from surveys conducted by the Palestinian Survey Research for the Palestinians
and Harry S. Truman Centre for the Israelis.
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poverty breeds terrorism as it lowers the outside options of club members. This link
can also be found in the work by Bueno de Mesquita (2005), Bueno de Mesquita
and Dickson (2007) and Jaeger et al. (2008). In contrast to this, Abadie (2006),
Krueger and Maleckova (2003) and Berrebi (2007) ﬁnd that suicide attackers and
participants in violent groups tend to have higher education and living standards
above the poverty line. Similarly, using a unique data set detailing the biographies
of Palestinian suicide bombers, Benmelech and Berrebi (2007) estimate the returns
to human capital in suicide bombing and ﬁnd that older and more educated suicide
bombers are assigned to more important targets and perform better (more casualties
and lower probability of failure).
Because the relation between education and political violence is disputed, it
is important to analyze its role for attitudes towards a peace process. In this, it
is important to clearly distinguish income from education, and personal or family
income from GDP per capita or the overall economic situation. While education may
drive expected or potential income, this can be quite diﬀerent from actual income.
Indeed, given the currently very depressed returns to education Palestine (shown in
Section 1.2.1), education conditional on current income is more likely a measure of
an individual’s current economic losses from the conﬂict. Therefore, education and
income should not be expected to have similar eﬀects.
For instance, as argued in Section 1.3, if the earnings of educated individuals are
more depressed relative to a situation of peace, then they may be more willing to
make concessions to reach a peace agreement. At the same time, they may be more
frustrated due to past losses and therefore less willing to reconcile. In contrast, it
is not clear how current income conditional on education would evolve with a peace
agreement; individuals may well all have similar expectations. Similarly, a change
in the overall economic situation may aﬀect attitudes diﬀerently from a change of
an individual’s situation relative to other Palestinians. One important contribution
of the paper is to pay careful attention to these issues.
The other main contribution of the paper lies in the measurement of the at-
titudes. I deﬁne attitudes towards a peace process as consisting of two compo-
nents: attitudes towards ‘chances for reconciliation and lasting peace in a scenario
of successful negotiations’ and attitudes ‘on positions expressed and concessions
discussed in the negotiations.’ I develop a new measure of such attitudes, argu-
ing that opinions of individuals about certain aspects of conﬂict resolution reﬂect
their attitudes in these dimensions. Applying a new methodology by Spady (2007),
I measure attitudes towards reconciliation and towards concessions as latent atti-
tudes at the individual level. The data used is a series of item responses concerning
El-Attar Vilalta, Mayssun (2010), Identification and Estimation of Latent Variables and their Effect on Social and Economic Outcomes 
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attitudes towards reconciliation and towards concessions from some of the surveys
realized by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). This data
is particularly useful because questions are very precise and allow distinguishing be-
tween attitudes towards reconciliation and towards concessions. I have information
about attitudes towards reconciliation for the period 2001-2006 and about attitudes
towards concessions for 2003-2006. Assuming that respondents’ answers have been
determined by their attitudes in these dimensions, the attitudes of individuals mak-
ing up the sample population can then be given probability distributions, based
on their item responses and personal characteristics. From these probability dis-
tributions I can infer the relation between individuals’ economic and demographic
characteristics and their attitudes.
The measure I propose allows for the multidimensionality of attitudes to peace
(involving attitudes both towards reconciliation and towards concessions) and takes
into account various facets of each of the dimensions. It thus goes beyond the
use of a single, speciﬁc question, capturing only a single aspect of a particular
dimension, as often seen in the literature (e.g. Jaeger et al. (2008)). This is important
because a measure of a broad concept such as attitudes towards a peace process
arguably improves if it can span several dimensions. In our analysis we use six
items (questions) for the reconciliation scale and six for the concessions scale. Each
of the items can be seen as reﬂecting a diﬀerent dimension of the concept.
The results of the paper indicate that I) There are theoretical reasons for con-
sidering attitudes towards peace as composed of two distinct dimensions; attitudes
towards reconciliation and attitudes towards concessions. This multidimensional
construct provides new meaningful insights about the role of education. II) Edu-
cation is positively related to attitudes towards concessions. III) In contrast to the
results on concessions, education has a negative eﬀect on attitudes towards recon-
ciliation. This negative eﬀect has been strengthening over the years in the sample
(2001-2006). IV) What possibly drives the negative eﬀect of education on attitudes
towards reconciliation is a higher level of frustration for more educated individuals
due to the low labor market opportunities. V) Attitudes towards reconciliation of
individuals with high education closely follow the evolution of the overall economic
situation. VI) Speciﬁc regional factors (construction of the Wall) inﬂuence attitudes
towards reconciliation for individuals with low education only.
These ﬁndings also show that allowing for attitudes to peace to have more than
one dimension is important for understanding the problems faced, as shown in par-
ticular by the diﬀerent eﬀect of education in diﬀerent dimensions. Willingness to
El-Attar Vilalta, Mayssun (2010), Identification and Estimation of Latent Variables and their Effect on Social and Economic Outcomes 
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make concessions is a necessary condition to establish peace in a ﬁrst stage. Rec-
onciliation is also very important. Several authors (e.g. Kulle and Hamber (2000))
have emphasized that a lack of forgiveness may threaten the peace peace processes
in the long run. Bar-Tal (2000) notices that there is not so much attention to the
attitudes towards reconciliation. Reconciliation based on mutual trust and accep-
tance. In this paper we try to capture these several dimensions, for that, Spady’s
(2007) estimator has proven very useful.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 revises brieﬂy the pre-
vious evidence on the relationship between individuals’ attitudes and the conﬂict.
Section 1.3 presents a simple theoretical argument for treating attitudes towards
peace as a composite of two dimensions. This argument will also guide the estima-
tion. In Section 1.4 I describe the methodology used to obtain the measure of the
attitudes. In Section 4.4 I present the data used, and I describe the questionnaire
items and the personal and demographic characteristics of the respondents that play
a role in the estimation of the latent attitudes. In Section 1.6 I obtain the measure
of attitudes towards concessions and towards reconciliation and analyze their deter-
minants and their correlation with economic trends. I also investigate the channel
through which the events of the conﬂict can shape attitudes. Finally, Section 4.7
concludes.
1.2. Previous evidence on the relationship between individuals’
attitudes and the conﬂict
The Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict has generated a considerable amount of social re-
search. Most of this research implicitly assumes that the conﬂict shapes individuals’
attitudes, and that these attitudes have an eﬀect on individuals’ behavior. Eckstein
and Tsiddon (2004) for instance argue that in the presence of terrorist activity, indi-
viduals value the future less relative to the present. They show that these changes in
individuals’ preferences inﬂuence macroeconomic aggregates. Concretely, they lead
to lower investment and lower income and consumption in the long run.
Zussman and Zussman (2006) evaluate the net eﬀect of the Israeli countert-
errorism policy on attitudes and on the economy. They argue that assassinating
members of Palestinian terrorist organizations can be counterproductive if it in-
creases Palestinians’ motivation for future attacks. Their idea is that it is possible
to ﬁnd moral objections to this type of policy, and these moral objections can aﬀect
Palestinians’ attitudes and therefore increase retaliation. To evaluate the eﬀect of
this policy, they exploit the forward-looking and information-aggregating nature of
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asset markets. Using reactions of the Israeli stock market to news of counterterror-
ism operations, they ﬁnd that assassinations of low-ranked members of Palestinian
terrorist organizations are perceived as counterproductive. The opposite is true for
assassinations of senior leaders.
Berrebi and Klor (2006, 2007) argue that terror attacks aﬀect Israeli public opin-
ion, which in turn has an eﬀect on election outcomes. To study the relation between
Palestinian militant groups and the Israeli political system they present a theoretical
model where Palestinians commit terror attacks and Israelis elect governments. The
model predicts that support for Israel’s right-wing party increases after periods of
severe terrorism, and that the expected level of terrorism is higher when a left-wing
party is in power. They show empirical evidence that supports these results.
The work of Jaeger and Paserman (2006, 2007) focuses on trying to explain
the dynamics of the violence. They ﬁnd that Israel reacts in a predictable way to
Palestinian attacks, while Palestinian actions do not appear to be related to Israeli
violence. Their conclusion is that a cessation of Palestine violence against Israel
may lead to an overall reduction in the level of violence. This result suggests that
it is essential to understand the factors that shape Palestinians’ attitudes towards
peace and towards the resolution of the conﬂict.
However, Palestinians’ attitudes have not been studied very much. Nachtwey and
Tessler (2002) notice that “Only a small portion of this research [on the Palestinian-
Israeli conﬂict] has explored the determinants of popular attitudes towards the con-
ﬂict, however, the factors that shape Palestinian public opinion have been partic-
ularly neglected.” They study the degree to which economic expectations change
individuals’ attitudes towards peace. Recently there have been some other attempts
to study the conﬂict from this point of view. Jasso and Meyersson (2004) study the
eﬀects of identity and social distance on support for key provisions of the Roadmap,
and Friedman (2005) studies the determinants of Palestinians’ attitudes towards
diplomacy and attacks. Similar to Nachtwey and Tessler (2002) they ﬁnd that the
economic impact of future peace exerts a positive eﬀect but that individuals’ current
economic situation plays only a modest role. Jaeger et al. (2008) study how violence
in the Second Intifada inﬂuences public opinion. They ﬁnd evidence that Israeli
violence against Palestinians temporary leads to more support for radical factions
and to more radical attitudes towards the conﬂict.
An area where important advances are possible is the measurement of individu-
als’ attitudes. Clearly, concepts like attitudes towards peace, towards reconciliation
or towards violence are inherently diﬃcult to measure. Using only one question
(e.g. ‘what party do you support?’ or ‘Do you think that lasting peace with Israel
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is possible?’) is restrictive. It is diﬃcult to believe that these partial measures are
suﬃcient for capturing wider concepts like attitudes towards peace. The approach
I use overcomes these limitations by incorporating more than one dimension of the
attitudes towards peace, and by measuring each dimension using responses to more
than one question.
Contentwise, an important question that this paper tackles concerns the link
between attitudes and education. This issue is intimately linked to some important
features of the Palestinian labor market.
1.2.1. Labor market and returns to schooling
The Palestinian economy is characterized by a labor market that is completely
dependent on the Israeli market, and strongly inﬂuenced by political and social
events. Palestinian unemployment and domestic wage respond to job opportunities
and wages in Israel. Angrist (1995) analyzes the Palestinian labor market over the
period 1981-1987 and ﬁnds that over that period, the unemployment rate of col-
lege graduates increased strongly, while returns to education declined substantially.
The college premium fell from was 40% at the beginning of the period to 20% be-
tween 1984 and 1987. Angrist (1995) shows that changes in labor supply explain
an important part of this development. The number of Palestinian college grad-
uates increased sharply following the opening of Palestinian institutions of higher
education, which had been totally absent before 1972.
Sayre (2001a) studies the same period and stresses some demand factors that
also explain part of the dramatic changes in returns to schooling. He argues that
the reduction of demand for skilled Palestinian workers by the Arab Gulf countries,
the increase in demand for unskilled Palestinian workers in Israel and changes in
labor demand coming from changes in the volume of international trade can explain
part of the changes observed during this period. Using a slightly diﬀerent empirical
approach, Sayre (2001b) ﬁnds that while supply changes could still account for
most of the decrease in returns to schooling, demand shocks could explain as much
as one-third of the change in the returns to a college. For similar reasons, the
return to college remained low in the period 1995-2001 (Sayre and Miller 2004).
Unemployment and wages in the Palestinian Territories continue to depend on the
Israeli economy and are driven by closures, job permits, changes in the demand of
low skilled workers, etc.
Angrist (1995) and Sayre (2001a) also link the bad labor market prospects for
educated Palestinians from 1981 to 1988 to the uprising of the ﬁrst Intifada. Sayre
and Miller (2004) link the similar situation experienced by the Palestinian economy
during 1995-2001 to the uprising of the second Intifada.
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Although recently some papers have analyzed the eﬀects of conﬂict and in par-
ticular border closures with Israel on the Palestinian economy and in particular the
labor market (see Bulmer (2003), Miaari and Sauer (2006) or Maio and Nando)
none of these studies report returns to schooling for the period under analysis
in this paper (2001-2006). But economic conditions have worsened since 2000.
Despite other factors that may aﬀect the Palestinian economy, the World Bank
(2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008) repeatedly reported that the closures and restrictions
on movements related to Israeli security concern have harmed the Palestinian econ-
omy and increased unemployment and poverty. Figure 1.1 shows rough estimates
of the college premium in the Palestinian territories for the period under analysis.
This ﬁgure shows that the college premium during this period has gone from 16%
to 30%. This is much lower than the college premium in the U.S., which is around
60% in this period (Goldin and Katz 2007).
This literature suggests that the depressed opportunities faced by highly edu-
cated Palestinians could shape their attitudes towards the peace process. The next
section sets out a simple model showing which relationships we could expect.
1.3. Education and willingness to make concessions and to reconcile
Suppose that Palestinians value consumption and derive value from their re-
lationships with Israelis. These valuations govern their attitudes towards making
concessions and towards reconciliation. Assume that the peace process has two
stages. In a ﬁrst stage, Palestinians and Israelis have to reach an oﬃcial settlement
or resolution and stop direct violence. Success depends on a negotiation process and
on individuals’ attitudes towards concessions on both sides. The second stage of the
peace process consists in a normalization of the relationship between Palestinians
and Israelis. This stage involves reconciliation and psycho/social healing. (these
stages are also described in Gawerc (2006)).
Suppose that in the ﬁrst stage of the conﬂict, Palestinians have the choice of how
many concessions to make. Denote the choice of concessions by s ∈ R
+
0 . Making
concessions may lead to a peace agreement with Israel, with the probability p of an
agreement increasing in the amount of concessions made. However, the “marginal
product” of concessions in increasing the probability of an agreement is decreasing
and goes to zero in the limit (p0 > 0, p00 < 0, 0 ≤ p(0) < 1, lims→∞ p(s) ≤ 1). As
a consequence, there is no ﬁnite amount of concessions that leads to an agreement
with probability 1.
Individual Palestinians expect income of w(e) after a peace agreement, which
increases with the individual’s education e. They currently earn ¯ w. Reﬂecting
El-Attar Vilalta, Mayssun (2010), Identification and Estimation of Latent Variables and their Effect on Social and Economic Outcomes 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/182671.3. EDUCATION AND WILLINGNESS TO MAKE CONCESSIONS AND TO RECONCILE 15
the evidence discussed above, current income and returns to education are both
depressed (¯ w < w(e), ¯ w0(e) = 0 for all e). For simplicity, current returns to education
are set to zero.
Whereas making concessions could raise future incomes, it also has a psycho-
logical (and possibly also a real) cost ci per unit of concessions. This diﬀers across
individuals. It may depend on demographics, but also vary in unobserved ways.
While in principle, the cost could vary systematically with education, we abstract
from this. Individuals then choose their optimal level of concessions by choosing s
to maximize the objective function p(s)w(e) + (1 − p(s))¯ w − cis.2 The optimal s is
the theoretical counterpart to the willingness to concede we measure in the data.
The optimal amount of concessions, if interior, then satisﬁes p0(s)[w(e) − ¯ w] = ci.
Because p0 > 0, p00 < 0, w0 > 0 and w(e) > ¯ w, the optimal s increases in education
and decreases in the cost of concessions. More educated individuals have more to
gain from concessions, so they are willing to invest more.
Palestinians also value the quality of the relationships they have with people
around them. This includes Israelis, and this allows for an analysis of the willingness
to reconcile. Reconciliation requires eﬀort, but has beneﬁts in terms of improving
the quality of relationships, and possibly also has economic beneﬁts. Denote these
beneﬁts by R(r;e), where r denotes eﬀorts to reconcile. The beneﬁts depend on
education because economic beneﬁts of reconciliation are likely to vary with educa-
tion. Assume that the marginal product of eﬀorts at reconciliation, R0, is positive
but decreasing (R0(·,e) > 0,R00(·,e) < 0 for all e).
Engaging in reconciliation also has a psychological cost, as it may be hard to
reconcile with people if past experience with them was bad. This cost increases in
the level of frustration experienced due to the conﬂict. This psychological cost can
be seen as hate generated because Palestinians see Israel as responsible for their
miseries, roots of hatred in self-defense and vengeance. (Glaeser (2002) study the
formation of hate). The experimental literature on reciprocity (see Fehr and Schmidt
(2005)) conﬁrms that subjects forgo rewards if that allows them to punish people
who have behaved unfairly, particularly by rejecting unequal oﬀers in ultimatum
games. Concretely, as stated above, this hate and frustration may be linked to
the poor labor market conditions and therefore may vary with individuals’ level of
education. Model this by assuming that the cost of reconciliation eﬀort c(e) increases
in frustration due to the conﬂict, and that frustration is driven by the diﬀerence
between potential and actual wages. Then c(e) = f(w(e)− ¯ w),f0 > 0 and c0(e) > 0.
Individuals then set their optimal amount of reconciliation to maximize its beneﬁts
2If this was about actions, not attitudes, this would of course be a strategic game, where Israeli
actions also matter for payoﬀs.
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net of the psychological cost. This yields the optimality condition R0(r;e) = c(e).
Individuals engage in reconciliation up to the point where the marginal beneﬁt equals
the marginal cost. More educated individuals prefer a higher level of reconciliation
if the beneﬁts from it increase strongly enough with education. If beneﬁts do not
rise strongly with education, in contrast, more educated individuals prefer a lower
level of reconciliation, as reconciliation is costly for them because of the frustration
they have endured due to the depressed labor market conditions.
The link between attitudes towards reconciliation and the general economic losses
such as the impact of the conﬂict on employment opportunities and returns to
schooling has been suggested previously. Morrow 2000 argues that forgiveness and
reconciliation in the context of ethnopolitical conﬂict could be considered an issue
for society as a whole because personal injuries committed by the parties in conﬂict
are often understood as the grief not only of individuals but of whole communities.
1.4. Measuring individuals’ attitudes
1.4.1. The Item Response Model
In this section, I deﬁne a model for estimating the latent attitudes towards
a peace process. The model used in this paper is a hierarchical item response
model3 estimated following the approach proposed by Spady (2007). The model is
represented graphically in Figure 4.2.
From the considerations in the previous section, every individual has attitudes
towards concessions and towards reconciliation that depend on the potential payoﬀs
and costs they face. That is, the optimal s implies an attitude towards concessions
AC and the optimal r an attitude towards reconciliation AR. Together, these atti-
tudes constitute the individual’s predisposition towards a peace process. They also
cause responses to survey questions on the issue. Finally, they also underlie agents’
behavior; e.g. their political decisions or their propensity to engage in violence. The
analysis of the impact of the attitudes on actions is left for future research.
From the model, education and other factors that systematically aﬀect costs and
payoﬀs aﬀect the willingness to make concessions and the willingness to reconcile.
Solving the optimality conditions for the optimal choices then leads to the empirical
speciﬁcation
AC = hC(e,X,C) (1.1)
AR = hR(e,X,R) (1.2)
3See Steele and Goldstein (2007) for an overview of this type of item response models.
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where X is a vector of covariates that captures diﬀerences in individuals’ costs or
preferences. The empirical speciﬁcation thus reﬂects the idea that individual char-
acteristics and experiences as well as community characteristics can be related to
individuals’ attitudes towards reconciliation and towards concessions. It is also as-
sumed that these characteristics do not aﬀect the answers directly, but only through
their eﬀect on the attitudes.
Equations (1.1) and (1.2) constitute a structural model with the following under-
lying assumptions: (1) the expressions of agreement and disagreement on questions
about conﬂict resolution (‘item responses’) reﬂect corresponding attitudes of the
responder; (2) the ‘attitudes’ are enduring individual-speciﬁc attributes, given the
individual’s characteristics and environment; and (3) each one of the series of item
responses used is determined by a single attitude only (attitudes towards reconcili-
ation and attitudes towards concessions respectively).
The variables used to estimate the individual attitudes and those included in X
are discussed in Section 4.4. Before that, I describe how to obtain the likelihood
function used to measure the attitudes towards reconciliation and to obtain the
correlates with the individual personal characteristics. The likelihood function and
the estimation method used for the analysis of the attitudes towards concessions
is the same. It only diﬀers in the use of diﬀerent questions. I denote the items
used to construct the reconciliation scale as R and the items used to construct the
concessions scale as C.
1.4.2. Structural Representation




where A is univariate, Um ∼ U(0,1) and gm(·) is weakly increasing in U and strictly
increasing in A. It is also assumed that Ui ⊥ Uj ∀ i 6= j and Ui ⊥ A ∀ i which
implies that conditional on A the responses are independent (Ri ⊥ Rj|A).4
Personal characteristics may aﬀect the way this latent variable is distributed in
the population. We assume that individual characteristics, and particularly edu-
cation, may aﬀect the latent variable A, but do not aﬀect the measurements Rm
4These assumptions correspond to the standard assumption in item response theory (IRT);
unidimensionality (A is unidimensional), monotonicity (gm(A,Um) is strictly increasing in A) and
local independence. See (C.R) Rao and S Sinharay (2007) for a review of parametric IRT.
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directly. (They can of course aﬀect them via A.) Consider the linear case
A = h(X,) = Xβ + ε (1.3)
where ε ∼ N(0,1) and ε ⊥ X. Assume also that Um ⊥ ε and Um ⊥ X.
Denoting a realization of A by a, consider the following threshold representation
for a given response variable:
gm(a,um) =

     
     
1 if Q0(a) < um ≤ Q1(a)
2 if Q1(a) < um ≤ Q2(a)
3 if Q2(a) < um ≤ Q3(a)
4 if Q3(a) < um ≤ Q4(a)
where Qr(a), r = {1,2,3,4}, are thresholds functions for item m, and 0 = Q0(a) <
Q1(a) < Q2(a) < Q3(a) < Q4(a) = 1. Figure reff:BoxesExample shows the graph-
ical representation of the functions Qr(a). This ﬁgure shows that higher item re-
sponses are associated to higher values of a, i.e. if a2 > a1 then the item responses
of a2 population stochastically dominate a1. Thus, higher item responses are associ-
ated to higher values of a. This assumption implies that the lines that indicate the
probability of answering k or higher in item j given a have to be downward sloping.
Of course, they cannot cross if probabilities are to be non-negative.
The model is identiﬁed if the structure, together with the restrictions of the
model, delivers the distribution of observables:
S = {g(A,U),FU|A} ⇒ FR|A,
where FU|A denotes the cumulative distribution function of a random variable U
conditional on A. From the identiﬁcation result, the following equality follows:
FU|A(Qr(a)|A = a) = FR|A(r|A = a)
and because of the uniformity of the error term
Qr(a) = FR|A(r|A = a) = Pr(R ≤ r|A = a).
Qr(a) thus is a conditional cumulative distribution function.
The way of modeling Pr(R ≤ r|A = a) diﬀers among diﬀerent types of item
response models. In this paper these functions are modeled as in Spady (2007),
using the distribution function corresponding to an exponential tilting of second
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where the functions γ1(u) and γ2(u) are 2 basis functions, chosen to be (shifted)
Legendre polynomials and τ1 and τ2 are the parameters estimated. From Gr(a) we
obtain Qr(a) as Qr(a) = 1 − Gr(a).
To ensure that the lines do not cross, they are constructed as products of the
estimated distribution functions. Consider an item m with 4 possible answers, so
r = {1,2,3,4}, Q4(a) = 1 and Q0(a) = 0 by deﬁnition. Assume Q3(a), G2(a)
and G1(a) are distribution functions estimated as described above. Then Q2(a) =
[1 − G2(a)]Q3(a) and Q1(a) = [1 − G1(a)]Q2(a).5
To build the likelihood function, the conditional probability of a response r,
Pr(R = r|A = a), is obtained as
Pr(R = r|A = a) = Pr(R ≤ r|A = a) − Pr(R ≤ r − 1|A = a)
= Qr(a) − Qr−1(a)
To simplify notation, denote Pr(R = r|A = a) as p(r|a;τr).











Because of the assumption of conditional independence of the responses, it is possible
to express the likelihood function as a product of the conditional item probabilities.
β is a vector of parameters that indicates the eﬀect of X on the mean of A. τ
parameterizes the distribution Qr(a;τm,r) that enters p(·). With two-parameter
exponential tilting, it consists of elements τm,r = (τ1
m,r,τ2
m,r).
The integral in the likelihood function has no general closed form solution. The
integration is thus carried out using Gauss-Hermite quadrature at 200 grid points.
Quadrature methods approximate the integral as a weighted sum of function values






Gaussian quadrature rules choose not only the weights, but also the evaluation points
or abcissæ, and can achieve higher precision with a ﬁx number of points. To ensure
that we can take into account even distributions with small variance, Gaussian
quadrature has been applied to 5 diﬀerent segments of the grid, with the segment in
the middle having a higher concentration of points. A Newton-Raphson algorithm is
5This also implies that the stochastic dominance is strengthened to dominance in hazard order.
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used to maximize the log-likelihood function. Concretely, we use the BFGS method
which builds an approximation to the Hessian in the course of iteration. However,
analytic results are used to evaluate the Hessian after convergence in order to obtain
more accurate standard errors.6
1.4.3. Identiﬁcation
The model is deﬁned as the structure
S = {g(A,U),FU|A}
with
FU|A(Qr(a)|A = a) = FR|A(r|A = a)
and the restrictions described above: Um ∼ U(0,1), gm(·) is weakly increasing in
U and strictly increasing in A, Ui ⊥ A ∀i, Ui ⊥ Uj ∀i 6= j, f(a) is assumed to be
















R|A(r|A = a) 6= F 0
R|A(r|A = a).
Douglas (2001) shows that nonparametric item response models are only identi-
ﬁable in an asymptotic sense, i.e., when the number of items tends to inﬁnity. For





generated by the diﬀerent combinations of responses limits the values of the pa-
rameters to a unique set. If Qr(a) were modeled nonparametrically, the degrees of
freedom would be much greater than the number of constraints, considering that
the value of the function at each point may be viewed as a separate parameter and
the constraints derived from the manifest distributions are not suﬃcient to identify
Qr(a). The set up of this paper is parametric; Qr(a;τ) is modeled as a function of
two parameters. The model identiﬁes gm(·) if the estimates of the two parameters
τ are unique for each Qr(a;τ).
There are 46 − 1 = 4094 possible constraints in the model of attitudes towards
reconciliation, and 63 parameters to be estimated. As the degrees of freedom are
larger than the parameters to be estimated, the model identiﬁes the functions gm(·).
6For a general discussion about estimation procedures for multilevel generalized linear models
see Rodriguez (2008).
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The same is true for the model of attitudes towards concessions, where there are
37 − 1 = 2186 constraints and 55 parameters to be estimated.
1.5. Data
The data comes from the public opinion surveys designed and conducted by
the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR). This institution
conducted public opinion polls from 2000 to 2008, collecting information about atti-
tudes and values of a representative sample of Palestinians in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip, including East Jerusalem. The surveys used in this paper are the ones
that include exactly the same questions about attitudes towards reconciliation: De-
cember 2001 (poll #3), May 2002 (poll #4), April 2003 (poll #7), March 2005 (poll
#15) and December 2006 (poll #22). These surveys also include information about
personal and demographic characteristics. To measure attitudes towards concession
I use data for December 2003 (poll #10), December 2005 (poll #18), and December
2006 (poll #22). The only survey that contains information on both concessions
and reconciliation is the one for December 2006.
This data set is particularly useful because questions are very precise and allow
distinguishing between attitudes towards reconciliation and towards concessions.
The items reﬂecting attitudes towards reconciliation emphasize that the questions
refer to steps that the Palestinians could take once the state of Palestine was estab-
lished. The items reﬂecting attitudes towards concessions refer to key issues such as
ﬁnal borders, the status of Jerusalem, refugees, and the security arrangements that
have been recurrently brought up during peace negotiations (the Geneva Initiative,
the Clinton Parameters and the Taba Negotiations). This distinction is important
because the use of more general questions can lead to misleading conclusions. For
instance, measuring attitudes towards peace using the support for the continuation
of peace negotiations as in Abu Sada (1998) is problematic because individuals’ an-
swers are also aﬀected by other factors like their conﬁdence in the leaders involved
in the negotiations. The use of party identiﬁcation as a way to infer attitudes, as
used for example in Jaeger et al. (2008), can also lead to wrong conclusions since
other issues like a person’s degree of religiosity or the current ruling party’s level
of corruption can play a role. Hence, the precise wording of the questions in the
survey used here makes more precise measurement possible and makes the data set
particularly useful. The full wording of the questions/items used to estimate the
individuals’ latent attitudes is shown in the appendix.
Summary statistics of the responses to these items are presented in Table 1.1.
Items on reconciliation have four possible answers (scale from 1 to 4) and items on
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concessions have three possible answers (scale from 1 to 3). A higher score cor-
responds to a more positive attitude towards reconciliation or concessions. Even
among the items referring to one attitude, answering behavior varies over these
items. Considering for instance the question ”Would you support to adopt a school
curriculum in the Palestinian state that recognizes Israel and teaches school children
not to demand the return of all Palestine to the Palestinians?” and the question ”In
case of a two state solution, would you support to open borders to free movement of
people and goods?”, the mean answer diﬀers strongly, at 1.71 for the ﬁrst question
and 3.04 for the second. This indicates that diﬀerent items carry information on
respondents’ attitudes to a varying degree, or capture diﬀerent aspects. Thus, by
focussing on just one questions, or on a narrow subset of questions, valuable infor-
mation may be lost. This is also indicated by the pairwise correlation coeﬃcients
for the items shown in Table 1.2; correlations are positive but far from perfect.
The theoretical model suggests that some demographic variables are informative
about the individual attitudes. Therefore, they are also used in the estimation. A
descriptive analysis of these variables is shown in Table 1.3. This table shows an
increase in the percentage of individuals with high levels of education and with a
high degree of religiosity. The theoretical justiﬁcation for the inclusion of personal
and demographics characteristics in the estimation is the following:
Education. As seen above, the role of education in shaping attitudes towards a
peace process is not well understood in the existing literature. The goal of this paper
is to shed some light on the connection of education with Palestinians’ attitudes.
To measure education I use three dummy variables: Low education (elementary
education or less), medium education (preparatory or secondary education) and
and high education (college or more).
Religion: personal piety. Tessler and Nachtway (1998) state that “the theo-
retical linkage between religion and international politics is based on the assumption
that religion plays a crucial role in shaping both the normative orientation of indi-
viduals and their understanding of the surrounding world.” They ﬁnd that diﬀerent
dimensions of religiosity have diﬀerent eﬀects on individuals’ attitudes towards poli-
tics or towards international conﬂicts. They ﬁnd that support for political Islam and
religious activism have a strong eﬀect on an individual’s political views, while per-
sonal piety is unrelated to those views. Unfortunately, I am not able to distinguish
between these two dimensions of religiosity. The surveys only contain information on
the degree of personal piety. The measure of personal piety used are three dummy
variables based on the answer to the following question: “How often do you pray?
1) every day, 2) only on Friday or occasionally, 3) rarely or never.”
El-Attar Vilalta, Mayssun (2010), Identification and Estimation of Latent Variables and their Effect on Social and Economic Outcomes 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/182671.5. DATA 23
Economic determinants: household income/family size. The relation be-
tween individuals’ current economic situation and their attitudes is a priori ambigu-
ous. It could be that individuals who are currently doing well believe that this will
allow them to beneﬁt more from economic opportunities arising with peace. It may,
however, also motivate them to avoid change, and pit them against an agreement,
whereas the poor might support it in the hope of an improvement in their situation,
and because they have little to lose. On the other hand, they may be frustrated due
to their economic situation, and not believe in the beneﬁts of an agreement. In this
sense, Nachtwey and Tessler (2002) ﬁnd that currently unsatisﬁed individuals tend
to be against an agreement. In addition, there is some new evidence ﬁnding little
relationship between hate crimes in general and economic conditions.7 It is possible
that this relationship (or its absence) also holds for attitudes towards reconciliation.
We measure household income using three dummies: Low Income (monthly in-
come per person in the household ≤ 125$), medium income (income per person
between 125 and 450$) and high income (income per person > 450$).
Age. Since attitudes might change over the life cycle due to personal experience
but also due to national and global developments, the age of respondents can be
informative.8
Working for the Public Sector. The public sector continues to be an impor-
tant source of employment in Palestine. In 2003, public sector employment (by the
Palestinian Authorithy and by municipalities) accounted for an estimated 26 percent
of total employment in the West Bank and Gaza. For many young men coming from
poor families this is the only route of social mobility. Therefore, working for the
public sector is also an indication of how well the individual is doing. In addition,
working in the public sector may of course by itself inﬂuence attitudes.
Being unmarried. Being unmarried in Palestine can be a source of frustration.
Marriage is important because in Palestine, it represents the key to adulthood. It
also is a religious obligation. Marriage is expensive; some families have to save all
their lives to aﬀord the wedding of their children.9 Since the economic situation has
been deteriorating in the last years, it is possible that individuals who cannot aﬀord
marriage seek outlets for their frustration, translating into more negative attitudes
towards reconciliation.
7See Krueger and Maleckova (2003). Green, McFalls and Smith (2001) provide a survey of the
literature on hate crimes.
8Note that the variable used is age standardized by its mean, and standardized age squared
over 100.
9For an illustration, see ‘The wedding shortage’, Navtej Dhillon, Newsweek.com, March 2007.
This article explains why the Middle East has the lowest rates of marriage in the developing world.
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We also control for gender and region of residence as they can inﬂuence the
experiences faced during life.
1.6. Results
In this section I use the methodology explained above to infer the relationship
between demographics and attitudes towards concessions and towards reconciliation.
I then use the construction of the separation barrier to explore the channel through
which the conﬂict aﬀects attitudes towards reconciliation diﬀerently across education
groups.
1.6.1. Attitudes towards concessions
Table 1.4 shows the eﬀect of the personal characteristics on the mean of the
probability distribution of attitudes towards concessions for a given person. They
correspond to the coeﬃcient vector β in equation (3.10). The eﬀects are additive,
which means that statements such as ‘more educated people have more positive
attitudes towards concessions’ must be understood in a ‘ceteris paribus’ sense (Spady
2006). Coeﬃcients describe deviations from a ‘standardized’ person. This is a male
who lives in Hebron, has the mean age of the sample, is married, has a medium level
of income per family member, is not a refugee, has low education and prays very
often.
Results show that education is positively related to attitudes towards conces-
sions. This ﬁnding is in line with the argument advanced above that more educated
people could have more to gain from an agreement that eases the constraints on the
Palestinian economy and therefore have more to gain from concessions.
Family income also matters; families with lower income tend to support the
concessions discussed in the peace talks. Again, controlling for education, these
might be the ones who have most to gain (or least to lose) from an agreement. The
degree of religiosity reduces the willingness to make concessions.
Other authors have found that education has a negative impact on attitudes
towards continuing with the peace negotiations after the Oslo agreements (Abu
Sada 1998) or towards the Road Map (Jasso and Meyersson 2004). These authors
explain this result by the fact that better educated respondents have more access to
information and are therefore more aware of the problems of the possible agreements.
Because of the diﬀerent questions used to measure the attitudes, it is diﬃcult to
compare their results with the ones in this paper. The questions used in those
papers are related to a particular moment in time and to a particular negotiation
process. It seems likely that the individuals’ answers take into account other factors
like the strength of the Palestinian leaders or the international and Israeli political
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situation. The questions used in this paper to measure attitudes towards concessions
are more atemporal in the sense that they are related to the key elements that have
recurrently been subject of negotiation in peace talks. Therefore they provide more
reliable information on individuals’ general attitudes towards concessions.
1.6.2. Education and attitudes towards reconciliation
The previous section described results about willingness to make concessions
obtained using a collection of items Cm. In this section I measure ‘attitudes towards
reconciliation’ using a diﬀerent collection of items Rm.
Results are presented in Table 1.5. It is clear that they diﬀer substantially from
those for concessions. In particular, education is negatively correlated with attitudes
towards reconciliation. This negative eﬀect has strengthened over the years in the
sample (2001-2006). Figure 1.4 shows the evolution of the eﬀect of education over
time. The coeﬃcient on the high education dummy is signiﬁcantly negative in
all years except for 2001, and becomes stronger (more negative) over time. The
coeﬃcient on the medium education dummy is less negative, but evolves very much
in parallel with the high education coeﬃcient. (The omitted group is low education.)
These results lend support to the idea that the depressed market opportunities of
highly educated workers and the frustration generated by the diﬀerence between ex-
pected and actual wages matter for attitudes towards reconciliation (assuming that
Palestinians attribute this lack of opportunities to the conﬂict and the interdepen-
dence with Israel). This hypothesis also ﬁts with the strengthening of the education
coeﬃcient that accompanies the deterioration of the political and economic situation
over the sample.
Reconciliation, economic expectations, and political events: It is in-
structive to consider the evolution of attitudes over time in more detail. Figure 1.4
plots the coeﬃcients associated to the high and medium education variables obtained
from the diﬀerent samples together with the evolution of the economic growth and
the GDP per capita. From visual inspection, it is clear that attitudes of the highly
educated individuals and GDP per capita or economic growth move together closely
over time.
In particular, the fall in GDP per capita from the beginning of the second Intifada
in 2000 until 2002 is accompanied by a steep drop in the attitudes towards recon-
ciliation of the highly educated. Afterwards, as GDP per capita recovers following
the Road Map conference, attitudes also improve again brieﬂy, only to deteriorate
again from 2003 onwards. They reach a low point in 2006, the year Hamas wins the
Parliamentary elections. The international response to that victory again caused an
important drop in GDP per capita. Overall, since the start of the Second Intifada
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in 2000, per capita GDP in Palestine has fallen by about a third, from $1621 in 1999
to $1129 by the end of 2006. Attitudes of the highly educated have evolved in a
similar way. More formally, the correlation between the coeﬃcients on the education
variables for the diﬀerent years and GDP per capita or economic growth is positive
and in almost all the cases statistically signiﬁcant (see Table 1.6).
Because the evolution of GDP is closely linked to political events (the Intifada,
peace talks), it is not clear whether the close link between GDP and attitudes
of the educated is due to the evolution of GDP or whether politics is a common
driving force. There is also the third possibility of attitudes driving some political
events. All this indicates that there is a strong interdependence between politics
and economics in the West Bank and Gaza, and that there is an interdependence
between the socio-economic situation and attitudes towards reconciliation.
Although economic factors are often mentioned and may matter at the aggre-
gate level, we ﬁnd that family income does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on attitudes
towards reconciliation. So relative income (conditional on education) is not signiﬁ-
cantly related to these attitudes. This suggests that it is overall and not individual
economic deprivation that is closely related to attitudes.
These results are similar to results obtained in the literature on education and
violence. For instance, Krueger and Maleckova (2003) and Berrebi (2007) both ﬁnd
that “having a living standard above the poverty line or a secondary school or higher
education is positively associated with participation in violent groups.” Although
our explanation relates low willingness to reconcile to the lack of opportunities in
the labor market, the results are also consistent with the hypothesis stated by these
authors that more highly educated individuals have a more acute awareness of the
political situation, resulting in deeper moral concerns and a more negative attitude
towards reconciliation. This hypothesis ﬁts well with the strengthening of the educa-
tion coeﬃcient that accompanies the deteriorating political and economic situation.
Finally, both Krueger and Maleckova (2003) and Berrebi (2007) point out the
possibility that the positive relationship between education and violence could be
related to the content of the education. For instance, Stern (2000) explains how
religious schools in Pakistan can induce students to get involved in violence and
terrorism. In the case of Palestine it is unlikely that the education system itself
negatively aﬀects attitudes to reconciliation. In 2006 around 67 percent of students
were enrolled in Palestinian Authority public schools, 27.2 percent in schools run
by the United Nations (UNRWA), and 6.2 percent in private or NGO-run schools,
including those linked to Hamas and other groups.10 Figure 1.5 shows the evolution
10Source: ‘Factbox – Facts about Palestinian schools,’ Reuters Foundation, September 2006.
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of the distribution of schools of each type during 2001 to 2007. The share of private
schools is small and stable over the period. So even if religious schools gained
importance among private schools, this can only be a minor phenomenon. Although
it is true that the curriculum of Palestinian public schools has been criticized for
containing anti-Semitic stereotypes, this refers to primary and secondary schools
only.11 Therefore, if the content of education was radicalizing students, it should
have an eﬀect on the whole sample. It is implausible that it mainly aﬀects the most
highly educated individuals.
Another factor that is strongly related to attitudes towards reconciliation is the
degree of religiosity (measured as the frequency with which the individual prays).
The results indicate that in 2001, the attitudinal diﬀerences between individuals
with diﬀerent degree of religiosity were weak. With time, diﬀerences become more
clear. More religious people tend be less favorable to reconciliation. Causality is
not clear, since we do not know if people with more negative attitudes towards
reconciliation become more religious or if more religious individuals changed their
attitudes toward reconciliation.
Being female, being a refugee, working for the public sector, or being unmarried
do not have signiﬁcant eﬀects. The inﬂuence of age is not clear.
Overall, educated or religious individuals are less in favor of reconciliation with
Israel, with the eﬀects of education and religion strengthening over time. In the
next section, we have a closer look at the eﬀect of education.
1.6.3. The eﬀect of the separation barrier on attitudes towards reconcil-
iation
In the previous sections I have linked the negative eﬀect of education to the
frustration derived from the general economic losses such as the impact of the conﬂict
on employment opportunities and returns to schooling. In this section I will give
more evidence in line with the idea that are events at the national, not local level
matter for attitudes. For this, I exploit the construction of the separation wall and
regional fatalities.
In June 2002 the Israeli authorities began building a barrier (wall) along the
border of the West Bank with Israel. The Israeli government has declared that the
objective of the wall is to protect Israeli citizens from the attacks of suicide bombers.
The trajectory of the wall is depicted in Figure 1.6. The ﬁrst parts were built in
the northern West Bank districts of Jenin, Tulkarem and Qalqilia. At the end of
11This has led to the introduction of new textbooks in 2000, but the sample of individuals under
analysis has not been aﬀected by this. For more information on the old and new textbooks see
Brown (2001).
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July 2003 Israel also started building a wall in the northern and eastern parts of
Jerusalem and Bethlehem. After that, the wall continued south to Hebron. To
build the wall, Palestinian land has been expropriated. In addition, the wall at
times extends far into the West Bank, leaving parts of it inaccessible or disrupting
circulation between villages.
The eﬀects of the separation barrier on the Palestinians is twofold. Firstly, it
aﬀects Palestinians who live nearby, particularly their ability to travel freely within
the West Bank and to access work in Israel, or to access other services (health,
education or religious sites). Its presence also reduces arable land. Therefore the
separation barrier directly aﬀects the population of the localities through which the
wall passes, resulting in localized economic losses. Secondly, many Palestinians see
the separation barrier as an attempt to artiﬁcially create a border, creating ‘facts
on the ground.’ Therefore, the wall can also aﬀect Palestinians generally, not only
locally, causing moral and existential concerns.
The construction of the wall helps to explore the channel through which educa-
tion aﬀects attitudes towards reconciliation. Controlling for the disruption caused
by the construction of the wall in an individual’s region of residence allows to cap-
ture the local eﬀect of the wall. This can be done separately by group of education,
giving an indication of how the experience of personal losses shapes attitudes for
diﬀerent groups of education. Any additional eﬀect of education on attitudes should
then be due to other, more general concerns.
This analysis is possible because the data indicate in which region individuals
live. In addition, I use measures of the evolution of the length of the wall, the areas
of land left on the Israeli side of the wall (in most of the cases, this land has been
conﬁscated) and the areas that have become enclaves.12
I have this information for July 2003, February 2005, and July 2006. The ﬁrst
two dates correspond quite closely to the moments in time when the surveys have
been conducted (maximum diﬀerence of three months). For 2006, the diﬀerence
is larger. To deal with this, I assume that the parts of the wall that were under
construction in July 2006 were completed by the time of the survey, in December








where WER,t refers to the eﬀect of the wall in region R in time t, WallR,t is the
length of the wall in time t expressed in km, and BorderR refers to the length of the
12Sources: These measures have been computed with information from the U.N. Oﬃce for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Aﬀairs in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the Palestinian
Environmental NGO’s network.
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Green Line border for region R expressed in km. The OutsideLandR,t is the area
of the region that at time t remains between the Green Line and the wall and the
EnclavesR,t are the areas that, at time t, have become enclaves due to the route of
the wall. These areas are divided by the total area of the region and they are all
expressed in km2. Figure 1.6 and tables 1.7, 1.8 and 1.9 show the evolution of the
construction of the wall and the measures used to construct the index. While it is
not obvious if the functional form chosen is optimal for ﬁtting disruptions suﬀered
by individuals living in adjacent regions, it receives some support from evidence
suggesting that other possible measures of the eﬀect of the wall are correlated with
the index constructed here. Using data for 2005, Figure 1.7 shows the relation of
WER,t for 2005 with the number of buildings destroyed and with the amount of land
that has been expropriated. The correlation between WER,t and the two alternative
measures is 0.61 and 0.57 respectively.13
With this measure I can then test whether living close to the wall and being
exposed to its eﬀects aﬀects attitudes. Because the eﬀect of the wall diﬀers across
regions and over time, it can be distinguished from just a year eﬀect and from
regional eﬀects. In addition, because deviations of the wall from the Green Line are
mainly guided by the placement of Israeli settlements and by the location of natural
resources, the index is exogenous.14
Results are reported in Table 1.10. The ﬁrst column shows results for the whole
sample. It conﬁrms the eﬀects found above; more educated or more religious people
are less in favor of reconciliation. In addition, we ﬁnd that living in areas strongly
aﬀected by the wall does not make people less favorable to reconciliation. Although
negative, the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant only at a 15% level. Splitting the
sample by education (low and medium levels of education vs high levels of education)
produces interesting results. While other signs and levels of signiﬁcance are largely
unchanged, eﬀects of living close to the wall are smaller and less signiﬁcant for people
with high levels of education.
13Note that it was not possible to directly use these alternative measure in our analysis since
they are available only for 2005. Moreover, they are not available for the region of Toubas.
14The Government of Israel maintains that the following considerations are taken into account
when determining the route of the wall: continuity in order to be operational, creation of controlled
areas, minimum damage to the landscape, avoidance of the inclusion of Palestinian villages in the
areas of the security fence, and minimal disruption in the daily life of the population residing near
the wall. See the Israeli Ministry of Defense’s website: www.seamzone.mod.gov.il. Concerning the
settlements, Ariel Sharon’s cabinet agreed to extend the wall to encircle Jewish settlements deep
in the West Bank (see ‘Israeli cabinet extends ’security fence”, The Guardian, October 2 2003).
The International Court of Justice Report of 8 September 2003 (E/CN.4/2004/6) also points out
that the Wall incorporates illegal Israeli settlements that form the subject of negotiations between
Israel and Palestine.
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The result that personal losses due to the wall have a weaker eﬀect on attitudes
of people with higher education may arise for several reasons. One possibility is
that the wall must be aﬀecting certain occupations more than others. Low educated
individuals are more likely to be farmers, a group particularly strongly aﬀected by
the wall, both because of the loss of arable land and because of the disruption of
transport routes.15
Overall, education is negatively related to attitudes towards reconciliation, in
contrast to the eﬀect found for personal losses. The presence of the wall thus cannot
be the driving force behind the negative eﬀect of education. More educated people
seem to react to something else. The evolution of the education coeﬃcient over time
suggests that a more acute perception of the political and socioeconomic situation
could be driving their attitudes towards reconciliation with Israel.
1.7. Conclusion
Given the importance of the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict, hints about why it is
so hard to resolve are very valuable. In this paper, I have used Palestinian survey
data to explore the determinants of Palestinians’ attitudes towards the peace pro-
cess, understood as attitudes towards possible concessions they might be willing to
make to achieve a settlement, and attitudes towards reconciliation in case of such a
settlement. Because of the breadth of the object to be measured, the use of more
than one dimension is natural. This is conﬁrmed by the empirical analysis of the
joint distribution of attitudes. Concerning the determinants, we focus particularly
on education because of its ambiguous role in previous literature.
On economic grounds, more educated people could be expected to have more to
gain from a peace process, in particular in the context of the repressed Palestinian
economy. The empirical analysis indeed conﬁrms that controlling for current family
income more educated people are more willing to make concessions. This could be
understood as an investment in peace, allowing the dividends of peace to be reaped
later on.
The eﬀect of education on attitudes towards reconciliation is disputed in previous
work. Some authors argue that less educated people are more prone to violence and
hatred, while others ﬁnd the opposite: more educated people are more likely to be
involved in violent groups. I ﬁnd results more consistent with the latter stream of
the literature, and then probe a bit deeper to identify a channel.
Individuals engage in reconciliation up to the point where the marginal beneﬁt
equals the marginal cost. The cost of reconciliation may be linked to the frustration
15See B’Tselem report on the eﬀects of the wall. B’Tselem is the information center for human
rights in the occupied territories.
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endured due to the depressed labor market conditions, and therefore may be larger
for highly educated individuals, explaining why highly educated individuals prefer
lower levels of reconciliation.
At the macro level, it is clear that there is a strong interdependence between
politics and economics, and between the socio-economic situation and attitudes
towards reconciliation. While economic deprivation may not be associated with
worse attitudes towards reconciliation at the individual level, periods of economic
stagnation or contraction coincide with worsening attitudes at the national level.
At the same time, the signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect of education on attitudes towards
reconciliation strengthens. I can identify that this is not due to direct, local eﬀects
of the separation barrier. It hence seems plausible that events at the national level
drive attitudes of people with high education. Knowing that are not personal losses
what strengthes the negative attitudes towards reconciliation but rather the general
situation, may be important for the peace process. Education and economic aid
may not be suﬃcient remedies.
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Appendix
Appendix 1.A. Original wording of the questions/items used
Items used for estimating attitudes towards reconciliation
• After reaching a peace agreement between the Palestinian side and Israel
and the establishment of a Palestinian state that is recognized by Israel,
the following are steps may be taken in order to enhance relations between
the State of Israel and a Palestinian State. For each of the suggested steps
please tell me whether you support or oppose it:
– Open borders to free movement of people and goods.
– Create joint economic institutions and ventures.
– Create joint political institutions (such as a parliament. designed even-
tually to lead to a confederate system)
– Take legal measures against incitement against Israel.
– Adopt school curriculum in the Palestinian state that recognizes Israel
and teaches school children not to demand return of all Palestine to
the Palestinians.
• After reaching a peace agreement between the Palestinian side and Israel
and the establishment of a Palestinian state that is recognized by Israel,
would you, under these conditions of peace, invite an Israeli colleague to
visit you in your home?
Items used for estimating attitudes towards concessions
The individuals are informed of the permanent compromise settlement, then they
are ask what do they think of each of the following items (Do they agree or disagree
with them):
• Withdrawal to 1967 borders with territorial swap. (An Israeli withdrawal
from all of the Gaza Strip and the evacuation of its settlements. But in
the West Bank, Israel withdraws and evacuates settlements from most of
it, with the exception of few settlement areas in less than 3% of the West
Bank that would be exchanged with an equal amount of territory from
Israel in accordance with the attached map show map. )
• A state without an army but with international forces. (An independent
Palestinian state would be established in the areas from which Israel with-
draws in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; the Palestinian state will have
no army, but it will have a strong security force but an international multi-
national force would be deployed to insure the safety and security of the
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state. Both sides will be committed to end all forms of violence directed
against each other.)
• East Jerusalem as capital of the state of Palestine after it is divided. (East
Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab
neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighbor-
hoods coming under Israel sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram
al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception
of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that will come under Israeli
sovereignty.)
• Refugees with ﬁve options for permanent residence. (With regard to the
refugee question, both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN
resolutions 194 and 242 and on the Arab peace initiative. The refugees
will be given ﬁve choices for permanent residency. These are: the Pales-
tinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the
territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on
refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in
host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision
of the states in those areas. The number of refugees returning to Israel will
be based on the average number of refugees admitted to third countries
like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees will be entitled to
compensation for their ”refugeehood” and loss of properties.)
• End the conﬂict. (When the permanent status agreement is fully imple-
mented, it will mean the end of the conﬂict and no further claims will be
made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the
homelands of their respective peoples.)
• A sovereign state with security arrangements. (The Palestinian state will
have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace. But Israeli will be al-
lowed to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and will main-
tain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. The multi-
national force will remain in the Palestinian state for an indeﬁnite period
of time and its responsibility will be to insure the implementation of the
agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian
state including its international border crossings.)
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Figure 1.1. Average Monthly Wage in NIS for wage employees in
the Palestinian Territory. Period: 2000-2006. Source: Palestinian




























Figure 1.2. Diagram of the underlying process.
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Figure 1.3. Probability Distributions of answering 1, 2, 3 or 4 in
the item ’Invite an Israeli
Table 1.1. Descriptive statistics for survey questions on reconcilia-
tion and concessions
Reconciliation Concessions
Items Mean Std.Dev Items Mean Std.Dev
Borders 3.038 0.718 Borders 67 2.458 0.729
Eco Inst. 2.781 0.760 No Army 2.110 0.769
Pol Inst. 2.220 0.785 Jerusalem 2.241 0.790
No Incitement 2.282 0.776 Refugees 2.233 0.781
Curriculum 1.714 0.665 End Conﬂict 2.337 0.670
Invite Israeli 2.155 0.867 Security 2.072 0.867
Obs 6121 Obs 3509
Scale 1-4 Scale 1-3
The survey realized in 2003 does not contain the item ‘Invite an Israeli’
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Table 1.4. Eﬀect of Personal Characteristics on the Attitudes
towards Concessions.
Variables 2003 2005 2006
Coeﬃcient S.E Coeﬃcient S.E Coeﬃcient S.E
Female 0.320 (0.072) 0.285 (0.076) 0.057 (0.078)
Age 0.004 (0.004) 0.003 (0.004) 0.010 (0.004)
Agesq.01 -0.007 (0.016) 0.040 (0.018) 0.019 (0.018)
Refugee -0.125 (0.080) -0.285 (0.089) 0.037 (0.084)
Med Education 0.188 (0.084) 0.360 (0.088) 0.521 (0.097)
High Education 0.170 (0.120) 0.209 (0.120) 0.548 (0.129)
Unmarried 0.079 (0.111) -0.015 (0.114) 0.029 (0.114)
Low Income -0.058 (0.077) 0.180 (0.088) 0.210 (0.090)
High Income 0.143 (0.139) 0.172 (0.113) -0.045 (0.113)
Med Praying 0.240 (0.179) 0.387 (0.168) 0.403 (0.138)
Low Praying 0.411 (0.136) 0.232 (0.143) 0.335 (0.172)
Public 0.007 (0.122) 0.214 (0.125) 0.053 (0.128)
Jenin 0.252 (0.172) 0.255 (0.170) 0.073 (0.156)
Toubas 0.875 (0.350) -0.038 (0.303) 0.531 (0.237)
Tulkarm 0.186 (0.168) 0.081 (0.167) 0.236 (0.218)
Qalqilia 0.739 (0.154) 0.285 (0.321) 1.122 (0.185)
Salﬁt 0.106 (0.257) 0.956 (0.288) 0.025 (0.171)
Nablus 0.372 (0.162) 0.325 (0.154) 0.375 (0.173)
Ramallah 0.631 (0.122) 0.235 (0.128) 1.064 (0.167)
Jerusalem -0.067 (0.155) 0.353 (0.155) 0.417 (0.147)
Jericho 0.851 (0.347) 0.164 (0.230) 1.338 (0.228)
Bethlehem -0.319 (0.185) 0.333 (0.170) 0.370 (0.199)
Jabalia 0.075 (0.153) 0.058 (0.218) 0.241 (0.208)
Gaza City 0.118 (0.139) 0.087 (0.149) 0.438 (0.139)
KhanYounis -0.354 (0.164) 0.241 (0.182) 0.967 (0.160)
Deir Al Baleh 0.737 (0.155) 0.514 (0.203) 0.450 (0.225)
Rafah -0.067 (0.224) -0.031 (0.177) 0.644 (0.256)
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Figure 1.4. Evolution of the eﬀect of education and its relation with
Economic Growth and GDP pc.
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Table 1.6. Correlations between economic conditions and the
willingness to reconcile of educated individuals.
Med Educ High Educ Med Educ High Educ
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
per capita GDP 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
growth rate 1.370 1.560
(0.569) (0.895)
constant -2.625 -3.269 -0.303 -0.455
(0.795) (1.240) (0.050) (0.078)
R2 0.679 0.561 0.592 0.432







2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Government Schools UNRWA Schools Private Schools
Figure 1.5. Distribution of the schools by supervising authority.
Source: Palestinian Education Ministry.
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Table 1.7. Summary of the wall and its eﬀects in 2003, by region.
Total Area Area Outside Area Enclaves Green Line Wall WE
(km2) (km2) (km2) Border (km) (km) Index
Jenin 587.838 33.891 0.000 50.02 61.421 1.286
Toubas 352.811 0.000 0.000 13.092 0.000 0.000
Tulkarm 243.586 23.135 0.000 29.867 37.321 1.345
Nablus 615.314 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Qalqilia 155.235 24.423 15.662 18.458 46.16 2.759
Salﬁt 211.175 0.000 0.000 5.598 4.003 0.715
Ramallah 849.188 0.000 0.000 46.283 0.000 0.000
Jericho 651.958 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Jerusalem 345.277 0.000 0.000 27.375 15.856 0.579
Bethlehem 637.548 0.000 0.000 22.245 10.475 0.471
Hebron 1007.135 0.000 0.000 91.817 0.000 0.000
Jabalia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Gaza City 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Khan Younis 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Deir Baleh 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rafah 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 1.8. Summary of the wall and its eﬀects in 2005, by region.
Total Area Area Outside Area Enclaves Green Line Wall WE
(km2) (km2) (km2) Border (km) (km) Index
Jenin 587.838 36.104 0.000 50.02 65.19 1.365
Toubas 352.811 2.68 0.000 13.092 12.608 0.971
Tulkarm 243.586 23.135 0.000 29.867 37.321 1.345
Nablus 615.314 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Qalqilia 155.235 24.423 15.662 18.458 56.75 3.333
Salﬁt 211.175 0.000 0.000 5.598 18.134 3.239
Ramallah 849.188 7.761 0.000 46.283 26.31 0.578
Jericho 651.958 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Jerusalem 345.277 0.000 0.000 27.375 25.176 0.920
Bethlehem 637.548 0.000 0.000 22.245 10.475 0.471
Hebron 1007.135 2.325 0.000 91.817 14.658 0.162
Jabalia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Gaza City 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Khan Younis 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Deir Baleh 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rafah 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 1.9. Summary of the wall and its eﬀects in 2006, by region.
Total Area Area Outside Area Enclaves Green Line Wall WE
(km2) (km2) (km2) Border (km) (km) Index
Jenin 587.838 36.104 0.000 50.02 65.19 1.365
Toubas 352.811 2.68 0.000 13.092 12.608 0.971
Tulkarm 243.586 23.135 0.000 29.867 37.321 1.345
Nablus 615.314 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Qalqilia 155.235 37.318 15.662 18.458 56.75 3.416
Salﬁt 211.175 13.567 0.000 5.598 25.86 4.684
Ramallah 849.188 84.521 1.512 46.283 59.158 1.379
Jericho 651.958 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Jerusalem 345.277 93.466 13.883 27.375 80.724 3.260
Bethlehem 637.548 8.815 0.000 22.245 10.475 0.485
Hebron 1007.135 12.71 0.000 91.817 64.757 0.718
Jabalia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Gaza City 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Khan Younis 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Deir Baleh 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rafah 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Figure 1.6. Evolution of the Separation Barrier.
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Num Destroyed Buildings Wall Index 2005
Figure 1.7. Correlation between the index used and other possible
measures of the eﬀect of the wall. The number of buildings destroyed
refer to the number of establishments in diﬀerent sectors which were
totally closed as a result of the wall, the conﬁscated land is the total
area conﬁscated by Israeli forces to construct the wall (usually taken
by military order). Source: PCBS – Survey on the Impact of the
Expansion and Annexation Wall on the Socio-Economic Conditions
of Palestinian Localities which the Wall Passes Through, June 2005.
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Trust, child care technology choice and female labor force
participation
Abstract. This paper investigates whether trust has an eﬀect on the
choice of child care technology and on female labor force participation.
Mothers with less trust in others may decide to stay at home with their
child instead of working. To do this, I sketch a simple model to show
why this eﬀect may be taking place, I measure trust using the European
Social Survey and I test its inﬂuence on the choice of child care tech-
nology. To measure trust, I use a hierarchical item response model pro-
posed by Spady (2007). Compared to other measures of trust, using this
technique has several advantages: allows the aggregation of information
from several questions and exploits additional information from personal
and demographic characteristics. It also imposes very few parametric
assumptions. The results show that trust matters for the degree of ex-
ternalness of the child care technology people choose. It can therefore be
a possible explanation for diﬀerences in female labor force participation
across countries and across sociological groups.
Keywords. trust, child care, labor force participation, latent attitudes,
item response models.
JEL Classification. J13, J22, D10.
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2.1. Introduction
Labor force participation diﬀers signiﬁcantly across countries, particularly for
women. Prime-age women are one of the demographic groups with the lowest partic-
ipation rate in Europe. This is particularly pronounced in Mediterranean countries,
less so in Nordic ones (Algan and Cahuc 2005).
There is a large literature trying to understand which factors drive labor force
participation of prime-age women, and what can explain diﬀerences across countries.
One factor that has been proposed are diﬀerences in social policies that lead to dif-
ferences in availability and cost of non-parental child care.1 These papers ﬁnd that
social policies can help to reduce the incompatibility between labor market partici-
pation and child care, and therefore induce higher female labor participation rates.
In a cross-country perspective, this type of studies presupposes that women in dif-
ferent European countries have the same preferences, but face diﬀerent possibilities
due to diﬀerent social policies across countries, leading to diﬀerent choices.
More recent papers have considered the possibility of heterogeneity in prefer-
ences, introducing elements like culture, beliefs, or the degree of religiosity in ex-
plaining women’s participation and fertility decisions. Examples of this are Algan
and Cahuc (2005), Fernandez, Fogli and Olivetti (2004) and Berman, Iannaccone
and Ragusa (2006). Fogli (forthcoming) notes that “a theory based on purely tech-
nological diﬀerences across countries would have a hard time in explaining the large
amount of heterogeneity observed in employment rates across European countries.
In this respect, it is important to explore the role played by diﬀerences in pref-
erences.” Del Boca and Locatelli (2006) in their survey on the determinants of
motherhood and work status conclude that while the importance of social polices is
well established in the literature, the role of culture is still an open question in this
ﬁeld.
This paper contributes to this literature by investigating whether trust can aﬀect
the choice of child care technology and labor force participation in the sense that
mothers with less trust in others may decide to stay at home with their child instead
of working. To do this, I sketch a simple model to show why this eﬀect may be taking
place, measure trust using the European Social Survey, and analyze its inﬂuence on
the choice of child care technology.
1See e.g. Del Boca (2002) for Italy, Baizn, Billari and Michielin (2002) for Spain, Laroque and
Salani (2005) for France, Del Boca and Sauer (2006) comparing France, Spain and Italy, and Del
Boca and Wetzel (2007) comparing several European countries.
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Since the main explanatory variable of my analysis is trust, it is important to
measure it well.2 Therefore, I use a hierarchical item response model proposed by
Spady (2007) methodology to measure trust. This method allows measuring trust
directly as a latent attitude at the individual level, assuming that opinions of individ-
uals about trust reﬂect their attitudes in this dimension. The attitudes of individuals
making up a sample population can then be given probability distributions, based
on their item responses and personal characteristics. Very few parametric assump-
tions are needed for this. The resulting measure of trust is conceptually cleaner and
more consistent with theory than the distant proxies or demographic characteristics
often used in previous work.
The measure of trust is obtained using a series of item responses from the Eu-
ropean Social Survey, obtaining measures of trust for married women with children
younger than 12 from 26 European countries. Trust is found to signiﬁcantly impact
their child care choices.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some of the
work done relating social attitudes to fertility and participation decisions, and gives
a brief overview of diﬀerent ways of measuring social attitudes used previously.
Section 3 presents a simple theoretical model that will guide the estimation. In
Section 4 I describe the methodology used to obtain the measures of trust. Section
5 presents the data used, and I describe the questionnaire items and the personal
and demographic characteristics of the respondents that play a role in the estimation
of the latent attitudes. In Section 6 I obtain the measure of trust and I analyze its
determinants as well as the variation of trust across countries. In Section 7 I study
the relationship between the trust and child care technology choice. Finally, Section
8 concludes.
2.2. Relevance and Measurement of Social Attitudes
There has been strong interest among economists in the impact of social and
cultural factors on economic or social outcomes (Knack and Keefer (1997), Guiso,
Sapienza and Zingales (2004)). Concepts like trust and beliefs have been used to ex-
plain several individual and group outcomes such as health, ﬁnancial development,
or economic growth. Recently, individual social attitudes have been introduced in
the analysis of female labor force participation and fertility; some papers have an-
alyzed how beliefs about what should be the role of women in society can explain
2Most of the literature about social attitudes faces the critique that sometimes researchers’
claims are in excess of what is justiﬁed by the statistical exercises reported (Durlauf and Fafchamps
2004).
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part of the diﬀerences in female labor force participation rates across time (Fernan-
dez et al. (2004) and Fogli and Veldkamp (2007)) and across countries (Algan and
Cahuc (2005)).
One of the main problems of the literature that studies the role of concepts
related to social attitudes is the measurement of such attitudes. Clearly, concepts
like trust are inherently diﬃcult to measure. There have been diﬀerent approaches
to solve this measurement problem, some involving the use of proxies, others using
experimental economics. The next few paragraphs give a brief overview of these
approaches and critiques to them.
One of the most common approaches to measuring social attitudes and concepts
like trust has been the use of “indirect” indicators. An example of this approach is
the work of Putnam (1993), who analyzes the impact of social capital on economic
performance using the number of readers of the local newspaper, the voter turnout
in referendums, and the participation rate in political elections as proxies for social
capital. Also Guiso et al. (2004) uses this approach. To study how trust aﬀects
portfolio choice decisions, he uses electoral participation and blood donation as
proxies for regional levels of trust.
Fernandez and Fogli (2005) ﬁnd that cultural diﬀerences have a signiﬁcant eﬀect
in explaining fertility and female labor force participation. They study second gen-
eration immigrants to the US, using lagged values of the total fertility rate in the
mother’s country of origin as a proxy for culture.
While this approach may allow to identify the impact of social attitudes on
economic outcomes, it still does not allow for direct measurement of social attitudes.
This makes it more diﬃcult to determine the eﬀect of which speciﬁc social attitude
I are actually observing. It is also less useful for the analysis of the determinants of
social attitudes, or for comparative or policy-focussed perspectives.
Other authors have studied the eﬀect of religious participation and beliefs. Barro
and McCleary (2002) study to what extent religious participation and beliefs inﬂu-
ence economic performance and political institutions. In the same vein, Berman
et al. (2006) study the eﬀect of changes in religiosity on fertility for European
Catholic countries. These authors ﬁnd that what matters are not changes in beliefs
and preferences for children, but rather the decrease in the social services oﬀered by
the Catholic institutions.
Another approach used in the literature is to measure regional trust as the per-
centage of people in the population that claim to trust others. Usually these papers
use the World Values Survey (WVS) or the European Values Survey (EVS) and
their question: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted
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or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?’ Individual responses are
then aggregated to a macro measure.
Examples of this approach are found in Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and
Knack (2001) who ﬁnd that trust and civic norms have a strong impact on eco-
nomic performance, or in Beugelsdijk and van Schaik (2004) who also ﬁnd that at
the regional level, trust and voluntary work are related to economic growth. Also
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1997) and Fukuyama (1995) follow this
approach to examine the eﬀect of trust in organizations.
This approach is similar to the one used by Algan and Cahuc (2005). These
authors use the WVS and the International Survey Program to obtain information
about diﬀerences in family attitudes and their eﬀect on the employment rates of
diﬀerent demographic groups. They ﬁnd that participation in the labor market is
particularly low for demographic groups whose labor market participation is dis-
couraged by families’ perceptions. One of these are prime-age women.
The scope of these studies is necessarily limited when a good measure of the
individual level of trust is required. Measuring individual trust using only the answer
to one question would be imperfect. It is diﬃcult to believe that this can be a
good measure for such a broad concept (for a critique of this approach see Glaeser,
Laibson, Sheinkman and Soutter (2000) and Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2002)).
The approach I use overcomes this limitation by measuring trust using responses to
more than one question. By analyzing the individual and country-level determinants
of trust, it also addresses the critique of lack of cross-country comparability of the
original trust-based measures aired by Fine (2001).
Experimental economics is also concerned with measuring concepts such as trust.
Since Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), diﬀerent authors have designed trust
game experiments to explain diﬀerences in trust across individuals of speciﬁc demo-
graphical groups. An example of that is Glaeser et al. (2000), they ask the standard
question about generalized trust to a sample of Harvard undergraduates, this group
of students is then asked to play the trust game. They ﬁnd that the ones who claim
to trust more people are not always the ones who trust more others. This may ques-
tion the reliability of using survey data. The problem is of course that experiments
rely in a very small and speciﬁc sample and it results diﬃcult to make generaliza-
tions. At the same time it seems plausible that using more questions about trust,
and not only one, it is possible to measure better trust as a latent attitude of the
individuals.
The methodology for measuring trust used in the present paper represents a
diﬀerent view in the factor analysis and item response models; it allows not to
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impose inessential assumptions and the use of categorical or discrete answers to the
questions used as a basis for the measurement (Spady 2007). The result of applying
this methodology will be the estimation of the probability distribution at individual
level, and will be used to infer the relation between trust and diﬀerent types of child
care used by the households.
2.3. Determinants of Child Care Choice
I will sketch a simple model to show the link between individual trust and the
choice of child care technology. Suppose that a mother’s utility is given by U(I,H),
where I is her income and H is the well-being of her child. U increases in I and in
H. Income can be obtained by working. For the mother to be able to work, someone
else needs to take care of the child. Several types of child care are available, each
with its cost C and expected beneﬁt in terms of well-being of the child.
These types of child care can be ordered by their degree of “externalness” e to
the family: The mother can stay at home and take care of the child herself (least
external), leave the child with the grandparents or other family members (somewhat
external), pay someone (e.g. a baby sitter) to take care of the child at home (more
external) or bring the child to a diﬀerent place (say a kindergarten) paying for the
service (most external).
Beneﬁts of child care have two components, the well-being/good treatment of
the kid h, and acquisition of education and social skills bi. Suppose that there is
a probability pi that the child is not treated well that increases with externalness.
The cost of child care depends on features speciﬁc to the country and to the family,
such as pricing and availability of kindergartens, or distance to grandparents and
other family members.
Trust T aﬀects beneﬁts of child care in two ways. It reduces the mother’s as-
sessment of the probability pi that the child is not treated well, and it increases the
assessment of the amount of social skills the child will acquire further away from the
family, i.e. ∂pi(e)/∂T < 0 and ∂2bi/(∂e∂T) > 0. So higher trust raises the expected
beneﬁt of child care further away from the family compared to close to it.
In this setting, women are more likely to stay at home with their child when
their potential wage is low, cost of external childcare is high, or they have a low
level of trust. A higher potential wage makes choice of more external childcare more
likely, just as higher trust. The optimal level of externalness then depends on the
shape of the cost of childcare. Fundamentally, it seems reasonable to suppose that
these costs rise with externalness. This can be reversed in countries where external
childcare is heavily subsidized (e.g. free kindergartens) or in families that are very
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dispersed, so that it would be very costly to have grandparents take care of a child.
So personal and demographic characteristics and a country’s institutions interact in
determining child care choices.
2.4. Empirical Approach
In this section, I set up the model used for estimating the latent attitude that
I identify as trust and its eﬀect on the externalness of the type of child care used.
ESS respondents indicate the degree of externalness in answering this question:
“Thinking about the youngest child in the household, I would like to ask you about
his/her usual child care, not counting lessons in school. By child care I mean care
carried out by anyone other than yourself or your current husband/wife/partner.
Using this card, what is the main type of childcare that the youngest child receives?
Please select only one.”
Just as in Section 3, I consider four diﬀerent types of child care technology that
can be ordered by their degree of “externalness” e to the family: The mother can
stay at home and take care of the child herself (type 1, least external), leave the
child with the grandparents or other family members (type 2, somewhat external),
pay someone (e.g. a baby sitter) to take care of the child at home (type 3, more
external) or bring the child to a diﬀerent place (say a kindergarten) paying for the
service (type 4, most external).3
The theoretical model implies that there is an underlying latent variable “desired
externalness”. Let this be e∗. There is a match from the latent variable, e∗
i, to the
observed one, ei ∈ {1,2,3,4}, representing the four diﬀerent types of child care
deﬁned above. According to this model, desired externalness will be a function of
social beneﬁts of child care, probability of failure, the costs of child care and the
expected wage in the labor market:
e
∗
i = f(SB,PF,CC,W) + εi (2.1)
ei = j if γj−1 < e
∗
i ≤ γj (2.2)
for unknowns γj with γ0 = −∞, γ1 = 0 and γ4 = ∞. The probability that tech-
nology j is chosen is the probability that the latent variable e∗
i lies between two
boundaries γj−1 and γj. We assume that εi is i.i.d. standard normal, so I will esti-
mate an ordered probit model.
3In the data, I deﬁne child care to be of type 1 if the mother’s main activity is house work
and taking care of children and the answer to the question is ‘no child care needed’, type 2 when
the answer is ‘grandparents or other family members’, type 3 when the answer is ‘Paid child care,
looked after at carer’s or own home’ and type 4 if the answer is ‘Paid nursery or child care, looked
after somewhere other than home’.
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The components that inﬂuence mothers’ decisions will be proxied by the following
explanatory variables:
Expected Wage in the Labor Market (W). The expected wage inﬂuences
the decision to participate in the labor market, and therefore the choice of child
care. This is important not only for the eﬀect on the decision of working or not
(and therefore the choice between child care technology 1 and the others), but also
because a higher wage in the labor market makes the use of more expensive child
care more aﬀordable. I will proxy the expected wage with mother’s education.
The marginal utility derived from consumption made possible by the wife’s income
also depends on the husband’s income. If this is higher, the beneﬁt from female
participation is lower.
Costs of Child Care (CC). These can diﬀer across individuals because of
personal and family circumstances, and across countries because of diﬀerent social
policies. While in some countries child care is free for almost the whole population, in
others the availability of public child care is very restricted and is basically reserved
to people who have economic problems. As a measure of these costs I include an
OECD indicator of the out-of-pocket child care costs for a lone parent (full-time
care at a typical child care center).4 This indicator is computed using as average
‘family net income’ the sum of gross earnings plus cash beneﬁts minus taxes and
social contributions. All fee reductions, including free pre-school or child care for
certain age groups, are taken into account as rebates. Unfortunately, the information
is not available for all countries (see Table 2.8). Nevertheless, I believe that these
social policies are quite homogenous at the country level, and I expect that I can
capture them by including country ﬁxed eﬀects in the regressions. I also allow for
the possibility that in cities the availability of formal child care can be higher, so I
include a dummy that takes value 1 if the household lives in a city. The utility cost
of child care expenditure will be diﬀerent for families with diﬀerent incomes. For
that reason, I control for the income of the household. More speciﬁcally, I use
the husband’s income since the entire households’ income includes the mothers’
income, so using it would induce problems of endogeneity.5
Probability of Failure (PF). Mothers assume that the probability of failure or
of misbehavior of the person taking care of the child rises with externalness. From
the model, however, I expect that mothers with more trust will attach a lower
probability to misbehavior of the person taking care of the child. I also include
4OECD Indicators 2007 – Beneﬁts and Wages.
5I know if the percentage of the family income generated by the respondent (the mother) is
none, very small, under a half, about a half, over a half, very large, all. We attribute the rest to
the husband.
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a dummy that is 1 if the grandmother was working when the mother was 14.
Following the idea of Fernandez and Fogli (2005), I think that personal experiences
can inﬂuence mothers’ beliefs about how much harm can come from leaving the
children with strangers. Therefore I expect these variables to have a negative eﬀect
on the expected probability of failure, and a positive eﬀect on the desired degree of
externaless.
Social Beneﬁts (SB). More external child care can yield social beneﬁts in the
form of education the child can receive from a well-trained person taking care of the
child, and in the form of social skills the child can gain from interaction with other
children. It is possible that parents with higher education will tend to give more
importance to this type of beneﬁts. Therefore, I include in the ordered probit the
education of the parents. As described in the theoretical model, I also expect
trust to aﬀect expected social beneﬁts positively.
If trust was observable, estimating equation 2.1 would be straightforward. But
since trust is not observable, the estimation becomes less trivial. As stated above,
concepts like trust are inherently diﬃcult to measure. In this paper I measure trust
using the item response model developed by Spady (2007). This estimation tech-
nique proves very useful for obtaining a measure of trust using all the information
available (answers to questions about trust and personal and demographic charac-
teristics) and allowing for a ﬂexible functional form. Next, I give a brief description
of Spady’s (2007) method used here.
2.4.1. The measurement of trust
2.4.1.1. The underlying process. Figure 4.2 shows a diagram of the underly-
ing process that I have in mind for measuring trust. I suppose that every individual
has some amount of trust. This attitude directly causes the responses to certain
survey questions. It also has an eﬀect on the individuals’, in this case the choice of
child care technology.
Demographic and personal characteristics may also be informative about the way
in which trust is distributed in a population; individual characteristics and experi-
ences as well as community characteristics can be related to how much people trust
each other. I assume that these characteristics do not aﬀect the answers directly. If
they have an eﬀect it is through their eﬀect on the attitudes I am measuring here.
These characteristics can however aﬀect the behavior of the individual (e.g. child
care technology choice) directly, and this will be taken into account in the analysis.
The theoretical justiﬁcation of the personal and demographic characteristics used
in our estimation is the following:
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Age. Since attitudes might change over the life cycle due to personal experience
but also due to national and global developments, the age of respondents can be
informative. In addition, there may be cohort eﬀects. Since the data set is only
a cross section, it is unfortunately impossible to disentangle life cycle and cohort
eﬀects.
Political orientation (left vs right). Information about respondents’ politi-
cal orientation can be informative about their attitudes. The expected sign is not
immediately clear here, since on the one hand, one could think that more conser-
vative people attach more importance to traditions and have a stronger feeling of
belonging to a community. That could increase the level of trust in others. On the
other hand, however, left-wing parties deﬁne themselves by their concern for the
wellbeing of others, and this could aﬀect left-leaning respondents’ attitude to trust.6
Living in a village. As argued e.g. by La Porta et al. (1997), repeated interac-
tion and small size of a local community can enhance trust and the sharing of norms
and values of reciprocity. In particular, this could be the case for people living in
villages.
Income. Since most determinants of income are also included as controls, the
income coeﬃcient should mainly reﬂect luck. Here it seems reasonable that peo-
ple that faced more negative shocks have lower levels of trust and possibly also of
reciprocity.
Belonging to a group that historically felt discriminated. Members of a
group that has felt discriminated will probably not expect to be treated fairly in the
future and therefore will trust less. The question used here is: ”Would you describe
yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country?
(yes/no)”
I also control for education and country of residence as they can inﬂuence the
experiences faced during life.
2.4.1.2. Methodology and Estimation. Given the underlying process de-
scribed above, I can apply the estimation methodology developed by Spady (2007).
This method allows to obtain quantitative measures of latent attitudes without im-
posing speciﬁc parametric assumptions. The only assumptions needed are that (1)
the expressions of agreement and disagreement on questions about trust (‘item re-
sponses’) reﬂect corresponding attitudes of the responder; (2) the ‘attitudes’ are
enduring individual-speciﬁc attributes, given the individual’s characteristics and en-
vironment. We will use a series of item responses, and I will assume that this series
6The question used from the EES is: “In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right.”
Where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?”
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has been determined by the attitude in trust. The attitudes of individuals making
up a sample population can then be given probability distributions, based on their
item responses and characteristics.
As described above, I use 8 item responses with 3 categorical responses each,
stemming from 2.290 married women with children. In that case there are 38 = 6561
cells or possible combinations of responses. I assume that the item responses are
determined by the individual’s attitude on trust a. The probability of a particular
response pattern (or cell) conditional on a is simply the product of the constituent
item probabilities. That is (for m items):
p(r1,r2,...,rm|a) = p(r1|a)p(r2|a)...p(rm|a). (2.3)
To make more eﬃcient use of the information available, I also exploit the in-
formation from personal and demographic characteristics. I assume that individual
i has certain characteristics Wi, and that the distribution f(·) of the latent atti-
tude can be inﬂuenced by these characteristics Wi, that means f(a|Wi). Concretely,
as the theoretical model implies, suppose that W gives rise to social experiences,








Equation 4.3 is used to estimate simultaneously how W aﬀects a and how a
aﬀects item responses. It is speciﬁed that f(a|W) is represented by a N(µ(W),1),7
where
µ(W) = Wβ. (2.6)
So a is normal with a mean that is a linear function of the characteristics W.
Equation 4.4 implies that f(a|W) is a N(0,1) for the ‘standardized respondent’ and
that the diﬀerent groups of the population, characterized by diﬀerent W, are also
normally distributed with possibly diﬀerent values of location µ.8
Results of this estimation are illustrated in Figure 3.7. This ﬁgure shows the
resulting item response models estimated using equations 4.3 to 4.4 for the items
selected to represent the trust scale. The ﬁrst box shows the probability of answering
7Although it is methodologically possible, for simplicity I will not allow for scale variation.
8The “standardized respondent” will be a Greek married women who lives in a town or city,
is 35.8 years old, has secondary education and medium income, has intensity of religion of 5.2, a
value of 5.14 on a left-right scale of self-proclaimed political attitude, and who does not belong to
a discriminated group(This is not the average person but the reference person.)
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1, 2 or 3 in item 1 as a function of an individual’s attitude a (trust), where the lowest
line represents the probability of answering 1, the diﬀerence between the second and
the lowest one the probability of answering 2, and the diﬀerence between 1 and the
second line the probability of answering 3. The other boxes show the same for the
other items.
The item response model is estimated by maximum likelihood, subject to the
constraint that the distribution functions (the lines that indicate the probability
of answering j in item k in Figure 3.7) be downward sloping and not crossing.
The probability densities of the item responses as a function of the attitude are
approximated using exponential tilting of second degree. Subtracting the cumulative
distributions corresponding to these densities from 1, we obtain downward sloping
lines. The units of measurement are then transformed into [−∞,∞] by the normal
distribution function. To ensure that they do not cross, the lines of the boxes are
constructed as products of the ﬁrst lines.
The integration for the probability of a particular outcome for individual i
(p(r1,r2,...,rm|W) =
R
p(r1|a)p(r2|a)...p(rm|a)f(a|W)da) has been carried out us-
ing a Gaussian quadrature at 200 grid points. To ensure that even the distributions
with small variances are collected, the gaussian quadrature has been applied to 5
diﬀerent segments of the grid, with the one in the middle having more points.
The parameters obtained are the ones describing the distribution functions as
well as the parameters associated to the personal characteristics (indicating the eﬀect
on location relative to the probability distribution of the ‘standardized respondent’).
Since the estimation is done using exponential tilting of second degree, for each
distribution function there are two parameters being estimated. The parameters
associated to the personal characteristics are shown in Table 4.5.
2.4.2. Obtaining the Individual Level of Trust
One of the advantages of the methodology that I am using is that I can calculate
the distribution of estimated trust for each individual. Applying Bayes’ Law, the












The elements of this expression have all been estimated previously; p(r|W) is given
as
R
p(r|a)f(a|W)da in equation 4.3.
Note that in estimating f(a|W,r) I use all the information; both the personal
characteristics and the item responses. It seems reasonable to think that f(a|W,r)
El-Attar Vilalta, Mayssun (2010), Identification and Estimation of Latent Variables and their Effect on Social and Economic Outcomes 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/182672.5. DATA 63
will be the most informative measure that can be obtained. To illustrate the eﬀect of
personal characteristics and item responses on our measure consider as an example
the four respondents represented in Figure 2.4. The left panel shows the probability
distribution of trust for two women who gave the same responses ( the answers were
[1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1]), but who diﬀer in their personal characteristics. Respondent A
is a Spanish mother, she is 34, has high income, tertiary studies, lives in a city
and does not belong to a discriminated group. On the intensity of religion scale
(0-10) she situates herself at level 0 and on the left-right scale she situates herself
at 7. Respondent B is a Ukrainian mother, she is 28, has secondary education, low
income, lives in a village and does not belong to a discriminated group. On the
intensity of religion scale (0-10) she situates herself at level 5 and on the left-right
scale she situates herself as 9. The ﬁgure shows that while the two give the same
responses, the probability distribution of trust for respondent A lies further to the
right. This is because despite the fact that they give the same answers, Respondent
A’s personal characteristics are associated with higher levels of trust than those of
Respondent B.
The right panel of Figure 2.4 shows the probability distribution of two Greek
women, with very similar personal characteristics (they are between 30 and 35 years
old, live in a city, have medium income and secondary studies and do not belong to a
discriminated group. On the intensity of religion scale (0-10) they situate themselves
at level 6 or 7 and on the left-right scale they situate themselves as 5) but they give
very diﬀerent responses to the items (Respondent C answers [1,1,1,3,2,1,1,1], and
Respondent D answers [3,3,3,2,3,1,1,1].) Here, clearly the item responses drive
the estimates of trust.
2.5. Data
To estimate the attitudes on trust I use the second wave of the European Social
Survey (ESS). The ESS is a recent data set covering 26 European Countries in 2004.
It provides rich information on social attitudes. In this round, the questionnaire
includes, for the ﬁrst time, a module on ‘economic morality’. This module is de-
signed to investigate the normative and moral culture of markets and consumption
in European countries and is useful for us because it contains some questions about
the level of trust and conﬁdence in business and state/government institutions. In
addition, the ESS also contains information about some demographic variables. In
accordance with the theoretical model, some of these (described below) will also be
used in the estimation. In this paper I have restricted my sample to married women
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with children younger than 12. After this selection, Slovenia is removed from the
sample since were left with only two observations for this country.
To measure the attitudes in shared trust I choose eight questions/items related
to this scale. The original wording of the questions/items used to estimate the
individual’s latent attitudes towards trust is shown in the appendix, just as the
original wording of the question about diﬀerent types of child care.
Summary statistics of the responses to the these items are presented in Table
4.2. Scales are recoded such that each item has three possible answers (1-3 scale).9
A higher score corresponds to a higher level of trust. Even inside each scale the
answering behavior varies over these items. Considering for instance the question
“How much do you trust public oﬃcials?” and the question “Can politicians be
trusted?”, the means range from 2.20 to 1.55. This indicates that diﬀerent items
carry information on respondents’ attitudes to a varying degree. Thus, by focussing
on just one or on a narrow subset of these items, valuable information might be lost.
This is also indicated by the pairwise correlation coeﬃcients for the items shown in
Table 4.4; correlations are positive but far from perfect.
Table 4.3 contains summary statistics of the personal and demographic char-
acteristics that I expect to be related to an individual’s level of trust, as well as
with the type of child care used. Whether these relationships hold in the data is an
empirical question on which this analysis can shed some light.
2.6. Results
2.6.1. How Personal and Demographics Characteristics relate to Trust
Table 4.5 shows the eﬀect of W on the location (µ) of a. The eﬀects are additive,
which means that statements such as ‘more educated people have more trust in
others’ must be understood in a ceteris paribus sense (Spady 2006). The eﬀect of
age10, intensity of Religion and the left-right scale are shown in Figure 2.3.
The factors that aﬀect trust most strongly are the level of education and be-
longing to a discriminated group. The signs of the coeﬃcients are as expected:
Belonging to a discriminated group has a strong negative eﬀect on trust. Lower
levels of education also aﬀect the level of trust negatively. I do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
eﬀect for the diﬀerent income levels, nor for living in a village. Age matters; younger
and older mothers have less trust than the middle-aged. This result is similar to the
ones obtained by Putnam (2000) and by Glaeser et al. (2002). These authors ﬁnd
that this U-shaped proﬁle is predicted by their model of social capital accumulation
9The recoding does not matter for our estimation.
10Notice that the variables presented in the tables are Age = Age − mean(Age)and Age.01 =
(Age − mean(Age)2/100), the same for intensity of religion and left-right scale
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over the life cycle. In the present case, the cross-sectional nature of the data does
not allow us to distinguish whether this pattern is due to this life cycle pattern or
to cohort eﬀects. The intensity of religion also has the expected eﬀect, with more
religious mothers trusting others more. As to political orientation, what matters
is more a distinction between the center and extremes than between right and left:
people that identify with more extreme values have less trust in others. The level
of trust decreases particularly rapidly for those that identify with the far-left. The
highest value is reached in the center-right. It is important to notice that in de-
termining a person’s level of trust, these eﬀects taken together can neutralize or
reinforce each other. For instance, religiosity is positively correlated with belonging
to a discriminated group, and these two eﬀects can neutralize each other.
2.6.2. Trust Across Countries
Country characteristics such as diﬀerences in institutions, in labor market con-
ditions, or in income and ethnical inequality also aﬀect trust, as captured by the
country ﬁxed eﬀects. These coeﬃcients, shown in Table 4.5, make it clear that Euro-
pean countries diﬀer quite a lot.
11 The coeﬃcient is largest for the Nordic countries,
and lowest in the Eastern European countries. Since the level of trust of each coun-
try also depends on the characteristics of its inhabitants, individuals’ characteristics
need to be taken into account in studying the realized distribution of trust across
countries, and it is not enough to look at the coeﬃcients reported in Table 4.5. For
this reason, Table 2.5 reports country averages of individuals’ mean trust. To make
the means comparable to the coeﬃcients, both measures are normalized so that they
range from 0 to 1.
The order of the ranking varies only slightly between the two diﬀerent measures.
This indicates that the country dummies explain quite a lot of the diﬀerences in levels
of trust. This result ﬁts with those obtained in experimental frameworks. Henrich,
Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, Gintis, McElreath, Alvard, Barr, Ensminger, Henrich,
Hill, Gil-White, Gurven, Marlowe, Patton and Tracer (2005) provide evidence that
individuals from diﬀerent cultures behave diﬀerently in ultimatum games and public
good games, and Bornhorst, Ichino, Schlag and Winter (2005) ﬁnd that there are
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between Southern and Northern Europeans in terms of trust
in a trust game experiment with PhD students from diﬀerent European countries.
As Holm and Danielson (2005) say, all this evidence may be an indication that “trust
operates diﬀerently in diﬀerent cultures, even in relatively homogeneous groups.”
This is also clear from the map in Figure 2.5 which shows the pattern of the
levels of trust across countries. Countries have been grouped according to their
11Note that the reference country is Turkey.
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value of the indices reported in Table 2.5. The changes in the rankings when using
the two diﬀerent indices do not aﬀect which countries are included in each group,
underlining again that it is mainly country-speciﬁc, not individual-speciﬁc, factors
that matter for cross-country diﬀerences.
2.6.3. Testing the Relationship between Trust and Child Care Technology
Choice
Table 2.7 shows the results of the estimation of equation 2.1. To perform this
estimation I use an ordered probit. The model is estimated for three diﬀerent
samples, the ﬁrst consisting of all the countries, the second of all the countries
except the Nordic countries, and the third of the Nordic Countries only. I am forced
to exclude Turkey from the sample since in this country almost nobody uses the
more external forms of child care (See Table 2.6). The availability of child care in
Turkey is so low that it is diﬃcult to assume that for most of the mothers the use
of external child care constitutes a feasible choice.
In the full sample, I observe that trust has a non-linear, signiﬁcantly positive
eﬀect on the externalness of child care, i.e. higher trust increases the probability
of leaving the child with a more external type of child care. At high levels of
trust, increments in trust cease to have an eﬀect, as captured by the non-linearity.
When I separate the sample, I observe that the eﬀect of trust is linear for the
non-Nordic countries. As average trust is signiﬁcantly lower in these countries, the
non-linearity, which occurs for high levels of trust, cannot be identiﬁed here. In
the Nordic countries, in contrast, trust has no eﬀect on the degree of externalness
of child care. Several factors could be driving this result. First, the eﬀect of trust
on externalness can only be identiﬁed if a change in the type of child care can
occur. However, in practice, the menu of child care choices is limited; if trust in
the Nordic countries is generally high and as a consequence most people choose the
most external type of child care (as shown in Table 2.6), people who would prefer
even more external child care do not have such an option. Secondly, it could be that
social policies are such that the cost of child care is so low that the most external
choice is dominant for most people independently of trust. A low gender wage gap
could have a similar eﬀect. This suggests that cost is not the only factor leading to
the choice of high levels of externalness of child care and high female labor market
participation in the Nordic countries compared to the rest of Europe. Trust can also
be an important explanatory factor.
The remaining variables take the expected sign. The coeﬃcient on grandmother’s
labor market participation is positive and signiﬁcant even for the Nordic countries.
The husband’s income is negatively associated to the degree of externalness, so the
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eﬀect on the marginal utility of consumption gained by a mother’s labor market
participation outweighs that on the aﬀordability of child care. This is similar to
ﬁndings in the literature that male wages are positively related to fertility and neg-
atively to women’s participation.
12 Education has a positive eﬀect on externalness.
This is true both for a higher degree held by the mother (though not for a secondary
degree) and for a secondary or higher degree held by the partner. Columns IV to VI
show the same speciﬁcation but this time controlling for household income instead
of husband’s income. Although the eﬀect of trust remains similar, this speciﬁcation
could suﬀer from endogeneity problems as the entire households’ income includes
the mothers’ income. This endogeneity could explain the diﬀerences in education
coeﬃcients.
Most of the country dummies included in the regressions are also signiﬁcant.
Hence, factors other than trust and the other controls also matter in explaining
child care choices; data on the cost of child care in diﬀerent countries would help to
shed more light on this. For that purpose I use a measure of out-of-pocket child care
costs for a lone parent using full-time care at a typical child care center calculated
by the OCDE. Unfortunately, I do not have this information for all the countries of
the sample. Therefore, I perform the analysis using only the countries for which I
have this information. Table 2.8 shows the measure of child care cost per country
and the sample of countries for which I have this information. The ﬁrst two columns
of Table 2.9 compare the results of all the sample including country ﬁxed eﬀects and
the ones obtained using the sample of countries for which I have information on child
care costs. I observe that the eﬀect of trust is larger and still signiﬁcant and that
the child care costs have a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on the degree of externalness.
For the rest of speciﬁcations (discussed below) I also perform the analysis for the
reduced group of countries and including the child care cost measure. The eﬀect of
child care costs is always signiﬁcant, but the interpretation of this coeﬃcient requires
care since it could be picking up other variables with country variation.
Culture and trust: In measuring trust, it has been shown that political ori-
entation, belonging to a group that historically felt discriminated, and intensity of
religion are among the variables related to trust. It is possible that these variables
are correlated with certain cultural perceptions about the role of women in the fam-
ily. To verify this possibility, I include a proxy for these cultural diﬀerences in our
regression. The proxy takes the value 1 if the woman thinks that the mother should
12For evidence for various countries, see Carliner, Robinson and Tomes (1980) on Canada,
Ermisch (1989) on the UK, Colombino and Di Tommaso (1996) and Di Tommaso (1999) on Italy,
and Hotz and Miller (1988) on the US.
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reduce work in favor of family obligations.
13 Columns III and IV of Table 2.9 show
the results of including this variable, excluding and including child care costs respec-
tively. The results indicate that the variable is important in determining the degree
of desired externalness. However, the eﬀect of trust remains positive and signiﬁcant.
It also retains the non-linear pattern found before.
I also verify the eﬀect of including the variables reﬂecting political orientation,
feeling of belonging to a discriminated group, and intensity of religion in the regres-
sions. The results are shown in columns V and VI of Table 2.9. The coeﬃcient
on belonging to a discriminated group and intensity of religion are negative and
signiﬁcant for both speciﬁcations. The eﬀect of trust, however, remains positive and
signiﬁcant.
The role of education: It could be argued that trust should play less of a role
for more educated mothers. For instance, it may be that more educated mothers
feel more able to specify what type of education they want for their children and
more able to enforce it. Trust should then matter less for their decision.
To test this hypothesis, I separate the sample between mothers with higher
education and mothers with primary or secondary education. The results obtained
are shown in Table 2.10. Indeed, the more highly educated mothers do not rely
on trust when taking the decision about the degree of externalness desired. The
results hold when controlling for costs of child care. Trust remains very signiﬁcant
for mothers with lower levels of education.
Trust and female participation in the labor market: The previous results
show that trust increases the probability of using a more external type of child care.
If this transition if from child care by the mother to child care by someone else,
this means that more trust can encourage labor market participation. To explore
this possibility with more detail, Table 2.11 shows the results of a probit estimation
where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if mother’s mains activity is paid work and
0 otherwise. The results conﬁrm that trust increases the probability that mothers
participate in the labor market. Previously I have identiﬁed a possible channel; they
have a higher predisposition to use more external forms of child care.
2.7. Conclusion
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that trust aﬀects mothers’ choice
child care technology. In extension, it may also aﬀect their decision to participate in
the labor market. Since the results show strong diﬀerences of trust across countries,
13The exact wording is “A woman should be prepared to cut down on her paid work for the
sake of her family.”
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trust could also be a possible explanation for the diﬀerences in the use of formal
child care and in female participation rates across countries.
Although it would be desirable to formally take into account additional factors
such as policies aﬀecting the cost of child care or gender discrimination in the labor
market, this paper raises the issue that the level of conﬁdence of citizens with their
institutions and with other citizens may have important implications for female labor
force participation.
Results are obtained using a new item response model for measuring individuals’
attitudes (here, trust). Item response theory models are conceptually cleaner than
previously used methods since they allows estimating trust directly (and not a proxy)
as a latent attitude and using a simple theoretical model. The item response model
used in this paper does also allows to consider a very ﬂexible functional form. In line
with the idea that generalized trust is a broad idea, the model allows to build the
individual measure using diﬀerent dimension of trust, avoiding problems of other
papers that use more partial measures.
In measuring the individual level of trust, I exploit information on individuals’
attitudes contained in survey responses, and information from personal and demo-
graphic characteristics. This allows to see the probability distribution of the latent
attitude, conditional on these characteristics. In particular, education, age, intensity
of religion, political orientation, and being from a discriminated group can explain
part of the distribution of trust. Regional characteristics are also very important in
explaining diﬀerences of trust across Europe.
The ﬁndings of this paper imply that social policies aﬀecting the cost and avail-
ability of child care are not the only factor that facilitates the use of formal child
care and promotes labor market participation of mothers; trust and any policies
aﬀecting it also matter. Enhancing trust may also make social policies more eﬀec-
tive, particularly in countries with low levels of trust such as the Eastern European
countries. This could be achieved by increasing trust in institutions, but also by
raising levels of education, and by reducing discrimination.
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Appendix
Appendix 2.A. Original wording of the questions/items used
• Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?14 (Score of 0 to 10, where 0
means you can’t be too careful and 10 means most people can be trusted.)
• Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they
got the chance, or would they try to be fair?15 (Score of 0 to 10, where 0
means most people would try to take advantage of me and 10 means most
people would try to be fair.)
• Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they
are mostly looking out for themselves?16 (Score of 0 to 10, where 0 means
people mostly look out for themselves and 10 means people mostly try to
be helpful.)
• Please tell me how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read
out. (Score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you do not trust an institution at all,
and 10 means you have complete trust.)
– the legal system
– politicians
• How much would you trust the following groups to deal honestly with people
like you? (Score of 1 to 5, where 1 means you distrust and 5 means you
trust a lot.)
– plumbers, builders, car mechanics and other repair people17
– ﬁnancial companies such as banks or insurers.
– public oﬃcials18
14Can’t be too careful: need to be wary or always somewhat suspicious.
15Take advantage: exploit or cheat; fair: in the sense of treat appropriately and straightforwardly.
16The intended contrast is between self-interest and altruistic helpfulness.
17Builders include all kinds of tradespeople who work on building sites.
18Public oﬃcials refers to both government oﬃcials, such as custom oﬃcers and to local oﬃcials,
such as housing/building regulators etc.
El-Attar Vilalta, Mayssun (2010), Identification and Estimation of Latent Variables and their Effect on Social and Economic Outcomes 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/18267APPENDIX 2.B. TABLES AND FIGURES 73
Appendix 2.B. Tables and Figures
Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics of the items used to estimate the
Trust Scale.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Most People Trusted 1.962 0.837 1 3
Most People Fair 2.157 0.820 1 3
Most People Helpful 1.874 0.803 1 3
Trust Legal System 2.080 0.835 1 3
Trust Politicians 1.552 0.704 1 3
Trust Repair People 2.125 0.838 1 3
Trust Banks 2.109 0.835 1 3
Trust Public Oﬃcials 2.202 0.782 1 3
Table 2.2. Pairwise Correlation Coeﬃcients for the items used to
build the two scales.
Question Trust People People Fair People Help Legal System
Trust People 1.000
People Fair 0.545 1.000
People Help 0.426 0.429 1.000
Legal System 0.254 0.215 0.232 1.000
Politicians 0.252 0.194 0.201 0.445
Repair Things 0.135 0.163 0.140 0.119
Banks 0.134 0.152 0.1160 0.121
Public Oﬃcials 0.160 0.185 0.133 0.250
Question Politicians Repair Things Banks Public Oﬃcials
Politicians 1.000
Repair Things 0.113 1.000
Banks 0.154 0.401 1.000
Public Oﬃcials 0.198 0.340 0.468 1.000
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Table 2.3. Descriptive Statistics for the Personal and Demographic
Characteristics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Age 35.584 6.923
Primary Degree 0.129 0.336
Secondary Degree 0.513 0.500
Higher Degree 0.357 0.479
City 0.320 0.467
Intensity Religion 5.496 2.814
Left-Right 5.589 5.159
Discriminated Group 0.067 0.249
Average Income 32601.52 29418.70
Husband’s Income 21970.01 21776.23
Partner Primary Degree 0.310 0.463
Partner Secondary Degree 0.420 0.494
Partner High Degree 0.258 0.438














Figure 2.1. Diagram of the underlying process.
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Figure 2.2. Estimates of the item response model for the items con-
































































































Figure 2.3. The eﬀect of the three continuous demographic vari-
ables: Age, Intensity of Religion, Left-Right Scale.
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Table 2.4. Estimated Coeﬃcients for Personal and Demographic
Characteristics in Trust Scale.
Standard Errors
Variable Coeﬃcient Outer Product Hessian White Robust
Age 0.0103 0.0039 0.0036 0.0035
Agesq.01 -0.0752 0.0320 0.0305 0.0293
Income1 -0.1056 0.0806 0.0756 0.0732
Income3 0.0050 0.0662 0.0626 0.0608
PrimaryDegree -0.3028 0.0889 0.0834 0.0808
HigherDegree 0.3215 0.0587 0.0544 0.0521
Village 0.0113 0.0530 0.0492 0.0468
IntensityReligion 0.0281 0.0100 0.0095 0.0092
IntRelig.01 0.3743 0.2868 0.2656 0.2516
DiscriminatedGroup -0.4876 0.1030 0.0942 0.0882
LeftRight 0.0226 0.0120 0.0115 0.0115
LeftRight.01 -0.0313 0.0159 0.0156 0.0158
Austria 0.9958 0.1465 0.1430 0.1479
Belgium 0.5473 0.1569 0.1469 0.1479
Switzerland 1.1304 0.1236 0.1282 0.1419
Chez Republic 0.1046 0.1341 0.1351 0.1445
Germany 0.3995 0.1123 0.1205 0.1388
Denmark 1.9314 0.1470 0.1260 0.1193
Estonia 0.4844 0.1607 0.1574 0.1611
Spain 0.1402 0.1539 0.1443 0.1441
Finland 1.4525 0.1161 0.1186 0.1304
France 0.3210 0.1433 0.1260 0.1215
Great Britain 0.5209 0.1216 0.1331 0.1532
Greece -0.5820 0.1217 0.1195 0.1212
Hungary -0.0409 0.1629 0.1439 0.1335
Ireland 0.7222 0.1179 0.1177 0.1276
Iceland 1.4234 0.2514 0.1929 0.1610
Luxembourg 0.2671 0.1885 0.1676 0.1565
Netherlands 0.9396 0.1246 0.1158 0.1170
Norway 1.5071 0.1406 0.1226 0.1156
Poland -0.2285 0.1549 0.1309 0.1223
Portugal -0.2553 0.1465 0.1398 0.1434
Sweden 1.0094 0.1268 0.1404 0.1611
Slovakia -0.0193 0.2006 0.1631 0.1430
Ukraine -0.1569 0.1722 0.1607 0.1592
Italy -0.4836 0.1978 0.2113 0.2487
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Figure 2.4. Probability density distribution of the latent attitudes
for diﬀerent respondents.
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Table 2.5. Diﬀerences in trust levels across countries.



























Table 2.6. Percentage of mothers using diﬀerent types of technology
(diﬀerences across samples).
All countries Non Nordic Nordic Turkey
included* countries countries
Mother Home 37.69 42.15 19.38 83.87
Family Member 39.21 40.74 32.96 14.92
Baby-Sitter 6.86 6.79 7.13 0.81
Kindergarten 16.24 10.32 40.53 0.40
Sample Size 2090 1841 449 248
This sample does not include Turkey.
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Figure 2.5. Trust across Europe: from dark (more trust) to light
(less trust)
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Table 2.8. Out-of-pocket child care costs for a lone parent: full-time
care at a typical child care centre.
Child Child care Net cost,
Country care beneﬁt/ Tax Other Net % family
fee rebates reduction beneﬁts cost net income
Norway 18.0 -18.9 -2.9 0.0 -3.8 -5.76
Hungary 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00
Portugal 27.8 -26.4 -0.1 0.0 1.3 2.00
Netherlands 8.0 0.0 -2.9 -3.3 1.7 3.00
Belgium 12.5 -8.7 -1.8 0.0 1.9 3.53
Greece 3.7 -0.9 -0.1 0.0 2.7 4.58
Finland 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 4.15
Sweden 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 4.85
Luxembourg 7.7 -4.2 0.0 0.0 3.4 4.84
Germany 6.2 -2.1 -0.5 0.0 3.6 6.81
France 6.7 0.0 -1.7 0.0 5.0 8.75
Austria 5.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 9.28
Denmark 11.4 -5.4 0.0 0.0 6.0 8.48
Poland 9.3 -4.1 0.0 4.1 9.3 12.69
UK 47.8 -26.0 0.0 -12.0 9.9 14.37
Czech Republic 10.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.3 14.71
Iceland 12.5 -2.1 0.0 0.0 10.4 13.54
Slovak Republic 11.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.3 17.10
Switzerland 15.0 0.0 -1.1 0.0 13.9 22.70
Ireland 49.6 -5.0 0.0 0.0 44.6 51.75
Results are for 2004. Two children aged two and three. ‘Family net income’ is the sum of gross
earnings plus cash beneﬁts minus taxes and social contributions. All fee reductions, including free
pre-school or child care for certain age groups, are shown as rebates where possible. Source:
OECD tax-beneﬁt models.
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Table 2.9. Ordered Probit Estimation for Child Care Technology
Choice: Including cost of child care and other cultural variables.
Child Care Type All CC Cost Culture Culture Other Other culture
CC Cost culture CC Cost
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Trust 0.073 ∗∗ 0.162 ∗∗∗ 0.069 ∗ 0.156 ∗∗∗ 0.065 ∗ 0.152 ∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036)
Trust2 -0.034 ∗∗ -0.020 -0.034 ∗∗ -0.021 -0.033 ∗ -0.013
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Income Husb. -0.007 ∗∗∗ -0.005 ∗∗∗ -0.007 ∗∗∗ -0.005 ∗∗∗ -0.008 ∗∗∗ -0.005 ∗∗∗
/1000 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 0.013 0.016 ∗∗∗ 0.013 ∗∗∗ 0.016 ∗∗∗ 0.013 ∗∗∗ 0.016 ∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
City 0.048 -0.030 0.061 -0.020 0.059 -0.013
(0.067) (0.070) (0.067) (0.070) (0.067) (0.070)
Second Educ 0.183 ∗ 0.038 0.174 ∗ 0.024 0.162 0.004
(0.106) (0.109) (0.106) (0.109) (0.106) (0.110)
High Educ 0.548 ∗∗∗ 0.492 ∗∗∗ 0.538 ∗∗∗ 0.474 ∗∗∗ 0.530 ∗∗∗ 0.480 ∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.119) (0.115) (0.119) (0.115) (0.119)
Partner Second 0.146 ∗∗ -0.010 0.141 ∗∗ -0.018 0.150 ∗∗ -0.016
(0.066) (0.064) (0.066) (0.064) (0.066) (0.064)
Partner High 0.166 ∗∗ 0.050 0.160 ∗∗ 0.050 0.177 ∗∗∗ 0.054
(0.077) (0.078) (0.077) (0.078) (0.077) (0.078)
Grandma 0.213 ∗∗∗ 0.282 ∗∗∗ 0.210 ∗∗∗ 0.281 ∗∗∗ 0.209 ∗∗∗ 0.263 ∗∗∗
worked (0.054) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053) (0.055) (0.053)
Child care cost -0.011 ∗∗∗ -0.011 ∗∗∗ -0.010 ∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)




Discriminated -0.252 ∗∗ -0.238 ∗∗
Group (0.105) (0.108)
Intensity -0.016 ∗ -0.039 ∗∗∗
Religion (0.009) (0.009)
Country yes yes yes
Dummies
LR-Chi2 524.34 233.22 535.15 247.95 533.87 259.37
pseudo-R2 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.05
N 2290 2030 2290 2030 2290 2030
Standard errors in parentheses; stars indicate signiﬁcance at 10 (∗), 5 (∗∗), and 1 (∗∗∗) percent
levels, respectively.
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Table 2.10. Ordered Probit Estimation for Child Care Technology
Choice: Analyzing the role of education
Child Care Type Low High Low High
Education Education Education Education
Trust 0.129 ∗∗∗ -0.068 0.197 ∗∗∗ 0.081
(0.043) (0.070) (0.041) (0.070)
Trust2 -0.060 ∗∗∗ 0.022 -0.053 ∗∗ 0.029
(0.023) (0.029) (0.023) (0.030)
Income Husband/1000 -0.008 ∗∗∗ -0.007 ∗∗∗ -0.005 ∗∗∗ -0.004 ∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age 0.013 ∗∗∗ 0.014 ∗∗ 0.019 ∗∗∗ 0.012 ∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
City 0.024 0.098 -0.081 0.048
(0.093) (0.098) (0.097) (0.103)
Partner Second 0.156 ∗∗ 0.160 -0.019 0.018
(0.077) (0.132) (0.071) (0.133)
Partner High 0.197 ∗ 0.194 0.089 0.058
(0.108) (0.129) (0.106) (0.133)
Grandma worked 0.247 ∗∗∗ 0.157 ∗ 0.302 ∗∗∗ 0.252 ∗∗∗
when mothe 14 (0.071) (0.087) (0.067) (0.085)
Child care cost -0.014 ∗∗∗ -0.008 ∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Country Dummies yes yes
LR-Chi2 259.05 162.26 80.79 41.04
pseudo-R2 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.02
N 1405 885 1258 772
Standard errors in parentheses; stars indicate signiﬁcance at 10 (*), 5 (**), and 1 (***) percent
levels, respectively.
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Table 2.11. Probit Estimation for the mother’s probability of par-
ticipating in the labor market.
Mother (I) (II) (III) (IV)
works (= 1) All CC Cost Low Educ High Educ
Trust 0.089 ∗∗ 0.132 ∗∗∗ 0.148 ∗∗∗ -0.086
(0.042) (0.040) (0.049) (0.086)
Trust2 -0.040 ∗∗ -0.033 ∗ -0.056 ∗∗ 0.017
(0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.036)
Income Husband/1000 -0.010 ∗∗∗ -0.006 ∗∗∗ -0.011 ∗∗∗ -0.009 ∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Age 0.019 ∗∗∗ 0.022 ∗∗∗ 0.011 ∗∗ 0.037 ∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
City 0.014 -0.093 0.108 -0.055
(0.078) (0.081) (0.106) (0.119)
Second Educ 0.329 ∗∗∗ 0.127
(0.122) (0.122)
High Educ 0.750 ∗∗∗ 0.597 ∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.134)
Partner Second 0.205 ∗∗∗ -0.001 0.238 ∗∗∗ 0.144
(0.076) (0.073) (0.088) (0.163)
Partner High 0.172 0.029 0.222 ∗ 0.155
(0.091) (0.090) (0.124) (0.161)
Grandma worked 0.229 ∗∗∗ 0.228 ∗∗∗ 0.294 ∗∗∗ 0.130
when mothe 14 (0.063) (0.060) (0.081) (0.106)
Child care cost -0.006 ∗
(0.003)
Constant -1.558 ∗∗∗ -0.937 ∗∗∗ -1.118 ∗∗∗ -1.195 ∗∗∗
(0.242) (0.206) (0.256) (0.396)
Country Dummies yes yes yes
LR-Chi2 327.96 153.57 159.34 112.08
pseudo-R2 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.10
N 2290 2030 1405 885
Standard errors in parentheses; stars indicate signiﬁcance at 10 (*), 5 (**), and 1 (***) percent
levels, respectively.




Trust and the Choice Between Housing and Financial
Assets: Evidence from Spanish Households
Abstract. Trust has been shown to aﬀect households’ portfolio choice.
We argue that it also inﬂuences their investment in housing, which for
many households is the main portfolio component. We test this hypoth-
esis using data for Spain. Using data from the European Social Survey
(ESS), we estimate individual-level trust as a latent attitude using survey
questions on personal attitudes by applying the econometric methodol-
ogy by Spady (2007). We then combine this information with information
about Spanish households’ ﬁnancial decisions from the Survey of House-
hold Finances (EFF) conducted by the Bank of Spain. We ﬁnd that trust
has a positive eﬀect on the share of wealth invested in ﬁnancial assets and
a negative eﬀect on the share of wealth invested in housing. Trust also
has an important eﬀect on the share of risky assets in ﬁnancial assets.
Trust can therefore be a possible explanation for the low participation in
ﬁnancial markets and the high percentage of households’ wealth invested
in real estate.
Keywords. housing, trust, portfolio choice, item response models.
JEL Classification. D1, D8, Z1.
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3.1. Introduction
While most of the literature on portfolio choice has focussed on holdings of risky
assets, the asset class that actually dominates private asset holdings is real estate.
Figure 3.1 shows that in Spain, real estate accounts for a high percentage of assets
held at all but the very lowest percentiles of the gross wealth distribution. In fact,
as shown in Figure 3.2, the number of households that hold risky assets is almost
negligible for most of the wealth distribution, while nearly all households have some
real estate from the 20th percentile of the wealth distribution on. Figure 3.3 shows
that real estate dominates the portfolios of low and middle class households. Finan-
cial assets and risky assets become somewhat important for wealthier households
only.
Although housing also dominates households’ portfolios in other developed coun-
tries, it is particularly important in Spain, making it a good case to study. The per-
centage of households that are owner occupiers is very large in Spain (82% versus
around 70% in the UK, the US and Italy). In addition, the percentage of house-
holds owning real estate other than the household’s main residence is also higher in
Spain (30% versus 22% in Italy, 17% in the United States and 8.5% in the United
Kingdom).1 All this evidence indicates that the pattern that a small percentage of
households own risky assets (especially for the low wealth quantiles) while many
households own real estate is found across countries, but is particularly pronounced
in Spain.
As pointed out by Bover et al. (2005), this situation makes Spanish households
more dependent on real estate property prices and makes it more diﬃcult to ad-
just the composition of their portfolios when facing adverse shocks. This became
very evident in the recent (since 2007) period of declining house prices. In such an
environment, Oswald’s (1996) argument that home ownership raises mobility costs
and makes labor market adjustment harder gains particular force. In addition, rates
of home ownership matter for monetary policy transmission, interest rate deter-
mination, the welfare cost of inﬂation, and for other macro policies. Households’
participation in ﬁnancial markets also inﬂuences the equity premium (see Vissing-
Jorgensen and Attanasio (2003) and Heaton and Lucas (1996)). Finally, portfolio
composition has eﬀects on the retirement situation and on intergenerational wealth
transmission (bequests). For all these reasons, understanding factors behind portfo-
lio composition is important. In particular, it is relevant to understand why Spanish
portfolios are so skewed towards real estate.
1Data from Bover, Martinez-Carrasco and Velilla (2005) who compares Spain with the US, the
UK and Italy.
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While portfolio choice can have large macroeconomic implications, its determi-
nants are not only “traditional” economic variables: A recent literature ﬁnds that
social attitudes inﬂuence portfolio choice. Diﬀerent authors have studied the eﬀect
of social interactions (as a mechanism through which information can be transmit-
ted) on participation in pension plans (Duﬂo and Saez (2002)) or in the stock market
(Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004)). The eﬀect of trust on portfolio decisions has been
studied by Guiso et al. (2004) and Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008). These au-
thors argue that when dealing with risky assets, the individual’s perception of their
risk is not only a function of the assets, but also of the subjective characteristics of
the investor. The expected return may depend on a series of uncontrollable events
that most of the time can be related to human misbehavior. As a consequence, less
trustful individuals participate less in ﬁnancial markets. They test this hypothesis
empirically for Italy and the Netherlands.
Pursuing this argument further, we argue in this paper that individuals’ decision
about how much to invest in housing versus other ﬁnancial assets is aﬀected by trust.
We sketch a very simple model where housing, while constituting an investment, also
yields ﬂow utility from use. Demand for housing is determined simultaneously with
demand for other assets. If trust aﬀects the expected return of the risky ﬁnancial
assets, it also determines how much the households invests in housing.
To test this hypothesis empirically, we use data from the European Social Survey
(ESS) and from the Survey of Household Finances (EFF) conducted by the Bank of
Spain.2 While the EFF does not contain information on trust, it can still be used
by proceeding in two steps. First, using data from the ESS, we estimate probability
distributions of trust for a large set of detailed demographic groups (where the
groups are deﬁned for given sets of demographic characteristics: age, education,
parents information, gender, number of members in the family...). We then exploit
the variation between these groups to identify the eﬀect of trust on the share of
wealth invested in housing, in ﬁnancial assets and in risky ﬁnancial assets.
For this two-step approach, it is particularly important to have a good measure of
trust in the ﬁrst step. Hence, instead of using partial information or distant proxies
as previously done in the literature, we apply a hierarchical item response model by
Spady (2007) that, while imposing some parametric assumptions, is highly ﬂexible
and still allows to exploit all the information available. Employing this method,
we can use information from several questions about trust and about individuals’
demographic characteristics.
2I would like to thank the Bank of Spain, in particular Olympia Bover, for channeling the blind
use of regional information, protecting the conﬁdentiality of the EFF, following up my stay in the
Research Division as a visiting Ph.D. researcher.
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We ﬁnd that trust has a positive eﬀect on the share of wealth invested in ﬁnancial
assets and a negative eﬀect on the share of wealth invested in housing. We also ﬁnd
that trust has a large eﬀect on the share of ﬁnancial assets invested in risky assets.
In Spain, as opposed to Guiso et al.’s (2004) results for Italy, trust does not aﬀect
cash holdings.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2 we give a brief
overview of the determinants of portfolio choice and remaining puzzles, as estab-
lished in the literature. Section 3.3 presents a simple theoretical model that will
guide the estimation. Section 3.4 shows the structural representation of the empir-
ical model and discusses the measurement of trust. In section 3.5 we present the
data used; we describe the questionnaire items and the personal and demographic
characteristics of the respondents that play a role in the estimation of trust (ESS).
We also describe the dataset with the information about the ﬁnancial situation of
households in Spain (EFF). In section 3.6 we obtain the measures of trust and an-
alyze its determinants. We study the eﬀect of trust on the share of wealth invested
in ﬁnancial assets, housing, and risky assets. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2. Puzzles and Determinants of Portfolio Decisions
The theoretical literature on household portfolio decisions has focussed mainly
on the choice between risky and non risky ﬁnancial assets.
The limited stock market participation (called the equity market participation
puzzle), while especially strong in Spain, is a stylized fact identiﬁed in almost all
developed economies. Theoretical research has analyzed and proposed diﬀerent ex-
planations for this phenomenon: The existence of market imperfections like credit
constraints, participation and information costs, the presence of background risk
and non-standard preferences.
Some costs for entering the stock market such as broker fees are observable.
Others are unobservable, for instance the cost of being aware of the existence of
stock markets, and of learning how they work. The fact that wealth and income
appear as signiﬁcant variables in participation regressions (see Vissing-Jorgensen
(2002)) has been interpreted as evidence of a role of ﬁxed entry costs. Education
also appears signiﬁcantly, supporting a role of learning costs. (See Bayer, Beheim
and Scholz (1996) and Beheim and Garret (2003) for an analysis of the eﬀects of
ﬁnancial education on retirement plans. Guiso and Japelli (2005) ﬁnd that awareness
of the existence of ﬁnancial assets is aﬀected by education and argue that the lack
of awareness can resolve part of the stockholding puzzle.)
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The presence of background risk can also have an inﬂuence on households’ asset
allocation. Heaton and Lucas (2000a) and Heaton and Lucas (2000b) ﬁnd that
households with signiﬁcant business holdings or ownership of their employer’s stock
tend to hold a smaller fraction of their liquid ﬁnancial assets in the form of stocks.
Non-standard preferences and loss aversion have also been invoked to explain
the low participation rates in the stock market. The concept of loss aversion comes
from prospect theory. It has been demonstrated by Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
and refers to the fact that households show a stronger preference for avoiding losses
than for making gains. This type of preferences has been used by Barberis, Huang
and Santos (2001) and Barberis and Huang (2006) to explain the low participation
rates in the stock market. Halissos and Hassapis (2001) and Ang, Bekaer and Liu
(2005) use diﬀerent type of non-standard preferences to explain households’ asset
allocations.
A diﬀerent type of explanation is based on behavioral theory, the role of social
interaction and social attitudes. Diﬀerent authors have studied the role of social
interaction in portfolio decisions; Madrian and Shea (2001) and Duﬂo and Saez
(2002) study peer eﬀects on saving decisions. The idea is that individuals who work
together talk about their pension contributions. This may motivate them to acquire
similar levels of savings. Hong et al. (2004) show that social interactions also have
an eﬀect on stock market participation. They argue that more sociable potential
investors may learn about the existence and the functioning of the stock market
from interacting with other investors and that investors derive utility from being
able to share the ups and downs of the market with other fellow participants.
In this line of work, Guiso et al. (2008) ﬁnd evidence that trust is a determinant
of portfolio choice decisions. The idea is that investments involve implicit ﬁnancial
contracts. Because these contracts are not perfectly enforceable, trust will play a
role. People with less trust will think that there is a high probability of some mis-
behavior, and they will discount that from the expected return of the investment.
Individuals with more trust think that this probability will be lower, and therefore
the expected return higher. In that way, not only objective characteristics matter for
the investment, but also subjective characteristics of the individuals. These authors
argue that this explanation has the advantage of explaining the low participation
even among wealthier households, and that it can explain regional variation in par-
ticipation rates without need of unrealistic assumptions on diﬀerences of entry costs
across countries.
In the previous section we have seen that housing is the largest component of
households’ portfolios, which underlines the importance of including housing when
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analyzing the portfolio choice decision. Some authors have linked the housing in-
vestment decision with the low degree of participation in ﬁnancial markets. The
diﬃculty in modeling housing investment is due to the fact that diﬀerently from
ﬁnancial assets, it has a consumption component. Flavin and Yamashita (2002)
consider both components of housing; investment and consumption. Their model
predicts that identical households (in their preferences for risk and asset return per-
ceptions) can have very diﬀerent portfolios because they optimize their portfolios
subject to the constraint of housing. The implication of their model is that young
people have stronger demands for housing, that this acquisition of housing consti-
tutes a background risk, and that this reduces the participation in other risky assets.
Brueckner (1997) suggests that the limited participation in the stock market could
be the result of household’s rational decisions between the investment in housing,
which gives utility from consumption, and other risky investments. Cocco (2004)
also shows that investment in housing reduces stock market participation.
In this paper we analyze the eﬀect of trust on portfolio choice decisions. Con-
cretely, and diﬀerently from previous studies, we will see trust as a determinant of
the decision of allocating assets between ﬁnancial risky assets and housing. The
idea is that people with less general trust attach higher probabilities of misbehavior
to ﬁnancial transactions than to housing transactions. This will then aﬀect their
portfolio allocation decision.
3.3. A Simple Model
We will sketch a simple model to show the link between individual trust and the
portfolio choice decisions. We construct the model in terms of a household decision
about how much to invest in housing versus other assets.
Suppose that agents derive utility from housing h and from consumption c,
and that this can be characterized by an instant utility function u(c,h) that is
increasing and concave in housing and in consumption and has limx→0 ux(x) =
∞ and limx→∞ ux(x) = 0 for x = c,h. ux here denotes the derivative of u with
respect to x. Because of very high marginal utility of the ﬁrst units of housing,
all households with positive income will hold some housing.3 Agents’ income wt
follows an exogenous process. They discount future utility using a discount factor
β. They can save by investing in housing or in two types of ﬁnancial assets; a risk
3In the data, a small fraction of households does not own any housing. This can be explained
by indivisibilities: there is a minimum house size (h ≥ hmin); agents with too small endowments
to aﬀord this resort to renting. As in Cocco (2004), we abstract from this in the following. Hu
(2001) and Yao and Zhang (2005)) study the eﬀects of renting on portfolio decisions.
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free one yielding a return of rf and a risky asset that yields a stochastic return r,
with expected return E[ri] = ri > rf, and variance σ2
r.
Furthermore, suppose that a person’s trust τ inﬂuences the return they expect
from investing in risky assets. For instance, individuals with more social trust will
expect with less probability that their bank misbehaves (e.g. asks for unjustiﬁed or
exaggerated fees or gives them bad advice), or that their broker misbehaves (e.g. runs
away with the money invested; the setting used in Guiso et al. (2004)), or that other
parties involved in the investment misbehave. Summarize this as ∂E[ri|τ]/∂τ > 0.
We do not expect person’s trust τ to have a direct eﬀect on the investment in
housing.
Assets carried over from the previous period, including housing, can be sold
costlessly, and the proceeds can be reinvested or consumed. Let the relative price of
housing in terms of consumption goods be q, and let a person’s total assets at the
beginning of period t be At−1. With these assets in hand, households then choose
current consumption ct, housing ht (at price qt), and current holdings of the risky
and the risk-free asset bt and b
f
t (that will yield returns rt and r
f
t ). The budget
constraint then is
ct + qtht + bt + b
f




t−1 + qtht−1. (3.1)
The subscripts on q reﬂect that house prices could change over time. Individuals then
maximize the expected sum of discounted utility subject to this budget constraint,
the realizations of their income process, and initial assets. Since assets are perfectly
fungible, a person’s expected utility at the beginning of period t depends only on




t−1 + qtht−1. Denote this value by
V (A), given by
V (A) = max
c,h,b,bf {u(c,h) + βV (A
0)}. (3.2)
In this context, the individual’s inter- and intratemporal decisions cannot be
separated because the housing choice enters both of them: housing yields utility,
but is also a way of transferring resources to the future. The ﬁrst-order condition
for the housing choice then is
uh(ct,ht) + βqt+1V
0(A
0) = qtuc(ct,ht). (3.3)
Buying more housing yields current utility from housing and future utility from
spending accumulated assets, but has a cost in terms of current consumption. As
marginal utilities of housing and consumption are convex, the marginal return to
investing in housing is a decreasing function of h.
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This is not the case for investments in ﬁnancial assets. The ﬁrst order condition





and the one for riskfree assets is analogous, but does not depend on trust.4 Due to
the linearity of these conditions, agents invest only in one type of ﬁnancial assets;
risky ones if they have trust high enough such that E[rV 0(A0)|τ] > rf, and riskfree
ones otherwise.5 That is, agents with more trust are more likely to invest in risky
assets.
The housing investment decision is depicted in Figure 3.4. Agents allocate the
initial units of their savings to housing because of the high utility of use of the ﬁrst
units of housing. They then buy housing up to the level where the return to housing
falls below that of ﬁnancial assets. Remaining savings are invested in ﬁnancial assets.
Up to here we have shown that the level of trust aﬀects the investment in housing
through its eﬀect on the expected return on the investment in ﬁnancial assets. More
trust in others raises the expected return to ﬁnancial assets and thereby makes
households invest more in ﬁnancial assets and less in real estate. In addition, trust
could have a direct eﬀect on the expected return of housing. If low-trust individuals
expect a higher relative return on housing because they see housing as a particularly
safe investment or just because they appreciate living in a castle, then the eﬀect of
trust on the housing share in the portfolio will be reinforced. This eﬀect is shown
in Figure 3.5.
Note that more risk averse individuals behave in a similar way to low-trust ones:
higher risk aversion decreases the expected marginal utility from investing in a risky
asset, so they choose lower portfolio shares of risky assets relative to risk free ones,
and of ﬁnancial assets relative to housing. In the empirical section, these two eﬀects
will be disentangled.
3.4. Empirical Approach
In this section, we set up the model used for estimating the latent attitude that we
identify as trust, and its eﬀects on portfolio choice decisions. We focus particularly
on the measurement of trust and its relationship to measures used elsewhere.
4Note that the left-hand side of the equation is marginal value, not marginal utility, as resources
spent today still need to be allocated between housing and consumption.
5In reality, agents invest in both types of assets; in particular, while many people do not hold
risky assets, almost everyone who holds ﬁnancial assets at all holds some riskfree ones in the form
of pension investments or life insurances. This could be explained by non-modelled features such as
obligatory participation in pension plans or insurance beneﬁts from life insurance that are distinct
from asset accumulation considerations.
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3.4.1. Structural Representation
Figure 4.2 shows a diagram of the underlying process that we have in mind.
We suppose that every individual has some amount of trust. An individuals trust
directly causes the responses to certain survey questions. It also has an eﬀect on the
individual’s behavior, in particular, the individual’s portfolio choice decisions. We
also claim that demographic and personal characteristics may be informative about
the way in which trust is distributed in a population; individual characteristics and
experiences as well as community characteristics can be related to how much people
trust each other. We assume that these characteristics do not aﬀect the answers
directly. If they have an eﬀect on the responses, this is through their eﬀect on trust.
These characteristics can however aﬀect the behavior of the individual (e.g. portfolio
choice) directly. In the Data section (Section 3.5) we discuss the variables used to
construct the measure of trust, and we give a theoretical justiﬁcation of the personal
and demographic characteristics used in our estimation.




R1 = g1(τ,U1) (3.6)
. . . (3.7)
RM = gM(τ,UM) (3.8)
τ = m(X
τ,Z,ε) (3.9)
where S is the household’s share of wealth invested in housing, R are the responses
to certain survey questions, τ is a direct measure of trust (estimated using the ESS)
and assumed to be univariate, Xτ are covariates (age, number of members in the
household, income and education, marital status and family background), XS are
other covariates aﬀecting only the portfolio choice decision, and Z are the 17 regional
dummies.
We assume that Um ∼ U(0,1) and gm(·) is weakly increasing in U and strictly
increasing in τ, (m=1,...,M). It is also assumed that Ui ⊥ Uj ∀ i 6= j and Ui ⊥ A ∀
i which implies that conditional on τ the responses are independent (Ri ⊥ Rj|τ).6
Personal characteristics may aﬀect the way trust is distributed in the population.
We assume that individual characteristics, and particularly education, may aﬀect
the latent variable τ, but do not aﬀect the measurements Rm directly. (They can of
6These assumptions correspond to the standard assumption in item response theory (IRT);
unidimensionality (A is unidimensional), monotonicity (gm(τ,Um) is strictly increasing in A) and
local independence. See Steele and Goldstein (2007) for a review of parametric hierarchical IRT.
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course aﬀect them via τ.) Consider the linear case
τ = m(X
τ,Z,ε) = X
τβ + Zγ + ε (3.10)
assume W = (Xτ,Z) where ε ∼ N(0,1) and ε ⊥ W. Assume also that Um ⊥ ε,
Um ⊥ W, µ ⊥ W and ε ⊥ µ .
If trust was observable, estimating equation 3.5 would be straightforward. But
since trust is not observable, the estimation becomes less trivial. Although very
informative of personal and demographic characteristics, the EFF does not contain
direct information on trust. Therefore the approach we take is two perform the
estimation in two steps using two datasets:
Step I:. Using equation 3.6 and equation 3.9 and applying Spady’s (2007)
methodology we obtain an estimate of individuals’ trust and an estimate of m(·). It
is desirable to obtain the estimate of m(·) using the maximum amount of informa-
tion, controlling for diﬀerent dimensions of individuals’ trust and being as ﬂexible as
possible. The estimation method proposed by Spady (2007) has proven very useful
for this. To obtain this measure of trust we use the ESS.
Step II:. We construct a proxy for trust using the estimate of m(·) and the
personal and demographic information contained in the EFF. We then estimate the
eﬀect of trust on portfolio choice decisions (i.e. equation 3.5). In doing this, the
identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of trust on portfolio choice does not only rely on the func-
tional form of the estimate of m(·), but also on additional instruments. The regional
dummies Z provide those instruments. From the measurement of trust in the ﬁrst
step, we know that they are correlated with trust (see Table 4.5) but we assume
that once we control for regional housing prices and regional ﬁnancial development,
they are not correlated with the portfolio choice decision. As a robustness check,
we also perform Step II using instrumental variables, employing instruments from
Tabellini (2006).
Using a two-stage setup with generated regressors always raises issues of consis-
tency and eﬃciency of the estimates and of consistency of the estimated standard
errors. In the present case, which corresponds to Model 2 in Pagan (1984), the
estimates are eﬃcient and inference is correct for testing the hypothesis that the
coeﬃcient on trust is zero (Pagan 1984, p. 229).
One of the main problems of the literature that studies the eﬀect of social atti-
tudes on economic outcomes is the measurement of these attitudes. Clearly, concepts
like trust are inherently diﬃcult to measure. There have been diﬀerent approaches
to this measurement problem, some involving the use of proxies, others using crude
measures of trust. We believe that the approach proposed in this paper is the best
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way of estimating the eﬀect of trust, given the limitations of the available data. At
worst, the measure of trust used in Step II may contain measurement error. How-
ever, all other measures used previously in the literature, be they proxies or partial
or crude measures, also contain measurement error. In addition, if the limitations of
the data leave no choice but to construct a regressor, it is desirable to use a method
that uses as much information as possible in a ﬂexible way, as done here. Next, we
give a brief overview of the diﬀerent approaches used previously in the literature,
and describe the hierarchical item response model used here.
3.4.2. Other measures of trust
One of the most common approaches to measuring social attitudes and trust
has been the use of “indirect” indicators. Since the work of Putnam (1993), several
authors have used this approach. One of the most recent examples is the work by
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004a, 2004). In the former paper, for instance, these
authors proxy trust by common language, border, legal system and genetic-ethnic
distance between the population of the two countries. While this approach may
allow to identify the impact of social attitudes on economic outcomes, it does not
allow for a direct measurement of the attitudes. This makes it hard to know the
eﬀect of which speciﬁc social attitude we are actually observing.
Another approach used in the literature is to measure regional trust as the per-
centage of people in the population that claim to trust others. Usually these papers
use the World Values Survey (WVS) or the European Values Survey (EVS) and
their question: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted
or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?’ Individual responses are
then aggregated to a macro measure.7 This question has also been used to measure
trust at individual level (e.g. Guiso et al. 2008). However, it is diﬃcult to believe
that the use of only one question can provide a good measure for such a broad
concept (for a critique of this approach see Glaeser et al. (2000) and Glaeser et al.
(2002)). Fatih, Kalemly-Ozcan and Sorensen (2007) have proposed to measure trust
and conﬁdence using several questions; they construct very simple regional indexes
averaging individuals’ responses to more than one question. The advantage of this
approach is that they use the information contained in several questions, and this is
important since we expect diﬀerent questions to have diﬀerent information content.
The problem of their measure is that it imposes an equal weight for each question
7Examples of this approach are found in Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001)
who ﬁnd that trust and civic norms have a strong impact on economic performance, or in Beugels-
dijk and van Schaik (2004) who also ﬁnd that at the regional level, trust and voluntary work are
related to economic growth. La Porta et al. (1997) and Fukuyama (1995) also follow this approach
to examine the eﬀect of trust in organizations.
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in the ﬁnal measure. But if the information content of questions varies, this is not
ideal.
Summarizing, all these approaches (proxies or crude measures of trust) suﬀer
from measurement error. The approach we use in the ﬁrst step overcomes some of
the limitations just discussed by measuring trust using responses to more than one
question, and by giving them diﬀerent weights in function of how strongly they reﬂect
individual trust. The methodology for measuring trust used in the present paper is
a hierarchical item response model; it allows not to impose inessential assumptions
about the importance of each question in the construction of the individuals’ level
of trust and it speciﬁcally takes into account that the answers to the questions used
as a basis for measurement are discrete or categorical (Spady 2007).
3.4.3. Measuring trust using an item response model
Given the structural representation described in section 3.4.1 and using equation
3.6 and equation 3.9 and applying an item response model, we obtain an estimate of
individuals’ trust and an estimate of m(·). The assumptions underlying the model
described above are that (1) the expressions of agreement and disagreement on ques-
tions about trust (‘item responses’) reﬂect corresponding attitudes of the responder;
(2) the ‘attitudes’ are enduring individual-speciﬁc attributes, given the individual’s
characteristics and environment; and that (3) the series of item responses we use
are determined by a single attitudes only (trust).
We use 8 item responses with 3 categorical responses each, stemming from 1.156
Spanish men and women older than 18. In that case there are 38 = 6561 cells or
possible combinations of responses.8
Assumption: Conditional independence across the item responses.
Then, the probability of a particular response pattern (or cell) conditional on τ is
simply the product of the constituent item probabilities.
p(r1,r2,...,rm|τ) = p(r1|τ)p(r2|τ)...p(rm|τ). (3.11)
Assume that individual i has certain characteristics Wi = (Xτ,Z), and that the
distribution m(·) of the latent attitude is aﬀected by these characteristics, so there is
a conditional distribution of attitudes m(τ|W). Concretely, as the theoretical model
implies, suppose that W gives rise to social experiences, and consequently attitudes
8We have tried the same exercise restricting the items to those who reﬂect generalized trust
and trust to banks and the results of the analysis for the diﬀerent sociological groups do not change
dramatically. Therefore, we believe that the use of the most general deﬁnition of trust is more
adequate because rules out possible problems of endogeneity.
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This expression together with the conditional independence assumption implies
that conditional on W variables, the dependence across the item responses comes
uniquely through τ.
Assumption: τ is suﬃcient for r.
Consequently, once an attitude τ is given, the personal characteristics W are unin-







Equation 4.3 is used to estimate simultaneously how W aﬀects τ and how τ
aﬀects item responses. The estimation method used in this paper is the one pro-
posed by Spady (2007). It allows to obtain quantitative measures of latent attitudes
imposing ﬂexible parametric functional form. In next section I describe how the
estimation of the elements of this expression is performed.
Assumption: If τ2 > τ1 then the item responses of τ2 population stochastically
dominate τ1. Thus, higher item responses are associated to higher values of τ.
The stochastic dominance assumption implies that the lines that indicate the prob-
ability of answering k or more in item j given τ (shown in Figure 3.7) be downward
sloping; of course, they cannot cross if probabilities are to be non negative.
The modelization of these lines give rise to diﬀerent types of item response mod-
els, following Spady (2007) these lines are constructed as the distribution function







where the functions γ1(u) and γ2(u) are 2 basis functions, chosen to be (shifted)
Legendre polynomials. Subtracting G(·) from 1, I obtain downward sloping lines.
To ensure that the lines do not cross, they are constructed as products of
the estimated distribution functions. Assume item j has k possible answers, then
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F(k|τ) = 1 by deﬁnition. p(k|τ) = 1−F(k −1|τ) where F(k −1|τ) = 1−Gk−1(τ);
p(k −1|τ) = F(k −1|τ)−F(k −2|τ) where F(k −2|τ) = [1−Gk−2(τ)]F(k −1|τ).9
Results of this estimation are illustrated in Figure 3.7. This Figure shows the
resulting item response models estimated for the items selected to represent the scale
on trust. Each box shows the probability of answering 1, 2 or 3 in a given item as
a function of the attitude on trust (x-axis). As an example, take the ﬁrst box of
Figure 3.7. There are two lines. The distance between the x-axis and the ﬁrst line
indicates the probability of answering 1 in item (question) 1 (“Would you say that
most people can be trusted?”), the distance between the ﬁrst line and the second
line indicates the probability of answering 2 in item 1, and the distance between the
second line and 1 indicates the probability of answering 3.
Assumption: A location shift model for W.
m(τ|W) is represented by a N(µ(W),1),10 where µ(W) = Wβ. So τ is normal with
a mean that is a linear function of the characteristics W. This implies that m(τ|W)
is a N(0,1) for the ‘standardized respondent’ and that attitudes within the diﬀerent
groups of the population, characterized by diﬀerent W, are also normally distributed
with possibly diﬀerent values of location µ.11 Because of this normalization, the
units of measurement of p(r|τ) are then transformed into [−∞,∞] by applying the
inverse normal distribution function. The parameters associated to the personal
characteristics are shown in Table 4.5.
3.4.3.1. Estimation. The integration for the probability of a particular out-
come for individual i (p(r1,r2,...,rm|W) =
R
p(r1|a)p(r2|a)...p(rm|a)f(a|W)da) has
been carried out using a Gaussian quadrature at 200 grid points. To ensure that we
can collect even the distributions with small variances, the gaussian quadrature has
been applied to 5 diﬀerent segments of the grid, with the one in the middle having
more points. A Newton-Raphson algorithm is used to maximize the log-likelihood
function. Concretely, we use the BFGS method which builds an approximation to
the Hessian in the course of iteration.12
We obtain 61 parameters; 29 associated to the personal characteristics (indicat-
ing the eﬀect on location relative to the probability distribution of the ‘standardized
9This also implies that the stochastic dominance is strengthened to dominance in hazard order.
10Although it is possible, for simplicity we will not allow W to aﬀect the variance.
11The ’standarized’ individual is a male who lives in Analucia, is 38.92 years old, lives in a
household with 3.35 members, is married and employed, has secondary education, medium income
and his father did not have a professional occupation. (This is not the average person but the
reference person.)
12For a general discussion about estimation procedures for multilevel generalized linear models
see Rodriguez (2008).
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respondent’) and 32 describing the distribution functions (see Figure 3.7). Since
we use exponential tilting of second degree, we estimate two parameters per line
and box for the distribution functions. The parameters associated to the personal
characteristics are the ones used to specify m(τ|W), and therefore the parameters
of interest in our case.
3.5. Data
To estimate the attitudes in trust we use the second wave of the European So-
cial Survey (ESS). The ESS is a recent data set covering 25 European Countries
in 2004. In this paper we use the information related to Spain. The ESS provides
rich information on several aspects of interest to social scientists. In this round, the
questionnaire includes, for the ﬁrst time, a module on Economic morality: Trust
and interactions between producers and consumers. This module is designed to in-
vestigate the normative and moral culture of markets and consumption in European
countries and is useful for us because it has some questions about the level of trust
and conﬁdence in business and state/government institutions. In addition, the ESS
also contains information about some demographic variables.
Corresponding to the theoretical model, some of these demographic variables
will also be used in the estimation: We include the age of the head of the household,
since attitudes might change over the life cycle due to personal experience but also
due to national and global developments, the age of respondents can be informative.
In addition, there may be cohort eﬀects. Since our data set is only a cross section,
it is unfortunately impossible to disentangle life cycle and cohort eﬀects. We also
control for gender, education, marital status, region of residence and the number of
members in the household and a dummy that takes value 1 if the father of the head
had a professional occupation (father professional occupation) as they can inﬂuence
the experiences faced during life. We include income. Since most determinants
of income are also included as controls, the income coeﬃcient should mainly reﬂect
luck. Here it seems reasonable to expect that people who faced more negative shocks
have lower levels of trust.
To measure the attitudes in shared trust we choose eight questions/items related
to this scale. The original wording of the questions/items we use to estimate the
individual’s latent attitudes towards trust is shown in the appendix.
Summary statistics of the responses to these items are presented in Table 4.2.
Scales are recoded such that each item has three possible answers (1-3 scale).13 A
higher score corresponds to a higher level of trust. The answering behavior varies
13The recoding does not matter for our estimation. See Spady (2006)
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over these items. For instance, the mean for the question “Can public oﬃcials be
trusted?” is 2.178 and the mean for the question “Can politicians be trusted?” is
1.522. This indicates that diﬀerent items carry information on respondents’ attitudes
to a varying degree. Thus, by focussing on just one or on a narrow subset of these
items, valuable information might be lost. This is also indicated by the pairwise
correlation coeﬃcients for the items shown in Table 4.4; correlations are positive
but far from perfect.
Table 4.3 contains summary statistics of the personal and demographic charac-
teristics that we expect to be related to an individual’s level of trust. Whether these
relationships hold in the data is an empirical question on which our analysis can
shed some light.
For the analysis of portfolio choice decisions we use the 2002 wave of the Spanish
Survey of Household Finances (EFF).14 This survey contains information about
incomes, assets, debts and consumption at the household level. The deﬁnition of
the measures of real estate and ﬁnancial assets holdings are shown in the appendix.
Table 3.5 shows the descriptive statistics of these measures. Descriptive statistics
of the other personal characteristics that we think can be useful in explaining the
portfolio decisions of the households are shown in Table 3.6.15
3.6. Results
3.6.1. How Personal and Demographic Characteristics Relate to Trust
The coeﬃcients of Table 4.5 show how the location of the distribution of attitudes
depend on covariates. Using the estimated coeﬃcients shown in these tables we
can calculate the estimated distribution of the attitudes for diﬀerent demographic
groups. Therefore, we can answer the following question: What is the eﬀect on the
mean of the distribution of trust of changing the reference group’s characteristics in
one dimension?
As an example, Figure 3.8 shows our prediction for two diﬀerent type of re-
spondents: Respondent A is a 37 years old divorced male with low income and low
education who heads a household with 3 members and lives in Cantabria. Respon-
dent B is a 50 year old married male with medium income and high education who
heads a household with 4 members and lives in Madrid. We see that the expected
14The two datasets do no cover exactly the same time period. The ﬁeld work for the ESS
spanned October 2003 to September 2004, while this is from October 2002 to May 2003 for the
EFF. However, as trust arises from existing levels of social capital which depreciates only slowly,
we do not expect the attitudes of the diﬀerent sociological groups to change much during this time.
15A distinguishing feature of the EFF is that the wealthiest households are oversampled. So the
upper quantiles of the wealth distribution can also be studied. Since they hold most of the assets,
this is particularly important. For a detailed description of the survey see Bover (2004).
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trust for the two respondents diﬀers. It is E[Trust|W] = −0.426 for Respondent A,
and E[Trust|W] = 0.860 for Respondent B.
The factor that aﬀects trust most strongly is the level of education, with lower
levels of education aﬀecting the level of trust negatively. We also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
eﬀect for the diﬀerent income levels. Richer and poorer households tend to trust less
than middle-income households. Age also matters; younger and older individuals
have less trust than the middle-aged. This result is similar to the ones obtained by
Putnam (2000) and by Glaeser et al. (2002). These authors ﬁnd that this inverted U-
shape is predicted by their model of social capital accumulation over the life cycle.
In our case, the cross-section nature of the data does not allow us to distinguish
whether this pattern is due to this life cycle pattern or to cohort eﬀects. The eﬀect
of the number of household members has the same shape.
It is important to notice that in determining a person’s or group’s level of trust,
these eﬀects taken together can neutralize or reinforce each other. For instance, high
education is positively correlated with high levels of income, and these two eﬀects
can neutralize each other. Regional characteristics such as diﬀerences in institutions,
in labor market conditions, or in income and ethnical inequality also aﬀect trust, as
captured by the regional ﬁxed eﬀects. These coeﬃcients, shown in Table 4.5, show
that there are substantial diﬀerences across Spanish regions.
3.6.2. Testing the Eﬀect of Trust on Portfolio Choice
The model presented in section 3 has two distinct implications. The ﬁrst is that
trust raises the share of assets invested in ﬁnancial assets relative to housing. The
second is that it raises the share of risky assets held relative to all ﬁnancial assets.
In this section we will test empirically both implications.
3.6.2.1. Housing vs Financial Assets. We start by testing the hypothesis
that trust aﬀects investment decisions in the following way; it increases the propor-
tion of wealth invested in risky ﬁnancial assets, and therefore in ﬁnancial assets and
decreases the amount of wealth invested in housing. Financial Assets include risky
and non-risky assets and housing includes main residence and other real estate. We
deﬁne risky assets as listed shares, non listed shares, ﬁxed-income securities and mu-
tual funds. As said above, the shares of ﬁnancial assets and housing in an agent’s
portfolio are a function of their risk aversion τi and their level of trust. For the
empirical implementation, suppose that the relationship is linear.16 The equations
16It is easy to relax this restriction.
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of interest then are:
Hi = γH0X
S



















where FA is the household’s fraction of its wealth invested in ﬁnancial assets, RA is
the fraction invested in risky assets and H is the fraction invested in real estate. τi
represents the estimated level of trust. This is constructed combining information
on individuals’ characteristics with the coeﬃcients obtained previously using the
European Social Survey.17 Here, as well as in the subsequent regressions, we also
control for other household characteristics, Xτ
i . We control for income and net
wealth, gender, number of household members and children in the household, and
age of the head of the household. The latter should capture changes over the life
cycle. To control for factors that aﬀect portfolio choice only, XS includes a self
reported measure of risk aversion and the regional average price per square meter in
2002.18. We also control for regional diﬀerences in ﬁnancial development (included
in XS); we use as a proxy the percentage of private credit over GDP.19 We expect
these characteristics to capture diﬀerences in preferences across households as well
as possible diﬀerences in participation costs (Fi) in ﬁnancial markets.
Since we have a system of equations with the same regressors, the eﬃcient es-
timator is a single-equation OLS (see Green (2003) p. 344). In our case, since the
dependent variable is censored, we estimate a Tobit model. One may think that in
the ﬁrst two equations we have also an adding up condition if the two dependent
variables add to one. This is not the case for all the households; households may
own other real assets like jewels, art work or business related to self-employment.
Therefore, we show the results without imposing the restriction βH = −βFA.
Unfortunately, we do not have measures of other latent attitudes, like optimism
or expectations about the future economic conditions. Some authors, e.g. Puri and
Robinson (2005) and Dominitz and Manski (2005), have found these to signiﬁcantly
aﬀect participation in the stock market. Guiso et al. (2008), however, do not conﬁrm
17τi = f(gender, income, education, marital status, father professional, age, number members,
region of residence).
18Source: Ministerio de Fomento, from diﬀerent property valuations in the whole Spanish ter-
ritory.
19We use a common proxy for ﬁnancial development, but other proxies have also been used like
the market capitalization of listed ﬁrms and the sum of private credit and market capitalization
(as a percentage of GDP). But since the securities market in Spain is at national level, it does not
exist this information at regional level. But it must be taken into account that the eﬀect of this
variable might be diﬀerent depending on how we measure it.
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this, and ﬁnd that they do not aﬀect the coeﬃcient on trust in a portfolio choice
regression either. Moreover, as our measure of trust relies on several speciﬁc ques-
tions about trust that are reasonably unrelated to other attitudes, we would expect
them not to be a problem for the estimation in the present setting.
Table 3.7 shows the results of the estimated tobit. The ﬁrst two columns show
the result of equations 3.17, 3.18 and 3.19. We observe that trust has a signiﬁcantly
positive eﬀect on the percentage of wealth invested in risky ﬁnancial assets and
in ﬁnancial assets in general, i.e. higher trust increases the percentage of wealth
invested in ﬁnancial assets. At the same time and as expected we observe that trust
has a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on the percentage of wealth invested in housing.
This result indicates that housing gains importance as an asset in the household’s
portfolios when generalized trust decreases. Households with higher levels of trust,
on the other hand, invest less in housing and more in ﬁnancial assets. It is also
interesting to notice that risk aversion is still signiﬁcant and has a stronger eﬀect than
trust. As Guiso et al. (2008), we can say that the result also applies to the richest
households, since we control for wealth in the regression. Indeed, these authors
argue that trust may be an explanation to why even the rich do not participate in
ﬁnancial markets, and our results square well with theirs.
3.6.2.2. Trust, Risky Assets and Cash. Trust also positively aﬀects the
share of ﬁnancial assets held in risky assets. Here we deﬁne risky assets as above.
Letting the ﬁnancial portfolio share of risky assets be RAFA (computed as the value









where Xτ and XS are again demographic characteristics.
Guiso et al. (2004) also raise the possibility that households with less trust will
not participate in ﬁnancial markets but will keep money in cash. If that was the
case, it would be possible not to ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of trust on housing but rather
in the deposits and accounts usable for payments. For that reason we estimate a
similar equation as above but with the dependent variable indicating the share of
ﬁnancial assets that the household owns in cash.
Ci = γC0X
S





The results of equation these equations are shown in Table 3.7. The fourth
column of Table 3.7 shows that trust indeed is positively related to the portfolio
share of risky assets. The coeﬃcient on trust is larger than in the regression of risky
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assets over wealth (see third column). Note that the speciﬁcations are not exactly
the same. Instead of net wealth, we include the value of household ﬁnancial wealth
in the regression. The rest of variables of the estimation take the expected sign.
These results are in line with those of Guiso et al. (2008). Even the magnitude
of the trust coeﬃcient is quite similar to theirs. (They obtain an eﬀect of trust on
risky assets of 0.095, see Table 7.B in page 52, and on stocks of 0.130, see Table
7.A page 51.) Hence, trust is an important determinant of which fraction of the
portfolio is invested in risky assets in Spain, too.
The results for equation are shown in the fourth column of Table 3.7. They
show that trust does not matter for the decision of holding wealth in the form of
cash. This suggests that cash is held for liquidity and not so much as an investment
(see also the negative coeﬃcient on employees – they need less liquidity than the
self-employed). In any case, while diﬀerences in trust lead to diﬀerent choices of
housing and ﬁnancial assets, they do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect cash holdings.
3.6.2.3. The Role of Education. In this section we explore if education af-
fects the trust mechanism described in this paper. We expect that more educated
people have more information and a better understanding of how ﬁnancial markets
work, so trust may matter less for them.
Therefore we perform the same exercise as above, but include an interaction
between trust and years of education.20 The results obtained are shown in Table 3.8.
The interaction always takes the opposite sign of the trust coeﬃcient, indicating that
education reduces the eﬀect of trust on portfolio choice decisions. The interaction
has a stronger eﬀect and is highly signiﬁcant for the regressions where the dependent
variable measures the share of wealth invested in risky assets or the share of ﬁnancial
wealth invested in risky assets. The attenuating eﬀect of education on the trust
mechanism is thus less strong for housing and ﬁnancial assets in general.
We also want to test if a more speciﬁc ﬁnancial education has an eﬀect on the
trust mechanism. To proxy ﬁnancial education we use wealth, assuming that wealth-
ier people either have stronger ﬁnancial education or easier access to professional
ﬁnancial consulting. This might also mitigate the eﬀect of trust. The results of the
previous model including the interaction between trust and wealth are shown in the
second panel of Table 3.8. Again, the interaction has the opposite sign of the coef-
ﬁcient on trust in all the regressions. Including this interaction also eliminates the
eﬀect of the interaction between trust and education. This suggests that although
the eﬀect of trust persists for wealthier people, it is less strong, possibly due to their
access to ﬁnancial consultants.
20The rest of the speciﬁcation is the same as before, so we do not restate those results.
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3.6.3. Endogeneity Concerns
The identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of trust on the portfolio decisions has relied on the
non linearity of the trust measure and on the assumption that the regional dummies,
once controlling for regional housing prices and regional ﬁnancial development, are
not correlated with ﬁnancial decisions. To be able to relax this assumption we esti-
mate the model using instrumental variables. To instrument trust we use the same
variables as Tabellini (2006) in his study of the impact of culture on development,
the regional literacy rate at the end of the XIXth century and indicators of politi-
cal institutions in the period from 1600 to 1850.21 We also include the number of
social and economic charity organizations in the region in 1920.22 Tabellini (2006)
argues that “historically more backward regions (with higher illiteracy rates and
worse political institutions) tend to have speciﬁc cultural traits today: less trust
in others, less respect for others, less conﬁdence in the individual.” The validity
of the assumption that history is a valid instrument for culture is discussed exten-
sively in his paper, so we do not reiterate it here. Table 3.9 shows the values of the
instruments for the Spanish regions.
The results of the IV tobit estimation are shown in Table 3.10.23 To test the
strength of the instruments we report the results of the ﬁrst-stage regression. They
show that the instruments are strongly correlated with our measure of trust. We
also show the results of the Wald test for exogeneity. They show that in the ﬁrst
regression, there are no endogeneity problems. Here, it is thus better to use the
the tobit without IV estimator since it is more eﬃcient. The coeﬃcient on trust
obtained using the instruments is larger (in absolute value) than the one obtained
using OLS, but the standard errors are much larger. The other regressions show
problems of endogeneity, so the IV estimates are adequate.
Overall, in the speciﬁcations where using IV is required, this reinforces the eﬀect
of trust. Trust has a positive eﬀect on the share of wealth invested in ﬁnancial
assets, particularly in risky ﬁnancial assets.
3.7. Concluding Remarks
Households with less trust invest less in ﬁnancial assets and more in housing.
Trust also aﬀects the share of wealth invested in risky assets positively.
21Literacy rate: percentage of population over 10 years old able to read and write in 1877, from
Nunez (1990).
Institutions: constraints on the executive, from Tabellini (2006).
22Source: Anuario Estad´ ıstico de Espa˜ na. Instituto Nacional de Estad´ ıstica (INE)
23For this estimation we use Amemiya Generalized Least Squares (AGLS) estimators for tobit
with endogenous regressors (see Amemiya (1974) and Newey (1987)).
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This paper presents new empirical evidence on how the level of conﬁdence of
citizens with their society in general (institutions and other citizens) may have im-
portant implications in economic outcomes; the mechanism explored here is trust as
a determinant of households’ share of wealth invested in ﬁnancial or housing mar-
kets. Individuals with less trust tend to invest more in housing and less in ﬁnancial
assets. Since there is empirical evidence showing that trust diﬀers across European
countries, it is possible to think that this eﬀect may also be at work across coun-
tries. Compared to other European countries, Spain has low levels of trust.24 As
a consequence, the eﬀect of trust on the share of housing in individuals’ portfolios
could be especially important in Spain. This may lead to less developed ﬁnancial
markets and a more vulnerable economy, as portfolios heavy on real estate can be
adjusted less easily. Improving institutions or raising levels of education can raise
levels of trust.
24Knack and Keefer (1997), Bornhorst et al. (2005) and El-Attar (2007) ﬁnd that levels of trust
are higher in Northern European than in Southern European countries.
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Appendix
Appendix 3.A. Original wording of the questions/items used
Original wording of the questions/items used to estimate trust
• Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?25 (Score of 0 to 10, where 0
means you can’t be too careful and 10 means most people can be trusted.)
• Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they
got the chance, or would they try to be fair?26 (Score of 0 to 10, where 0
means most people would try to take advantage of me and 10 means most
people would try to be fair.)
• Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they
are mostly looking out for themselves?27 (Score of 0 to 10, where 0 means
people mostly look out for themselves and 10 means people mostly try to
be helpful.)
• Please tell me how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read
out. (Score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you do not trust an institution at all,
and 10 means you have complete trust.)
– the legal system
– politicians
• How much would you trust the following groups to deal honestly with people
like you? (Score of 1 to 5, where 1 means you distrust and 5 means you
trust a lot.)
– plumbers, builders, car mechanics and other repair people28
– ﬁnancial companies such as banks or insurers.
– public oﬃcials29
Deﬁnition of the ﬁnancial variables used in the empirical analysis
• Total Assets is the value of Real Assets and Financial Assets.
• Real Assets is the value of Real Estate, Jewelery, Works of Art, Antiques
and the value of Business related to self-employed.
• Real Estate is the value of Main Residence and Other Estate Properties.
25Can’t be too careful: need to be wary or always somewhat suspicious.
26Take advantage: exploit or cheat; fair: in the sense of treat appropriately and straightforwardly.
27The intended contrast is between self-interest and altruistic helpfulness.
28Builders include all kinds of tradespeople who work on building sites.
29Public oﬃcials refers to both government oﬃcials, such as custom oﬃcers and to local oﬃcials,
such as housing/building regulators etc.
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• Financial Assets is the value of Listed Shares, Unlisted Shares, Fixed-
Income Securities, Mutual Funds, Pensions and Life Insurance and Ac-
counts and Deposits usable for payments.
• Risky Assets is the value of Listed Shares, Unlisted Shares, Fixed-Income
Securities and Mutual Funds.
• Cash refers to Accounts and Deposits usable for payments.
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Appendix 3.B. Tables and Figures
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Figure 3.1. The Spanish Wealth Distribution.
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Figure 3.2. Participation Rates on Real Estate and Risky Assets.
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Figure 3.3. Real Estate, Financial Assets and Risky Assets Shares
in Household Portfolios.
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Figure 3.4. Investment in housing and ﬁnancial assets aﬀected by
trust (Indirect Eﬀect).
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Figure 3.5. Investment in housing and ﬁnancial assets aﬀected by















Figure 3.6. Diagram of the underlying process.
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Figure 3.7. Estimates of the item response model for the items con-
stituting a scale on shared trust.




























Figure 3.8. Estimated probability distribution for the distribution
of two individuals’ attitudes towards trust.
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Table 3.1. Estimated Coeﬃcients for Personal and Demographic
Characteristics in Trust Scale.
Variable Coeﬃcient S.E. Variable Coeﬃcient S.E.
Divorced -0.198 0.194 Cantabria -0.145 0.247
Single -0.039 0.111 PaisVasco -0.155 0.184
Female -0.090 0.069 Navarra 0.759 0.291
Age 0.010 0.004 Rioja 0.301 0.262
Age.01 -0.053 0.026 Aragon 0.249 0.236
Num Members 0.065 0.032 Madrid 0.358 0.133
Num Members.01 -2.875 0.941 Castilla Leon 0.071 0.173
Low Income -0.124 0.149 Castilla Mancha 0.377 0.177
High Income -0.241 0.114 Extremadura 0.459 0.299
Primary Degree -0.026 0.093 Catalunya 0.061 0.126
High Degree 0.432 0.092 Valencia 0.002 0.139
Unemployed -0.266 0.152 Baleares -0.240 0.208
Father Professional 0.158 0.124 Murcia -0.125 0.231
Galicia 0.201 0.170 Canarias -0.117 0.201
Asturias -0.060 0.238
Age is the diﬀerence between the individual’s age and mean age, and Age.01 is the square of this,
divided by 100. The ‘standardized’ individual is a male who lives in Madrid, is 38.92 years old,
lives in a household with 3.35 members, is married and employed, has secondary education,
medium income and father who does not have a professional occupation.
Table 3.2. Descriptive Statistics of the items used to estimate the
Trust Scale.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Most People Trusted 1.914 0.773 1 3
Most People Fair 2.029 0.772 1 3
Most People Helpful 1.657 0.747 1 3
Trust Legal System 1.829 0.796 1 3
Trust Politicians 1.522 0.671 1 3
Trust Repair People 2.072 0.872 1 3
Trust Banks 1.875 0.867 1 3
Trust Public Oﬃcials 2.178 0.808 1 3
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Table 3.3. Pairwise Correlation Coeﬃcients for the Items Used to
Build the Trust Scale.
People People People Legal Poli- Repair Banks Public Trust
Trust Fair Help System titians People Oﬃcials Inx
MP Trust 1.00
MP Fair 0.43 1.00
MP Help 0.38 0.30 1.00
T LS 0.18 0.13 0.15 1.00
T Polit 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.45 1.00
T Repair 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.04 1.00
T Banks 0.11 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.35 1.00
T POﬀ 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.18 0.11 0.29 0.40 1.00
Trust Inx 0.85 0.65 0.60 0.35 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.26 1.00
Table 3.4. Descriptive Statistics for the Personal and Demographic
Characteristics used for Measuring Trust (ESS).
Demographics Mean Std. Dev. Regions Mean Std. Dev.
Single 0.347 0.476 Galicia 0.055 0.229
Divorced 0.047 0.211 Asturias 0.029 0.169
Married 0.587 0.493 Cantabria 0.011 0.105
Num Members 3.349 1.313 PaisVasco 0.051 0.220
Unemployed 0.056 0.230 Navarra 0.015 0.120
Low Income 0.145 0.352 Rioja 0.008 0.088
Medium Income 0.662 0.473 Aragon 0.028 0.164
High Income 0.193 0.395 Madrid 0.136 0.343
Father Professional 0.087 0.281 Castilla Leon 0.079 0.269
Primary Degree 0.270 0.444 Castilla Mancha 0.071 0.257
Secondary Degree 0.477 0.500 Extremadura 0.023 0.151
Higher Degree 0.237 0.425 Catalunya 0.113 0.317
Female 0.480 0.500 Valencia 0.095 0.294
Age 38.92 17.25 Baleares 0.024 0.154
Andalucia 0.183 0.386
Murcia 0.035 0.185
Sample Size 1156 Canarias 0.043 0.204
Low Income: <12000 euros/year; High Income: >90000 euros/year. Primary degree is 1 if the
head has less than secondary education, and higher degree is 1 if the head has a university degree
or more.
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Table 3.5. Descriptive Statistics of the Financial Variables (EFF).
Quantiles
Value Mean Std.Dev 0.25 0.50 0.75
Total Assets 475267 4133216 79400 162311 354608
Real Assets 340309 3125796 71796 148821 300000
Real Estate 254833 488857 65000 138000 275051
Financial Assets 134958 1242326 1703 9000 41095
Risky Assets 104453 1214906 0 0 6000
Non Risky Assets 30505 95466 1460 6000 24000
Cash 8249 25242 901 3000 7500
Sharea Mean Std.Dev 0.25 0.50 0.75
Real Assets 0.788 0.299 0.752 0.923 0.980
Real Estate 0.737 0.317 0.639 0.870 0.970
Financial Assets 0.212 0.299 0.020 0.077 0.248
Risky Assets 0.051 0.131 0.000 0.000 0.023
Non Risky Assets 0.161 0.277 0.014 0.048 0.143
Cash 0.101 0.246 0.006 0.018 0.052
a Share refers to the variable divided by Total Assets.
Table 3.6. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used in the Port-
folio Choice Analysis (EFF).
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Risk Aversion 3.70 0.58 Num Children 0.90 1.08
Income 40355 76021 Num Members 2.77 1.34
Net Wealth 463778 4216161 Years Education 13.64 7.27
Female 0.35 0.48 Employee 0.32 0.47
Age Head 57.65 15.62 Num Obs. 4999
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Table 3.7. Tobit estimation for portfolio choice.
RE/W FA/W RA/W RA/FA C/FA
Trust -0.048 ∗∗∗ 0.043 ∗∗∗ 0.055 ∗∗∗ 0.128 ∗∗∗ 0.017
(0.015) (0.013) (0.019) (0.040) (0.030)
Risk Aversion 0.042 ∗∗∗ -0.035 ∗∗∗ -0.073 ∗∗∗ -0.108 ∗∗∗ -0.016
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.015) (0.013)
Housing Price -0.045 ∗∗∗ 0.076 ∗∗∗ 0.038 ∗∗
(0.015) (0.013) (0.019)
Financial Development 0.002 ∗∗∗ -0.002 ∗∗∗ -0.002 ∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Income -0.122 ∗∗∗ 0.075 ∗∗ 0.209 ∗∗∗ -0.019 0.054 ∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.035) (0.081) (0.015) (0.012)
Income2 0.004 ∗ -0.002 -0.008 ∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Net Wealth 0.923 ∗∗∗ -0.936 ∗∗∗ -0.089 ∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.022) (0.022)
Net Wealth2 -0.036 ∗∗∗ 0.037 ∗∗∗ 0.007 ∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Financial Wealth 0.238 ∗∗∗ -0.259
(0.007) (0.005)
Female 0.022 ∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.011 0.012 -0.023
(0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.022) (0.016)
Age Head 0.002 0.004 ∗∗ -0.003 -0.008 -0.009 ∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Age Head2 0.000 0.000 0.000 ∗∗ 0.000 ∗ 0.000 ∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Num Members 0.016 ∗∗∗ -0.018 ∗∗∗ -0.022 ∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.013
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.018) (0.013)
Num Children -0.012 ∗∗ -0.003 0.017 ∗ 0.008 -0.003
(0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.020) (0.015)
Years Education -0.003 ∗∗∗ 0.006 ∗∗∗ 0.007 ∗∗∗ 0.010 ∗∗∗ -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Employee 0.082 ∗∗∗ -0.012 -0.024 ∗∗ -0.077 ∗∗∗ -0.068 ∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.025) (0.019)
Constant -5.801 ∗∗∗ 5.480 ∗∗∗ -1.080 ∗∗ -1.917 ∗∗∗ 2.922 ∗∗∗
(0.247) (0.211) (0.459) (0.207) (0.155)
Sigma 0.240 0.212 0.236 0.491 0.436
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007)
Log Likelihood -326.6 281.6 -1076.9 -2107.0 -2732.2
Pseudo-R2 0.865 1.139 0.462 0.410 0.431
Sample Size 4999 4999 4999 4999 4999
Standard errors in parentheses; stars indicate signiﬁcance at 10 (∗), 5 (∗∗), and 1 (∗∗∗) percent
levels, respectively.
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Table 3.8. Tobit estimation for portfolio choice. The Role of Education
RE/W FA/W RA/W RA/FA C/FA
Trust -0.092 ∗∗∗ 0.079 ∗∗∗ 0.169 ∗∗∗ 0.427 ∗∗∗ -0.100
(0.029) (0.025) (0.042) (0.088) (0.062)
Trust*Education 0.003 ∗ -0.002 ∗ -0.006 ∗∗∗ -0.016 ∗∗∗ 0.007 ∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Log-Likelihood -324.9 283.0 -1072.2 -2099.6 -2729.7
Pseudo-R2 0.866 1.139 0.464 0.412 0.431
Sample Size 4999 4999 4999 4999 4999
RE/W FA/W RA/W RA/FA C/FA
Trust -0.440 ∗∗∗ 0.493 ∗∗∗ 0.489 ∗∗∗ 0.716 ∗∗∗ -0.703 ∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.077) (0.114) (0.170) (0.115)
Trust*Education 0.000 0.001 -0.005 ∗∗ -0.014 ∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Trust*Wealth 0.032 ∗∗∗ -0.038 ∗∗∗ -0.028 ∗∗∗ -0.032 ∗ 0.071 ∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.015) (0.011)
Log-Likelihood -316.4 300.0 -1067.1 -2097.4 -2708.7
Pseudo-R2 0.869 1.147 0.466 0.413 0.436
Sample Size 4999 4999 4999 4999 4999
Standard errors in parentheses; stars indicate signiﬁcance at 10 (∗), 5 (∗∗), and 1 (∗∗∗) percent
levels, respectively.
Table 3.9. Instruments and Variables with Regional Variation.
Average Literacy Early Charity
Regional Rate Political Organizations
Housing Price 1887 Institutions 1920
Andaluc´ ıa 914.97 26.25 1 0.118
Aragon 1013.62 29 3 0.039
Asturias 985.89 40.5 1 0.021
Baleares 1525.95 21 1 0.058
Canarias 1218.04 18.5 1 0.018
Cantabria 1183.22 40.5 1 0.021
Castilla Leon 1012.56 48.5 1 0.236
Castilla La Mancha 681.00 29 1 0.042
Catalunya 1553.95 32 3 0.182
Extremadura 557.25 20 1 0.027
Galicia 800.08 27.5 1 0.051
Madrid 1973.78 62 1 0.294
Murcia 747.40 21 1 0.018
Navarra 1290.22 45.5 1 0.021
Pais Vasco 1900.44 48.5 1 0.042
Rioja 1061.41 45.5 1 0.021
Valencia 877.26 21 3 0.097
Charity Organizations in 1920 is measured relative to the population, multiplied by 1000
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Trust and Reciprocity: Social Capital and Civic
Participation
Abstract. This paper measures the inﬂuence of social capital on dif-
ferent ways of individual civic engagement. Although the idea that social
capital increases the probability that an individual will engage in civic
participation is widespread in the literature, there is not much robust
evidence on the relationship between the components of social capital
(such as trust or reciprocity) and individuals’ civic participation. One
of the reasons for this lack of evidence is the diﬃculty of obtaining good
measures of social capital and its components. In this spirit, we propose
to measure individuals’ attitudes to trust and reciprocity using data from
the European Social Survey and applying the methodology proposed by
Spady (2007). This methodology allows to aggregate information from
several questions and makes use of individuals’ personal and demographic
characteristics. It also allows for a multi-dimensional measure of social
capital as suggested by theory, and it is free of parametric assumptions.
The measure of the components of social capital that we propose is con-
ceptually cleaner and more consistent with theory than the proxies or de-
mographic characteristics often used in previous work. The results show
that although both components of social capital rise civic engagement,
their importance diﬀers depending on the degree of institutionalization
of the practice itself.
Keywords. social capital, civic engagement, item response models.
JEL Classification.C43, O15, Z1.
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4.1. Introduction
Recently, there has been strong interest among economists in the impact of so-
cial and cultural factors on economic or social outcomes. (Knack and Keefer (1997),
Guiso et al. (2004)). For instance, the concept of social capital has been used to
explain individual and group outcomes such as health, ﬁnancial development or
economic growth. Social capital may also have important positive externalities.
For instance, in their study of the importance of education for democracy, Glaeser,
Ponzetto and Shleifer (2006) conclude that the theory that ﬁts best with their em-
pirical ﬁndings says that education is a means to acquire social capital, and that
it is social capital that raises civic participation. This ﬁts with the frequent use
of voting turnout as a proxy for social capital (e.g. Guiso et al. 2004). Yet, while
the idea that social capital enhances civic and political participation is widespread,
there is not much robust evidence on the relationship between the components of
social capital (such as trust or reciprocity) and individuals’ democratic attitudes
and civic participation.
This is despite great current interest in the determinants of civil engagement and
political participation, motivated by the decline in participation in some traditional
associations (like political parties) observed in many European countries over the
last decade. Sources and consequences of this development are not immediately
obvious as at the same time, aﬃnity and commitment to new social movements has
remained fairly constant (see Gaiser and de Rijke 2008).
To shed some light on this issue, this paper measures the impact of social capital
on diﬀerent measures of individual civic engagement. In this, we distinguish trust
and reciprocity as components of social capital, and we take into account various
forms of civic engagement of more or less “traditional” character, or degree of in-
stitutionalization. It results that while both components of social capital increase
civic engagement, their eﬀects diﬀer depending on the degree of institutionalization
of the practice under consideration.
To be able to tackle this topic, a good deﬁnition of the concept of social capital is
needed. Following Durlauf and Fafchamps’s (2004) analysis of the leading deﬁnitions
of social capital,1 three main underlying ideas related to the concept of social capital
can be distinguished: (1) social capital generates positive externalities; (2) these
externalities arise through trust and through norms and values of reciprocity and
their eﬀect on expectations and behavior; (3) shared trust, norms and values can
be inﬂuenced by individual characteristics and experiences as well as community
characteristics.
1Their references are Coleman (1990), Putnam (1993), Ostrom (2000) and Putnam (2000).
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In this perspective, a measure of social capital can be based on agents’ levels of
trust, and their norms and values of reciprocity. The concept of “social capital” then
embodies the intuitive notion of consistent underlying attitudes that aﬀect personal
and community interactions. These underlying attitudes are not observable and are
usually thought to matter by aﬀecting “how people spend their resources on others,
how much people invest in each other, and how people can mobilize the resources
of others” (van Schaik 2002). These types of individual behavior lead to positive
externalities.
Good measurement of social capital is particularly important to overcome one
of the critiques directed at the social capital literature, that is that sometimes the
claims done by some researchers are in excess of what is justiﬁed by the statisti-
cal exercises reported (Durlauf and Fafchamps 2004). Barro and McCleary (2002)
similarly claim that although the arguments about the importance of social capital
seem reasonable on an a priori basis, much of the work in this literature is impres-
sionistic, rather than quantitative or rigorous. Also Van Deth (2002), after doing an
analysis of the empirical research on social capital, claims that there is the need for
the application of multi-method and multi-level strategies to obtain good measures
of this concept.
Therefore, one of our goals here is to develop a new measure of the two main com-
ponents of social capital as deﬁned above: trust and norms and values of reciprocity.
We argue that the opinions of individuals about trust and norms of reciprocity re-
ﬂect their attitudes in these two dimensions, and that social capital is an aggregate
of these attitudes. One of the main contributions of this paper is the use of a new
methodology that allows to measure these two attitudes directly. This results in a
measure of the components of social capital that is conceptually cleaner and more
consistent with the theory than the distant proxies or demographic characteristics
often used in previous work. The analysis is performed using data for Germany.
Germany constitutes a good unit of analysis because its past political experience
has given rise to substantial heterogeneity in social capital.
The methodology that we will use in this paper is the one proposed by Spady
(2007), which allows us to get quantitative measures of latent attitudes imposing
very few parametric assumptions. The only assumptions needed are that (1) the
expressions of agreement and disagreement on questions about trust and norms
and values of reciprocity (‘item responses’) reﬂect corresponding attitudes of the
responder; (2) the ‘attitudes’ are enduring individual-speciﬁc attributes, given the
individual’s characteristics and environment. (3) We will use two diﬀerent series of
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item responses, and we will assume that each series has been determined by a sin-
gle attitude. The attitudes of individuals making up a sample population can then
be given probability distributions, based on their item responses and characteris-
tics. These probability distributions can then be used to infer the relation between
attitudes and economic outcomes, be it at the individual or at the aggregate level.
With measures of trust and reciprocity in hand, we analyze their determinants
and their impact on political interest, participation in elections, political involve-
ment, political group membership in Germany and other more occasional forms of
participation like signing a petition or contacting the government or the police. We
ﬁnd that individuals with more trust and more reciprocity tend to participate more
in their societies. Although both components have a positive eﬀect, individuals with
higher levels of trust tend to participate more in more institutionalized activities.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 4.2 we present the con-
ceptual framework for social capital, and give a brief overview of measures of social
capital previously used in the literature. Section 4.3 presents the underlying model
that will guide the estimation, and we describe the methodology used to obtain the
measures of the components of social capital. In Section 4.4 we present the data
used and describe the questionnaire items and the personal and demographic char-
acteristics of the respondents that are related to their latent attitudes. In Section
4.5 we analyze the results obtained from the measurement of trust and reciprocity.
Their relationship to diﬀerent ways of civic engagement is analyzed in Section 4.6.
Finally, Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2. Social Capital: the conceptual framework
Apart from the empirical literature, there has also been a growing interest in
the theoretical and conceptual bases of social capital. Starting from the seminal
contributions of Coleman (1990), Putnam (1993), there has been a proliferation of
slightly diﬀerent approaches and deﬁnitions. Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) review
this literature and extract the principal components, stressing the following three
main underlying ideas: (1) social capital generates positive externalities, (2) these
externalities are achieved through trust, and norms and values of reciprocity and
their consequent eﬀects on expectations and behavior, (3) shared trust, norms, and
values arise from informal forms of organizations based on social networks and as-
sociations. We adopt (1) and (2) and generalize (3) in the sense that while Durlauf
and Fafchamps refer basically to the experience of participating in informal forms of
organizations based on social networks and associations, we look for a more general
approach and assume that there are other characteristics and experiences that may
El-Attar Vilalta, Mayssun (2010), Identification and Estimation of Latent Variables and their Effect on Social and Economic Outcomes 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/182674.2. SOCIAL CAPITAL: THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 127
also have an inﬂuence on the level of social capital.We will consider these three main
ideas as the ’structural’ aspects of the concept and we will let them be the guide
of our empirical approach. Note that (2) implies that there are two dimensions to
social capital.
One main problem of the literature about social capital has been its measure-
ment. Clearly, concepts like trust, norms and values are inherently diﬃcult to
measure. There have been diﬀerent approaches to this, some involving the use of
proxies, that have not always been very rigorous or conceptually satisfactory. The
next few paragraphs give a brief overview of these approaches and critiques to them.
To our knowledge, there are three main approaches to the study of the impact
of social capital on economic outcomes. Two of them proxy social capital, using
outcomes or individual characteristics, and another one uses partial measures from
value surveys.
Proxies for Social Capital: Outcomes. There are many studies that measure
social capital through “indirect” indicators. Sometimes these indicators can be
related to the outcomes of social capital, instead of its components as identiﬁed by
the theoretical literature. One example of this approach is the work of Putnam
(1993) who uses the number of local newspaper’s readers, the voter turn-out in
referendums and the percentage of votes on the political elections as proxies in the
analysis of the impact of social capital on economic performance. The problem with
this approach is that it is not clear what eﬀect is being identiﬁed, as the proxies
themselves may be related to the outcome that is analyzed. In more recent work,
Guiso et al. (2004) avoids this problem. They identify the eﬀect of social capital on
ﬁnancial development by using particular, arguably unrelated outcomes (electoral
participation and blood donation) as proxies for social capital.
While this approach may allow to identify the impact of social capital on eco-
nomic outcomes, it still does not allow for direct measurement of social capital.
This makes it less useful for analysis of the determinants of social capital, or for
comparative or policy-focussed perspectives.
Other authors have studied the eﬀect of religious participation and beliefs; like
Barro and McCleary (2002) who study to what extent religious participation and
beliefs inﬂuence economic performance and political institutions. In this line Berman
et al. (2006) studies the eﬀect of changes in religiosity on fertility for European
Catholic countries. These authors ﬁnd that actually are not the changes in beliefs
and therefore in preferences for children what matter, but rather the decrease in the
social services that Catholic institutions used to oﬀer.
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Proxies for Social Capital: Individual Characteristics. Other papers have
used the participation in social networks as a measure of social capital. A seminal
contribution to this vast literature is the already cited Putnam (1993), who uses the
number of voluntary organizations (sport clubs and cultural circles) in a region as
a proxy for social capital. The problem with this approach is that it does not take
into account the multidimensional character of social capital and that the focus on
some type of network causes loss of generality, which can compromise the eﬀective-
ness of the analysis. Another problem is that there are no theoretical studies that
have provided an explanation of the mechanism through which trust within groups
generalizes to the entire society.
Other authors like Easterly and Levine (1997) and more recently Alesina, Devlee-
shauwer, Easterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg (2003) study the impact of ethnic, linguistic
and religious heterogeneity on the quality of institutions and growth. They believe
that more demographic diversity could bring more political instability, poor quality
of institutions, badly designed economic policy and disappointing economic perfor-
mance. Barro and McCleary (2002) study to what extent religious participation and
beliefs inﬂuence economic performance and political institutions.
In our opinion these studies jump one step in the process. We believe that the
channel at work here is that the degree of fragmentation or religious participation
has an eﬀect on individual latent attitudes (shared trust, and norms and values of
reciprocity), and that these attitudes aﬀect behavior and therefore economic out-
comes. Whereas demographics may provide a clue towards a society’s values and
attitudes, a more direct approach can be used, estimating latent attitudes.
Partial Deﬁnitions: Survey responses. Another approach used in this liter-
ature is to measure social capital as the percentage of people in the population that
claim to trust others. Usually these papers use the World Values Survey (WVS) or
the European Values Survey (EVS) and their question: ‘Generally speaking, would
you say that most people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing
with people?’ Individual responses are then aggregated to a macro measure.
Examples of this approach are found in Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and
Knack (2001) who ﬁnd that trust and civic norms have a strong impact on economic
performance or in Beugelsdijk and van Schaik (2004) who also ﬁnd that at the
regional level, trust and voluntary work are related to economic growth. Also La
Porta et al. (1997) and Fukuyama (1995) follow this approach to examine the eﬀect
of trust in industrial organizations.
The scope of these studies is necessarily limited since they use only one dimension
of social capital: trust. Moreover, the measurement is imperfect, since they use only
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the answer to one question. It is diﬃcult to believe that these are good measures for
the wider concept of social capital, which by deﬁnition is a compilation of diverse
attitudes. The approach we use overcomes these limitations by incorporating more
than one dimension of social capital, and by measuring each using responses to more
than one question. By analyzing the individual and country-level determinants of
social capital, it also addresses the critique of lack of cross-country comparability of
the original trust-based measures aired by Fine (2001).
Our approach oﬀers a new dimension to the study of the social capital. We
develop a more complete measure of the components of social capital, and not just
proxy for it using either outcomes, demographic characteristics, or partial aspects
of social capital. This new measure allows us to obtain the probability distribution
of social capital for each individual. At the same time this approach takes into
consideration the possible inﬂuence of individual characteristics and experiences as
well as community characteristics. Measuring social capital and understanding what
social characteristics lead to more social capital seems useful and important since
social capital is related to positive outcomes.
As a result, an individual measure of social capital and its distribution (not just
the mean) can be characterized, and the importance of its level and dispersion for
economic and social outcomes can be investigated.
4.3. Measuring Trust and Reciprocity using an Item Response Model
In this section, we set up a simple model that will allow us to estimate the latent
attitudes that we identify as the components of social capital and that captures the
three underlying ideas pointed out above. We also explain the methodology that we
use to obtain these estimates.
4.3.1. Setting up the empirical model and some desired properties
Figure 4.2 shows a diagram of the underlying process that we have in mind. We
suppose that every individual has some amount of social capital, which will be a
compilation of his/her attitudes on trust and on norms and values of reciprocity.
These attitudes directly cause the responses to certain survey questions, and have an
eﬀect on the behavior of agents. This behavior may generate positive externalities
for society. In this paper, we will focus on the measurement of social capital and we
will relate it to political engagement.
We also claim that demographic and personal characteristics may be informative
about the way in which latent attitudes are distributed in a population; individual
characteristics and experiences as well as community characteristics can be related
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to how much people trust each other or how much people share values or accept
norms. We assume that these characteristics do not aﬀect the answers directly. If
they have an eﬀect it is through their eﬀect on the attitudes we are measuring here.
In the Data section we will discuss the variables we use to construct these two
scales and we will give a theoretical justiﬁcation of the personal and demographic
characteristics used in our estimation.
Given the restrictions implied by the theoretical model, we can apply the esti-
mation methodology developed by Spady (2007). Given the model we have in mind,
we would like our measure (1) to conform to the notion that there are two dimen-
sions to social capital, (2) to reproduce a given set of cell means or probabilities
(relative frequencies of the items used) and (3) to be able to take into account the
information embodied into the demographic and personal characteristics. The next
paragraphs detail how this can be achieved, following Spady’s (2007) approach.
4.3.1.1. Desired Property I: Two dimensions of social capital. To esti-
mate the two main components of social capital at the individual level we assume
that we can ﬁnd a collection of questions and the corresponding responses (called
‘items’) that depend solely on the individual’s trust. We can ﬁnd another collection
of ‘items’ that depend solely on the individual’s norms and values of reciprocity.
The attitude in each dimension will be inferred from answers to these collections of
items. We believe that the probability distribution of the responses is determined
solely by an individual’s value on each attitude scale. Therefore individuals with the
same value for the attitude have the same probability distribution of responses for
the items that solely reﬂect that attitude. This means that we expect individuals
that have more trust in others (to focus on one scale, for the sake of concreteness) to
answer, on average, higher values on the items deﬁning the ’trust’ scale (by conven-
tion, higher values indicate more trust in others). Given a collection of responses,
the mapping from attitudes to responses can be inverted, resulting in probability
distributions over attitudes, conditional on the responses. Probability distributions
over attitudes a for responses indicating more trust then stochastically dominate the
distribution for responses indicating less trust.2 A ﬁnal point to note is that since
item responses are categorical, the ’scaling’ of a is arbitrary.3
4.3.1.2. Desired Property II: Reproducing Relative Frequencies of the
Item Responses. The second desired property of our measure is that it should
2A formal exposition of how this stochastic dominance structure across items determines a
monotonic scale representation is contained in Spady (2006).
3Spady (2007) shows that the ’scaling’ of a is arbitrary, in the sense that if a ﬁgure such as
Figure 4.1 exists for a particular scheme of assigning numbers to a, then there will be ﬁgures with
the required properties for any strictly monotonically increasing transformation of a.
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reproduce a given set of cell means or probabilities (relative frequencies of the items
used). This is the goodness-of-ﬁt criterion of the estimator employed here.
For concreteness, focus again on the trust scale. For that scale, we will use
a collection of 8 items, each of them with 3 categorical responses, therefore there
are 38 = 6561 possible combinations of responses. Each of these combinations
occurs with some relative frequency. We call these relative frequencies ‘cells.’4 For a
particular value of the attitude on trust, say a, there is a probability distribution of
item responses, and therefore a probability distribution over these 6.561 ‘cells’ that
depends solely on the individual attitude on trust. The probability distribution
generated by our measure should match the relative frequencies observed in the
sample.
As an example consider a hypothetical case with only two item responses with 3
categorical responses each, and 100 individuals. Table 4.1 represents the table with
the relative frequencies for these two items. In that case we have 32 = 9 cells or
possible combinations. Concerning the ordering of the responses, since we assume
that higher values indicate more trust in others, we could order the combination of
responses as a function of the level of trust that they represent.
In the example we believe that the two items are determined by the individual’s
attitude on trust a. The probability of a particular response pattern (or cell) con-
ditional on a is simply the product of the constituent item probabilities.5 That is,
we assume (for m items),
p(r1,r2,...,rm|a) = p(r1|a)p(r2|a)...p(rm|a). (4.1)
We can represent the results in Figure 4.1. The ﬁrst box shows the probability
of answering 1, 2 or 3 in item 1 as a function of an individual’s attitude a, where
the lowest line represents the probability of answering 1, the diﬀerence between the
second and the lowest one the probability of answering 2, and the diﬀerence between
1 and the second line the probability of answering 3. The second box shows the same
for item 2.
The model will have a better ﬁt when the estimated probabilities represented in
Figure 4.1 have a good match with Table 4.1. The requirement that the responses
of those with more trust in others stochastically dominate those with less trust in
others is precisely that the lines in Figure 4.1 have to be weakly decreasing, and
they must not cross.
4For the case of norms and values of reciprocity, we use 6 items, each one with 3 categorical
responses. In that case we have 36 = 729 ’cells’
5We assume independence across the item responses.
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4.3.1.3. Desired Property III: Including Demographic Characteristics
in the Estimation. The latent attitudes that we are estimating are not observable.
What we can actually observe are the item responses and observable individual char-
acteristics (such as age, education, income, etc.). We now assume that individual i
has certain characteristics Wi, and that the distribution f(·) of the latent attitudes
can be inﬂuenced by these characteristics Wi, that means f(a|Wi). Concretely,
as the theoretical model implies, suppose that W gives rise to social experiences,
and consequently attitudes may change; the attitudes are then reﬂected in item







Equation 4.3 is used to estimate simultaneously how W aﬀects a and how a aﬀects
item responses. We specify that f(a|W) is represented by a N(µ(W),σ(W)), where
µ(W) = Wβ (4.4)
log(σ(W)) = Wγ (4.5)
That means that a is normal with a mean that is a linear function of the W vari-
ables and a standard deviation whose logarithm is linear in the same W variables.
Equations 4.4 and 4.5 imply that f(a|W) is a N(0,1) for the ’standardized respon-
dent’ and that the diﬀerent groups of the population, characterized by diﬀerent W,
are also normally distributed with possibly diﬀerent values of location µ and scale
σ.6
4.3.2. Estimation Method
We will estimate the item response models by maximum likelihood, subject to
the constraint that the distribution functions (the lines that indicate the probability
of answering j in item k) be downward sloping and not crossing.
The probability densities of the item responses as a function of the attitude
are approximated using exponential tilting of second degree. Exponential tilting
of degree n involves approximating a density function using the product of the
uniform pdf and a polynomial of degree n. Subtracting the cumulative distributions
6The ’standardized respondent’ will be a single man who lives in a town or city, is 46.68 years
old, has primary education, has an intensity of religion of 3.8, a value of 4.48 on a left-right scale
of self-proclaimed political attitude, and who does not belong to a discriminated group. (This is
not the average person but the reference person.)
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corresponding to these densities from 1, we obtain downward sloping lines. The
units of measurement are then transformed into [−∞,∞] by the normal distribution
function. To ensure that they do not cross, the lines of the boxes are constructed
as products of the ﬁrst lines.




has been carried out using a gaussian quadrature at 200 grid points. To ensure that
we can collect even the distributions with small variances, the gaussian quadrature
has been applied to 5 diﬀerent segments of the grid, with the one in the middle
having more points.
The parameters obtained are the ones describing the distribution functions as
well as the parameters associated to the personal characteristics (2 per characteristic,
indicating eﬀect on location and scale). Since we use exponential tilting of second
degree, we estimate two parameters per line and box for the distribution functions.
4.4. Data and Descriptive Statistics
To estimate social capital we use the second wave of the European Social Survey
(ESS). The ESS is a recent data set covering 25 European Countries in 2004/05.
We use the information related to Germany because we think that the diﬀerences
in past political experiences of its regions can have lead to diﬀerences in the social
capital components’ distributions. This makes this country particularly interesting.
The ESS provides rich information on several aspects of interest to social scientists.
In this round, the questionnaire includes, for the ﬁrst time, a module on Economic
morality: Trust and interactions between producers and consumers. This module is
designed to investigate the normative and moral culture of markets and consump-
tion in European countries and is useful for us because it has some questions about
the level of trust and conﬁdence in business and state/government institutions, and
solicits general normative statement from individuals. In addition, the ESS also
contains information about some demographic variables. Corresponding to the the-
oretical model, some of these (described below) will also be used in the estimation.
To measure the two components of social capital, shared trust, and norms and
values of reciprocity, we choose questions/items related to them. The original word-
ing of the questions/items we use to estimate the individual’s trust and reciprocity
are shown in the appendix.
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Summary statistics of the responses to the considered items are presented in
Table 4.2. Scales are recoded such that each item has three possible answers (1-
3 scale).7 The low (high) score corresponds to a lower (higher) level of trust or
norms of reciprocity. Even inside each scale the answering behavior varies over
these items. Considering for instance the question ”Most People would try to be
fair” and the question ”Can politicians be trusted?”, the means range from 2.19 to
1.35. This indicates that diﬀerent items carry information on respondents’ attitudes
to a varying degree. Thus, by focussing on just one or on a narrow subset of these
items, valuable information might be lost. Table 4.4 show the pairwise correlation
coeﬃcients for the items used to build the two scales.
Table 4.3 contains summary statistics of the personal and demographic char-
acteristics that we expect to be related to an individual’s level of social capital.
The reasons why we would expect these factors to be related and to give us extra
information about the latent attitudes are given in the following. Whether these
relationships hold in the data is an empirical question on which our analysis can
shed some light.
Intensity of religion. Barro and McCleary (2002) study to what extent reli-
gious participation and beliefs inﬂuence economic performance and political insti-
tutions. It seems plausible that possible eﬀects of religion on economic outcomes
are via social capital. The concept of religion is linked to the concept of community
and presupposes immaterial links between members of the community. So it could
be argued that more religious people will tend to have a higher level of shared trust
and will share more norms and values of reciprocity. Empirical evidence also sug-
gests this idea: Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003) ﬁnd that religious aﬃliation
and participation is positively correlated with attitudes that are more favorable to
cooperation and economic growth. Moreover, survey evidence shows that religious
participation is associated with charitable giving and volunteering (Putnam (2000),
Brooks (2003) and Brooks (2005)). The question we use from the EES is: “Regard-
less of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you
are?” (Scale from 0 to 10.)
Age. Since attitudes might change over the life cycle due to personal experience
but also due to national and global developments, we think that the age of respon-
dents can be informative. In addition, there may be cohort eﬀects. Since our data
set is only a cross section, it is unfortunately impossible to disentangle life cycle and
cohort eﬀects.
7The recodiﬁcation does not matter for our estimation.
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Political orientation (left vs right). We believe that the information about
the political orientation can be informative of the attitudes of the person. On the
one hand we could think that more conservative people attach more importance to
traditions and have a stronger feeling of belonging to a community. That could
increase the level of trust in others, and increase the level of social capital asso-
ciated to these people. On the other hand, left-wing parties deﬁne themselves by
their concern for the wellbeing of others, and therefore may have stronger values of
reciprocity. The question we will use from the EES is: ”In politics people sometimes
talk of ”left” and ”right”. Where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0
means the left and 10 means the right?”
Living in a village. As argued e.g. by La Porta et al. (1997), repeated interac-
tion and small size of a local community can enhance trust and the sharing of norms
and values of reciprocity. In particular, this could be the case for people living in
villages.
Income. Since most determinants of income are also included as controls, the
income coeﬃcient should mainly reﬂect luck. Here it seems reasonable that peo-
ple that faced more negative shocks have lower levels of trust and possibly also of
reciprocity.
Discrimination. Members of a group that has historically felt discriminated
will probably not expect to be treated fairly in the future and therefore may trust
less. The question we will use from the EES is: ”Would you describe yourself as
being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country? (yes/no)”
We also control for gender, education, marital status and region of residence, as
they can inﬂuence the experiences faced during life.
4.5. Estimates of trust and reciprocity
Figure 4.3 shows the estimates for the item response models (equations 4.3 to
4.5) for the items representing the Trust scale. Table 4.5 shows the eﬀect of W on
the location (µ) and scale (σ) of a.
The eﬀects are additive, which means that statements such as ‘females have more
trust in others’ must be understood in a ’ceteris paribus’ sense Spady (2007). The
eﬀect of Age,8 Intensity of Religion and the left-right scale are shown in Figure 4.4.
The main points of interest are the following:
8Notice that the variables presented in the tables are
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(1) The hierarchy (most important ﬁrst) among social concepts in determining
trust is as follows: belonging to a discriminated group, education, group of
income and gender.
(2) The signs of the coeﬃcients are close to what we would expect: belonging
to a discriminated group has an important negative eﬀect on trust.
(3) Education is important, with a positive eﬀect on trust.
(4) Women trust more than men.
(5) People with higher income levels also tend to have more trust.
(6) Age has an eﬀect on trust. The young and the old have more trust than
the middle-aged.
(7) The intensity of religion has the expected eﬀect, more religious people tend
to trust others more.
(8) As to political orientation, people that identify with more extreme values
have less trust in others. The level of trust decreases particularly rapidly
for those that identify with the far-right. This eﬀect is stronger than that
of belonging to a discriminated group. The highest value is reached in the
center-left.
The second part of Table 4.5 gives the estimates of the demographic and personal
variables on the variability or heterogeneity (σ) of the attitude trust. The main
points of interest are the following:
(1) Being female reduces heterogeneity.
(2) Trust varies less among older respondents.
Table 4.6 shows the estimated eﬀects of demographic and personal variables on
norms and values of reciprocity. Though many signs are similar to the ones obtained
for trust, a few are diﬀerent, and the hierarchy of the eﬀects is not the same. As
before, the eﬀects of the three continuous variables are shown in Figure 4.6. We
highlight the following points:
(1) In determining the attitudes on norms and values of reciprocity, the hier-
archy among personal and demographic concepts is as follows: belonging
to a discriminated group matters most, then the level of education, then
gender, being married and income.
(2) Belonging to a discriminated group reduces the disposition to accept norms
and values of reciprocity.
(3) Education is an important determinant, with a strong positive eﬀect.
(4) Women have a signiﬁcantly higher acceptance of norms and have higher
values of reciprocity.
(5) Low income respondents are less disposed to follow norms of reciprocity.
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(6) About Age, we see that the curve takes a very diﬀerent shape than that
for trust. Here, the shape is much more linear, indicating that older people
(but not the young) tend to believe that rules and norms of reciprocity are
more important.
(7) The eﬀect of religion is similar compared to that for trust; more religious
people tend to have higher values of norms and values of reciprocity.
(8) The eﬀect of political orientation is similar to the case of trust; right-wing
people value less the norms and the idea of reciprocity. Being extreme left-
wing is also negatively related to norms and values of reciprocity. Again
the highest value is reached in the center-left. Moreover, being left-wing is
positively correlated with the level of education, reinforcing this eﬀect even
more.
The second part of Table 4.6 shows the heterogeneity of the diﬀerent social
groups in their attitude to reciprocity. The main result here is that the groups of
women, of married people, and of older people are all more homogenous.
Using the estimated coeﬃcients shown in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 we can calculate the
estimated distribution of the attitudes for diﬀerent demographic groups. Therefore,
the question that can be answered with Figures 4.7 and 4.8 is: How does changing the
reference group’s characteristics in one dimension aﬀect its distribution of attitudes?
These ﬁgures show the estimated attitude distribution of the reference group
(black line) and the estimated attitude distribution of other groups that have the
same characteristics except for the one under analysis (blue and red lines). In the
panel for diﬀerent levels of income, the blue line represent households with a low
income and the red line households with high income. In the panel for diﬀerent levels
of education, the blue line represents the individuals with secondary education, the
red line those with tertiary education.
From all these ﬁgures we can infer the distribution of trust and reciprocity for
some “ideal types”, shown in Figure 4.9. The ﬁgure at the left corresponds to a
young, single, low-education, low-income, non-religious, right-wing male who lives in
Berlin. The ﬁgure in the middle corresponds to an old married female with secondary
education, average income, right-wing political attitudes, who is intensively religious
and lives in a Bavarian village. The third one corresponds to a married middle aged
man, highly educated and with high income, politically in the center, moderately
religious, living in a metropolitan area of Nordrhein-Westfalen. Without considering
their answers, Figure 4.9 shows the distribution we would infer for those types of
people.
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4.5.1. Comparisons across respondents
Up to now we have considered the distribution of attitudes across members of
speciﬁc demographic groups. One of the advantages of the methodology that we
are using is that we can obtain the estimated distribution of both attitudes for each
individual. Applying Bayes’ Law, the distribution of the attitude a for an individual











The elements of this expression have all been estimated previously; p(r|W) is
given as
R
p(r|a)f(a|W)da in equation 4.3.
It is interesting to notice that in estimating f(a|W,r) we use all the information
we have; the personal characteristics and the item responses. One could think that
thanks to the exercise performed up to now, it would be suﬃcient to use only the
personal characteristics to know the distribution of a for each respondent. In that
case we would be saying that it is enough to compute f(a|W). The problem is that
if someone gives surprising answers, then it might be that f(a|W,r) will have higher
dispersion than f(a|W). Its estimated location can also be moved. Therefore it
seems reasonable to think that f(a|W,r) will be the most informative measure we
can get.
Consider an example. Respondent 21 is a married woman, is 53 years old, has
high income, tertiary studies, lives in a city or town and does not belong to a discrim-
inated group. On the intensity of religion scale (0-10) she situates herself at level 9
and on the left-right scale she situates herself as 3. Respondent 115 is a single woman,
she is 35 years old, has a high income, tertiary education, lives in a city or town and
does not belong to a discriminated group. In the intensity of religion scale she situ-
ates herself at level 0 and in the left-right scale she situates herself at 5. The vector
of responses for trust and reciprocity scales are [2,1,1,1,2,1,1,2] and [2,2,2,3,2,2]
respectively for respondent 21 and [3,3,2,3,3,2,2,2] and [1,2,2,2,2,2] for respon-
dent 115.
Figure 4.10 clearly shows the importance of using two diﬀerent dimensions of
social capital: While respondent 21 has a higher level of reciprocity compared to
trust, this is the opposite for respondent 115. Hence, using only one dimension can
be misleading. This conﬁrms the commonly accepted idea that social capital is a
multidimensional concept and that using only partial measures is not suﬃcient for
obtaining a general characterization of an individual’s level of social capital.
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4.5.2. Comparisons across regions
To study how the distribution of trust and reciprocity varies across regions in
Germany, it is not enough to look at the coeﬃcients reported in Tables 4.5 and
4.6. These coeﬃcients represent the ﬁxed eﬀect of each region, so they could reﬂect
e.g. diﬀerences in institutions, in labor market conditions, or in income and ethnic
inequalities. But it is clear that the level of trust and reciprocity of each region will
also depend on the characteristics of its inhabitants. In Figure 4.11, we show the
pattern of region ﬁxed eﬀects (ﬁgures at the left) and the pattern of levels of trust
and reciprocity across regions (ﬁgures at the right).
It is clear that diﬀerences due to regional speciﬁcities are not so important. The
regions colored in grey are the ones for which the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from the reference region, Bavaria. The coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly higher
for regions colored in black, and signiﬁcantly lower for those colored light grey.
When using the individual measures of the attitudes,9 diﬀerent patterns emerge.
The Eastern regions exhibit a lot of heterogeneity that is diﬃcult to synthesize.
There is more of a clear pattern for the regions in the West. For trust, we observe
that there is an East-West division (within the West). For reciprocity, there is a
North-South division. As a conjecture and for future work, this pattern might come
from diﬀerences in religion. If the intensity of religion does not aﬀect reciprocity in
the same way for the diﬀerent type of religions, then it is possible that this pattern
reﬂects diﬀerences between catholics and protestants.
4.5.3. A Two-Dimensional Index of Social Capital
The deﬁnition of social capital that we use says suppose that social capital has
two components; trust and reciprocity. We have used a collection of items r[at] and
r[ar] to estimate ‘attitudes on trust’ and ‘attitudes on reciprocity’, with no overlap
of items. In this section we would like to estimate the joint distribution f(at,ar|W)
of these two components. For this, we proceed under the following assumptions:
p(r[at]|at,ar,W) = p(r[at]|at,W) (4.7)
p(r[ar]|at,ar,W) = p(r[ar]|ar,W) (4.8)
Thus we assume that if we know the attitude on trust, the knowledge of the attitude
on reciprocity is irrelevant to the responses pertaining to the trust scale. Therefore
9Mean levels of Trust: white (<0), light grey (0-0.1), grey (0.1-0.2) and black (+0.2). Mean
levels of Reciprocity: light grey (0-0.2), grey (0.2-0.4) and black (+0.4).
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where the [r1 ...rm] are the responses to trust and [rm + 1...rM] are the responses
to reciprocity. The elements p(r1|at)...p(rm|at) and p(rm+1|ar)...p(rM|ar) have
already been estimated. We have speciﬁed f(at,ar|W) as having normal margins.
For this exercise at and ar have been scaled to be uniforms (0,1) separately. We can
completely specify f(at,ar|W) in the original ‘normal’ space by simply supplying






Figures 4.12 and 4.13 show the estimated joint density function. Notice that trust
and reciprocity have been scaled on (0,1), i.e. as ‘percentiles’, and the height of
the ﬁgure is the corresponding density. We observe that trust and reciprocity are
positively correlated since the density at (1,1) and (0,0) is very high, while the
density at (1,0) and (0,1) is very low. If the joint distribution was perfectly uniform,
the plot would be a horizontal line at 1. This graph also shows that there is an large
amount of people situated in the middle of the distribution.
4.6. The Eﬀect of Social Capital on Civic Engagement
The theoretical literature has argued that social capital generates positive ex-
ternalities. The spillovers of social capital have been considered important for ex-
plaining economic outcomes. For example, social capital is thought to increase the
probability that an individual will engage in civic participation, taking part in deci-
sions on policy issues that aﬀect the economic and social outcomes. This may occur
for instance through higher voting turn-out. This increase in civic participation can
improve the decision making and the quality of political decisions. By this process,
social capital creates an externality that may beneﬁt all citizens.
To test this hypothesis we study the relationship between individuals’ trust and
reciprocity and the probability that they participate actively in the society. We
compute the mean of the estimated probability distribution of trust and reciprocity
for each individual, and we then use these estimates to explain civic participation.
El-Attar Vilalta, Mayssun (2010), Identification and Estimation of Latent Variables and their Effect on Social and Economic Outcomes 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/182674.6. THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL CAPITAL ON CIVIC ENGAGEMENT 141
We classify civic participation as a function of its formality. We use as indicators
the following questions:
• Are you a member of any political party? (Yes/No)
• Did you vote in the last national election in [month/year]? (Yes/No)
• How interested would you say you are in politics? (scale from 1 to 4)
• During the last 12 months, have you contacted a politician, government or
local government oﬃcial?
• During the last 12 months, have you signed a petition?
• During the last 12 months, have you boycotted certain products?
Tables 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9 present the ﬁndings for the relationship between trust
and reciprocity and civic participation. These tables show a positive association
between the components of social capital and the political engagement variables.
They also show that trust and reciprocity can explain part of the eﬀect often attrib-
uted to human capital. The coeﬃcient associated to human capital, although still
signiﬁcant, shrinks when the variables reﬂecting social capital are introduced in the
regression. This result gives support to the hypothesis formulated by Glaeser et al.
(2006). They sustain that more educated individuals tend to be politically more
active because due to their higher levels of social capital, they have lower costs of
socialization.
The tables also show that the diﬀerent components of social capital can have
a diﬀerent eﬀect on the diﬀerent forms of participation. We ﬁnd that people with
more trust in others, and in institutions, choose “more institutional” ways of partic-
ipating. Figure 4.14 shows the eﬀect of trust and reciprocity on the diﬀerent forms
of participation. People with high levels of reciprocity will also tend to participate
more, but if their levels of trust are not so high, they may choose a more informal
(less traditional) way of doing it.
There are good reasons to think that people who trust others more and who share
more norms and values of reciprocity will tend to participate more, and to have more
interest in politics. It is possible that more traditional forms of participation lead
to higher personal beneﬁts. They might help people’s careers, for instance. Then
individuals with more trust in institutions will expect a higher return from their
participation. This explanation is consistent with the results that we obtain. A
diﬀerent explanation could be that people who think that others act helpfully and
in a decent way, ﬁnd the need to participate and invest time in producing collective
goods, as a matter of ethics. If this hypothesis was true, then we would expect to
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of trust in the more informal ways of participating. This is
not what we observe, see Table 4.9.
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It is also possible that people whose acceptance of norms and values of reciprocity
is higher may see participation in politics as a duty. And they participate even in
activities that are less rewarding individually. This could explain the stronger eﬀect
of reciprocity in explaining the participation in less traditional ways.
For the regions in the East,the low participation in elections can be explained
by a lower level of trust. This could reﬂect the fact that institutions have changed
recently in these regions. Individuals may show low levels of trust because of their
idea of the former institutions and because of the unknownness of the new ones.
4.7. Conclusions
In this paper we have applied a new methodology to measure the components of
social capital: trust and reciprocity. This methodology is conceptually cleaner than
previously used methods since it allows estimating social capital directly (and not
a proxy) as a latent attitude, describing a simple underlying model, and without
imposing parametric assumptions. In line with the theoretical literature on social
capital, the model allows social capital to be multi-dimensional (using trust and
reciprocity as its dimensions), avoiding problems of other papers that use more
partial measures.
In measuring the components of social capital, we exploit information on agents’
attitudes contained in survey responses, and information from personal and demo-
graphic characteristics. This allows to see the probability distribution of the latent
attitudes, conditional on these characteristics. In particular, education, gender, age,
income, intensity of religion, political orientation, and being from a discriminated
group can explain part of the distribution of trust and reciprocity. Regional charac-
teristics, on the other hand, do not explain much about these attitudes in Germany.
There is a growing literature on the impact of social capital on social and eco-
nomic outcomes. In this paper, we have focussed on measuring its impact on civic
and political engagement, ﬁnding that trust and reciprocity have diﬀerent eﬀects
on diﬀerent forms of civic participation. People with more trust in others, and in
the institutions, choose more institutional ways of participating. People with high
levels of reciprocity also tend to participate more, but if their levels of trust are not
so high, they may choose a more informal way of doing so. For the regions in the
East, the low participation in elections can be explained by a lower level of trust.
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Appendix
Appendix 4.A. Original wording of the questions/items used
Items used to estimate the individuals’ attitudes on trust:
• Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that
you can’t be to careful in dealing with people?10 (Score of 0 to 10, where 0
means you can’t be too careful and 10 means most people can be trusted.)
• Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they
got the chance, or would they try to be fair?11 (Score of 0 to 10, where 0
means most people would try to take advantage of me and 10 means most
people would try to be fair.)
• Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they
are mostly looking out for themselves?12 (Score of 0 to 10, where 0 means
people mostly look out for themselves and 10 means people mostly try to
be helpful.)
• Please tell me how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read
out. (Score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you do not trust an institution at all,
and 10 means you have complete trust.)
– the legal system
– politicians
• How much would you trust the following groups to deal honestly with people
like you? (Score of 1 to 5, where 1 means you distrust and 5 means you
trust a lot.)
– plumbers, builders, car mechanics and other repair people13
– ﬁnancial companies such as banks or insurers.
– public oﬃcials14
10Cant be too careful: need to be wary or always somewhat suspicious.
11Take advantage: exploit or cheat; fair: in the sense of treat appropriately and straightforwardly.
12The intended contrast is between self-interest and altruistic helpfulness.
13Builders include all kinds of tradespeople who work on building sites.
14Public oﬃcials refers to both government oﬃcials, such as custom oﬃcers and to local oﬃcials,
such as housing/building regulators etc.
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Items used to estimate the individuals’ attitudes on norms and values of reci-
procity:
• How much do you agree or disagree with this statement: Citizens should
spend at least some of their free time helping others. (Score of 1 to 5, where
1 means agree strongly and 5 means disagree strongly.)
• How wrong, if at all, do you consider the following ways of behaving to be?
(Score of 1 to 4, where 1 means not wrong at all and 4 means seriously
wrong.)
– Someone making an exaggerated or false insurance claim.
– A public oﬃcial asking someone for a favor or bribe in return for their
services.
• How much do you agree or disagree with these statements about how people
see rules and norms?
– If you want to make money you can’t always act honestly.
– Occasionally, it is alright to ignore the law and do what you want to
do.
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Appendix 4.B. Tables and Figures
Table 4.1. Table with relative frequencies for a 2 item example.
r1
1 2 3
1 0.16 0.12 0.05
r2 2 0.11 0.18 0.10
3 0.03 0.11 0.14










































Figure 4.1. Probability Distributions of answering 1, 2 or 3 in the
two items considered as example
W [a] r
cause cause















Figure 4.2. Diagram of the underlying process.
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Table 4.2. Descriptive Statistics of the questions used from the ESS.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Shared Trust
Most People Can be Trust 1880 1.889 0.808 1 3
Most People are Fair 1880 2.194 0.784 1 3
Most People are helpful 1880 1.791 0.769 1 3
Trust Legal System 1880 2.105 0.835 1 3
Trust Politicians 1880 1.354 0.597 1 3
Trust Repair People 1880 2.059 0.848 1 3
Trust Banks 1880 1.853 0.825 1 3
Trust Public Oﬃcials 1880 2.218 0.762 1 3
Reciprocity
Better More Time Helping Others 1880 1.851 0.583 1 3
Better Not Cheat Taxes 1880 1.863 0.653 1 3
Bad Make False Insurance 1880 2.080 0.632 1 3
Bad Public Oﬃcial Bribe 1880 2.708 0.515 1 3
Possible Make Money Honesty 1880 2.353 0.600 1 3
Obey Law Always 1880 2.218 0.762 1 3
Table 4.3. Descriptive Statistics for the Personal and Demographic
Characteristics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Female 0.482 0.500 0 1
Married 0.568 0.496 0 1
Age 42.961 13.269 18 65
Low Income 0.110 0.312 0 1
Medium Income 0.484 0.500 0 1
Highe Income 0.221 0.415 0 1
Primary Degree 0.091 0.288 0 1
Secondary Degree 0.659 0.474 0 1
Higher Degree 0.248 0.432 0 1
Village 0.280 0.449 0 1
Intensity Religion 3.702 2.923 0 10
Discriminated Group 0.040 0.197 0 1
Left-Right 4.449 1.792 0 10
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Figure 4.3. Estimates of the item response model for the items con-
stituting a scale on shared trust.
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Table 4.5. Estimated Coeﬃcients for the Personal and Demographic
Characteristics. Trust Scale.
Standard Errors
Mean Coeﬃcient Outer Product Hessian White Robust
Married -0.0360 0.0538 0.0531 0.0572
Female 0.0924 0.0452 0.0430 0.0444
Age -0.0003 0.0018 0.0018 0.0019
Agesq.01 0.0311 0.0124 0.0119 0.0122
Income1 -0.1006 0.0673 0.0728 0.0824
Income3 0.1306 0.0584 0.0536 0.0512
PrimaryDegree -0.3727 0.1940 0.2226 0.2638
HigherDegree 0.2748 0.0532 0.0501 0.0496
Village 0.0374 0.0520 0.0498 0.0500
IntensityReligion 0.0489 0.0090 0.0090 0.0094
IntRelig.01 0.0490 0.2936 0.2777 0.2749
DiscriminatedGroup -0.5853 0.1166 0.1150 0.1175
LeftRight -0.0348 0.0126 0.0124 0.0129
LeftRight.01 -1.3923 0.4078 0.4208 0.4556
Schleswig-Holstein 0.0626 0.1461 0.1432 0.1460
Hamburg -0.0614 0.2539 0.1776 0.1338
Niedersachsen 0.0785 0.0933 0.0922 0.0961
Bremen -0.2093 0.3457 0.2885 0.2501
Nordrhein-Westfalen 0.1838 0.0731 0.0746 0.0803
Hessen -0.0032 0.1006 0.1035 0.1107
Rheinland-Pfalz 0.2387 0.1201 0.1257 0.1381
Baden-W¨ urttemberg 0.1050 0.0868 0.0876 0.0919
Saarland 0.3032 0.2501 0.2241 0.2070
Berlin -0.1931 0.1040 0.1027 0.1065
Brandenburg 0.0247 0.1048 0.1142 0.1333
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 0.3119 0.1245 0.1186 0.1166
Sachsen 0.0541 0.0967 0.0929 0.0954
Sachsen-Anhalt 0.0327 0.1011 0.1014 0.1069
Th¨ uringen 0.0774 0.1169 0.1058 0.1023
Variance Coeﬃcient Outer Product Hessian White Robust
Married -0.1925 0.0559 0.0514 0.0507
Female -0.1563 0.0542 0.0492 0.0489
Age 0.0068 0.0022 0.0021 0.0021
Agesq.01 -0.0606 0.0157 0.0140 0.0136
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Figure 4.4. The eﬀect of the three continuous demographic vari-
ables: Age, Intensity of Religion, Left-Right Scale.






















































































































































Figure 4.5. Estimates of the item response model for the items con-
stituting a scale on norms and values of reciprocity.
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Table 4.6. Estimated Coeﬃcients for the Personal and Demographic
Characteristics. Norms and Values of Reciprocity Scale.
Standard Errors
Mean Coeﬃcient Outer Product Hessian White Robust
Married 0.1152 0.0604 0.0573 0.0594
Female 0.2726 0.0505 0.0497 0.0556
Age 0.0123 0.0022 0.0021 0.0021
Agesq.01 -0.0085 0.0133 0.0134 0.0156
Income1 -0.0365 0.0865 0.0789 0.0749
Income3 0.0707 0.0597 0.0577 0.0598
PrimaryDegree -0.4546 0.2423 0.2428 0.2504
HigherDegree 0.2236 0.0556 0.0530 0.0536
Village -0.0210 0.0558 0.0538 0.0545
IntensityReligion 0.0486 0.0095 0.0095 0.0102
IntRelig.01 0.4914 0.2899 0.2865 0.2978
DiscriminatedGroup -0.2847 0.1408 0.1247 0.1194
LeftRight -0.0228 0.0131 0.0132 0.0141
LeftRight.01 -0.7852 0.4295 0.4471 0.5004
Schleswig-Holstein 0.1503 0.1716 0.1513 0.1380
Hamburg 0.4867 0.1810 0.1860 0.2006
Niedersachsen 0.1882 0.1121 0.0998 0.0937
Bremen 0.2589 0.2784 0.3031 0.3453
Nordrhein-Westfalen 0.0391 0.0803 0.0807 0.0859
Hessen -0.0240 0.1210 0.1112 0.1078
Rheinland-Pfalz -0.0721 0.1391 0.1393 0.1442
Baden-W¨ urttemberg 0.0282 0.0953 0.0945 0.0982
Saarland 0.4291 0.2214 0.2434 0.2720
Berlin -0.0394 0.1126 0.1106 0.1137
Brandenburg -0.1876 0.1197 0.1211 0.1292
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 0.6073 0.1445 0.1259 0.1189
Sachsen 0.3692 0.1007 0.0972 0.0976
Sachsen-Anhalt 0.0237 0.1112 0.1092 0.1134
Th¨ uringen 0.2026 0.1135 0.1098 0.1110
Variance Coeﬃcient Outer Product Hessian White Robust
Married -0.2103 0.0689 0.0582 0.0528
Female -0.2133 0.0672 0.0570 0.0520
Age -0.0035 0.0030 0.0027 0.0027
Agesq.01 -0.0662 0.0182 0.0165 0.0161
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Figure 4.6. The eﬀect of the three continuous demographic vari-
ables: Age, Intensity of Religion, Left-Right Scale
























































































Figure 4.7. Eﬀects of demographics on the attitudes on Trust
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Figure 4.8. Eﬀects of demographics on the attitudes on Norms and
Values of Reciprocity





























































































Figure 4.9. Distribution of Trust and Reciprocity for some individ-
ual ideal types
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Figure 4.10. Probability density distribution of the latent attitudes
for two respondents.




Figure 4.11. Level of Trust and Reciprocity for each region from
grey (less scale) to black (more scale)
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Figure 4.12. Joint Distribution of Trust and Reciprocity, scaled to
uniform marginals.



















Figure 4.13. Countorplot of the Joint Distribution of Trust and
Reciprocity. Scaled to uniform marginals.
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Interest in Politics Contact policeman Sign Petition Boycot products
Effect of Trust Effect of Reciprocity
Figure 4.14. The eﬀect of Trust and Reciprocity on diﬀerent forms
of civic participation.
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